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Chapter 1
Introduction
Originally, the class of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models dates
back to Kydland & Prescott (1982) who first introduced real shocks into the
neoclassical growth model under the assumption of completely flexible prices in order
to create business cycle fluctuations. Hence, this class of models is also known as Real
Business Cycle (RBC) models. Over the past two decades, DSGE models have become
state of the art in the (Quantitative) Macroeconomic literature, varying in their degrees
of complexity as well as in their specific focus of application.
Rotemberg & Woodford (1997) were the first to enhance these DSGE models
by monopolistic competition in spirit of Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) and by nominal
rigidities in terms of Calvo (1983) contracts. Differing from the original RBC liter-
ature, these two assumptions render money non-neutral (in the short run), which has
crucial implications on the effectiveness of monetary policy as laid out by Clarida et
al. (1999). The state-of-the-art reference on the methodology of these so-called New
Keynesian models still is the celebrated research monograph by Woodford (2003).
Meanwhile, a very accessible textbook for graduate students on New Keynesian mod-
eling is available with Gal´ı (2008).
With their famous redux model, Obstfeld & Rogoff (1995) pioneered New Open
Economy Macroeconomics by enriching the traditional Open Economy Macroeconomic
literature of the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch type as they first applied the DSGE struc-
ture to a two-country setting. Numerous authors have contributed to this topic, which
continues to appeal to a wide range of scholars. In consequence, various survey articles
and even survey book chapters on open-economy DSGE models have come up over
time such as Obstfeld & Rogoff (1996, chapter 10), Lane (2001), Engel (2002),
Walsh (2003, chapter 6), or Gal´ı (2008, chapter 7).
Chapter 2 of this dissertation develops a small-scale two-country DSGE model that
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is characterized by diverging interest-rate rules. These diverging interest-rate rules
represent the differing statutes of the two central banks under scrutiny, the European
Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve System (Fed).
Both RBC and New Keynesian models are micro-founded, i.e. most of the model
equations are derived from optimizing behavior on the part of the economy’s agents
within a dynamic setting. Hence, the models’ structural or deep parameters directly
stem, e.g., from the households’ utility function or the firms’ profit function. Estimating
these structural parameters should then mitigate the Lucas (1976) critique as opposed
to traditional large-scale Macroeconometric models which consisted of a collection of
purely ad-hoc equations.
Due to the effectiveness of monetary policy in New Keynesian models, customized
models such as the New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) for the Euro area (see Christof-
fel et al. 2008) are used nowadays by virtually every central bank in the world. These
institutions are usually interested in the applications of empirical policy analysis (see,
e.g., Smets & Wouters 2003), forecasting (see, e.g., Smets & Wouters 2004), or
both (see Adolfson et al. 2007 for a prominent example for an open-economy model).
In those applications of DSGE models, Bayesian estimation techniques play a major
role (see An & Schorfheide 2007 for a survey).
Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation will cover these two important empirical appli-
cations in more detail for two different pairs of countries and with respect to different
Bayesian and classical (vector) autoregressive benchmarks.
In Gal´ı (2008, chapter 8), the reader can find possible theoretical extensions to the
basic closed-economy New Keynesian framework, which may, in principle, be intriguing
to open economy researchers, too: the topics mentioned are state-dependent pricing,
labor market frictions and unemployment, imperfect information and learning, endoge-
nous capital accumulation, financial market imperfections, and the zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates (for the references on these topics see Gal´ı 2008, pp. 191-193).
Besides this general introduction, the present dissertation entitled Monetary DSGE
Models of Two Countries: Set-Up, Estimation, and Forecasting Performance contains
three more chapters.
InChapter 2, we investigate within a small-scale two-country DSGE set-up whether
there exists a determinate rational expectations equilibrium and what are the impli-
cations on key macroeconomic variables of the European Union (EU) and the United
States (US) if we assume that the ECB and the Fed stick to their differing legal statutes,
which is reflected by diverging interest-rate rules.
For a calibrated version of the model we find that a unique stationary solution exists
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and that positive realizations of all types of simulated macroeconomic disturbances have
a negative impact on output of both economies. Expansionary monetary policy shocks
always have a prosper thyself and beggar thy neighbor effect with respect to the terms
of trade as these shocks influence the terms of trade for the benefit of EU (US) resident
households by decreasing them below (raising them above) their zero-inflation steady-
state value.
Moreover, we find that if the ECB implemented the interest-rate rule proposed in
this chapter, it would encounter lower fluctuations in EU producer-price-index inflation
compared to an interest-rate rule as proposed for the Fed. This is consistent with the
ECB’s paramount objective of price stability. However, this advantage only holds at
the expense of relatively high fluctuations in the EU output gap.
In Chapter 3, we estimate and forecast with [1] the two-country DSGE model
with diverging interest-rate rules developed in Chapter 2 while employing Bayesian
techniques and [2] a atheoretical vector autoregressive (VAR) model while employing
standard ordinary least squares. In doing so, we use quarterly OECD data ranging
from 1994Q1 until 2009Q1 for the Euro area on the one hand and the US on the other.
We find that the estimated DSGE model qualitatively reproduces the findings of
the calibrated one from Chapter 2 with respect to most of the parameter values and to
impulse responses on the various exogenous error terms. Estimating an unconstrained
VAR(1) does not yield the identical causal relationships as implied by the DSGE and
impulse responses based on the VAR(1) sometimes differ from the ones obtained for
the DSGE. Both models as well as the additive seasonal Holt-Winters method, a sim-
ple univariate extrapolation method serving as a benchmark, are not able to predict
the severeness or, at least, the evolution of the economic and financial crisis for the
forecasting period from 2007Q2 until 2009Q1.
Finally, we obtain the result that the accuracy of one-step-ahead DSGE forecasts
can compete well with the accuracy of VAR(1), Holt-Winters, and uniformly combined
forecasts under regular economic conditions. In two cases, the DSGE is able to signifi-
cantly outperform some of the rival forecasting models, but only at the 10% level.
In Chapter 4, we shift the focus from the two large open economies to the inte-
rior of one of them, namely to two economically integrated EU members that share a
common border: Austria and Hungary. We want to compare the forecasting accuracy
of new variants of the two-country DSGE model with several Bayesian and classical
(vector) autoregressive benchmarks for the subsequent four variables of interest: Aus-
trian and Hungarian output gaps as well as consumer-price-index inflation rates. In
particular, we address the forecasting performance [1] of the original open-economy
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DSGE characterized by producer-price-index inflation under the interest-rate rules, [2]
of an open-economy DSGE with consumer-price-index inflation under the interest-rate
rules, [3] and of the closed-economy DSGE with consumer-price-index inflation under
the interest-rate rule that is nested in the open-economy structure. In doing so, we use
quarterly Eurostat and OECD data ranging from 2000Q1 until 2009Q3 for Austria and
Hungary.
We obtain the result that Bayesian and classically estimated (vector) autoregressive
benchmarks deliver the most accurate one-step-ahead forecasts for all four endogenous
variables with respect to the different variants of the two-country DSGE model, but
cannot significantly outperform them. For three out of four variables, open-economy
models perform best compared to other single forecasts. If we additionally calculate
various combined forecasts, again for three out of four variables open-economy forecast
combinations perform best with respect to other combined forecasts.
In summary, even if single DSGE forecasts were not able to deliver the most accu-
rate one-step-ahead forecasts, the additional information provided by these forecasting
models seems to be valuable for uniform forecast combination for two variables. Since
open-economy models deliver the lowest forecasting error for three out of four variables
across single and combined forecasts, taking into account the non-negligible impact of
economic interrelations between Austria and Hungary indeed leads to a more accurate
prediction of most of the macro variables we take into consideration.
Interestingly, an evolution somewhat comparable to the one of the small-scale two-
country DSGE model from above was already perceivable in the literature for a medium-
scale closed-economy DSGE model by Smets & Wouters (2003, 2004, 2007): In
Smets & Wouters (2003), the model is set up and estimated using Bayesian tech-
niques for Euro area data. In Smets & Wouters (2004), the estimated model is used
to perform out-of-sample forecasts of Euro area variables and to address the model’s
forecasting performance. Finally, in Smets & Wouters (2007), a new variant of the
model is estimated and forecasted with for a different country, namely the US.
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Chapter 2
A two-country DSGE model with
diverging interest-rate rules
2.1 Introduction
If one studies scholarly articles that deal with monetary models of two countries such
as Corsetti & Pesenti (2001), Clarida et al. (2002), Pappa (2004), or Benigno
& Benigno (2006), one usually encounters that the countries’ monetary authorities
are modeled as perfectly symmetric institutions.
This gives rise to the question to which extent these models are able to capture
real-world features and to which extent policy recommendations based on the results
of these models are applicable. The reason why this is questionable is that, in general,
two different central banks may each obey a differing and legally binding statute. More
specifically, let us think of the two monetary authorities under examination as the ECB
on the one hand and the Fed on the other.
Article 2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank (1992, 2004) states the following:1
”In accordance with Article 105(1) of this Treaty, the primary objective of
the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the
objective of price stability, it shall support the general economic policies
in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the
objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2 of this Treaty. The
ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy
1More precisely, the responsible body for the monetary policy of the EU is the European System of
Central Banks (ESCB), which comprises the ECB and the national central banks of all 27 EU members
(in 2010).
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with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in
compliance with the principles set out in Article 4 of this Treaty.”
However, Section 2a of the Federal Reserve Act (1977, 2000) reads:
”The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal
Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary
and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential
to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”
As the reader can conclude from these diverging statutes, the paramount objective
of the ECB is price stability, whereas for the Fed this goal is just one out of many. In
order to model monetary policy of each central bank consistent with their diverging
statutes, we will incorporate these differing institutional features into their respective
policy functions.
It is worth noting that in the time from 1999 to 2004, the Fed revised its short-run
nominal interest rate more than twice as often as the ECB (see Sahuc & Smets 2008,
pp. 505-506). This difference in central bank activism can, at least, partly be explained
by differing sensitivities to the respective inflation rate and output gap in estimated
interest-rate rules for the ECB and the Fed within two separate closed-economy DSGE
models. The differing sensitivities, in turn, may be the empirically validated implication
of the diverging statutes of both monetary authorities as laid out above (see Sahuc &
Smets 2008, pp. 512-514). We extend Sahuc & Smets (2008) by investigating the
issue of differing statutes within a two-country DSGE framework.
In line with this observation, our main purpose is to investigate whether there ex-
ists a determinate rational expectations equilibrium and what are the implications of
this outcome for key macroeconomic variables of the EU and the US such as output
gaps, producer-price-index inflation rates, terms of trade, and short-run nominal in-
terest rates if we assume that the ECB and the Fed stick to their diverging statutes.
These implications will be expressed in terms of simulated impulse responses of the var-
ious endogenous variables to identical aggregate productivity, cost-push, and monetary
policy shocks.
Formally, we carry out the analysis by introducing diverging interest-rate rules into
a canonical log-linear representation of a variant of the two-country DSGE framework
by Obstfeld & Rogoff (2001), which will be extended by Calvo (1983) pricing,
a more subtle form of nominal rigidities within a New Keynesian model than the one
used in the original article.
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Obstfeld & Rogoff (2001) mostly concentrate on the issue of risk premia on
nominal exchange rates while Corsetti & Pesenti (2001) explore the international
transmission mechanism and the welfare properties of different types of money supply
and government spending shocks. Given the assumption of diverging interest-rate rules,
we will focus on the dynamic interrelations of two large open economies expressed by
the international transmission mechanism of various macroeconomic shocks.
A major part of the literature on two-country DSGE models such as Clarida et
al. (2002), Pappa (2004), Benigno & Benigno (2006), or Engel (2009) however,
cover the issue of optimal monetary policy in its various facets. Given the assump-
tion of producer currency pricing, Clarida et al. (2002) find that there are welfare
gains from monetary policy cooperation with respect to non-cooperation unless utility
of consumption is logarithmic and that the policy problem under non-cooperation is
isomorphic to the case of a closed economy. Assuming local currency pricing and co-
operation, Engel (2009) finds that optimal monetary policy should not only target
inflation and the output gap, but also currency misalignment.
In addition to cooperation and non-cooperation, Pappa (2004) investigates the wel-
fare properties of the intermediate case of a monetary union. Benigno & Benigno
(2006) show that it is possible to design specific targeting rules for non-cooperating
central banks, which have the property to assign the incentive for independent cen-
tral banks to replicate the cooperative allocation such that possible welfare losses from
non-cooperation can be avoided.
There are also numerous articles dealing with optimal monetary policy within a
small-open-economy DSGE setting like Clarida et al. (2001) or Gal´ı & Monacelli
(2005). Clarida et al. (2001) show that the log-linear representation of a small open
economy is isomorphic to a closed economy since all structural equations of a small
open economy are identical to their closed-economy counterparts, except that they are
related to the terms of trade. Gal´ı & Monacelli (2005) explore the size of welfare
losses of suboptimal monetary policies compared to the benchmark case of optimal
monetary policy as implied by the model structure.
The main results of a calibrated version of the model under scrutiny, for which a
determinate rational expectations equilibriums exists, are summarized in the following.
Simulated aggregate productivity shocks have a negative impact on EU and US
output, a result already described for the closed economy by Gal´ı (2002). Simulated
cost-push as well as contractionary monetary policy shocks also have a negative impact
on EU and US output.
In contrast to Corsetti & Pesenti (2001), expansionary monetary policy shocks
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always have a prosper thyself and beggar thy neighbor effect since they influence the
terms of trade for the benefit of EU (US) resident households by decreasing them
below (raising them above) their zero-inflation steady-state value. In addition, this
effect would induce a rise of both domestic and foreign output above their flexible-price
values.
If the ECB implemented the interest-rate rule proposed in the present article, it
would encounter lower fluctuations in EU producer-price-index inflation compared to an
interest-rate rule as proposed for the Fed. This is consistent with the ECB’s paramount
objective of price stability. However, this advantage only holds at the expense of rel-
atively high fluctuations in the EU output gap; a trade-off commonly observed in the
Monetary Policy literature.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 outlines the
discrete-time two-country DSGE model, Section 2.3 presents the equilibrium condi-
tions on all markets under flexible prices, Section 2.4 introduces the New Keynesian
framework, and Section 2.5 derives a locally unique rational expectations equilibrium
for a calibrated version of the model. The analysis is completed by an impulse-response
analysis in Section 2.6. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes. Detailed derivations of the model
equations are given in Appendix 2.8.
2.2 A New Open Economy Macroeconomic model
The subsequent model is based on the Obstfeld & Rogoff (2001) two-country
DSGE framework, which extends the basic Obstfeld & Rogoff (1995) model by
introducing uncertainty.
2.2.1 Preferences, consumption and price indices
Suppose world population is constant over time and consists of a continuum of unit mass
of infinitely lived atomistic households characterized by identical preferences. Assume
further perfect information and rational expectations on the part of all agents. There
are two countries, where domestic households live on the segment [0, n] of the unit
interval while foreign households live on the remaining segment (n, 1]. Even though we
will take up the idea of the home country representing the EU and the foreign country
representing the US again in Section 2.4, we shall abstract from this thought for the
moment since the present framework can possibly be applied to other pairs of countries,
too (see Chapter 4).
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The discounted stream of expected period utilities of the representative domestic
household reads as follows:2
Ut = Et
{ ∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
C1−ρs
1− ρ +
χ
1− ε
(
Ms
Ps
)1−ε
− γ
1− ξL
1−ξ
s
]}
. (2.1)
The above utility function is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) composite
separable in its arguments real consumption C, real money balances M/P (where P
denotes the domestic consumer price index (CPI)), and leisure −L such that the partial
derivatives of the utility function with respect to one variable are independent of all
other variables. β denotes an intertemporal discount factor (0 < β < 1). Moreover, the
following shall hold for the various parameters: χ, γ > 0, 0 < ρ, ε < 1, and ξ < 0. ρ
is the coefficient of relative risk aversion in consumption and the modulus of ξ denotes
the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply.3
Since (2.1) is a function in real money balances, the model is a variant of the
Sidrauski (1967) and Brock (1974) money-in-the-utility-function (MIU) models, in
which the inclusion of real money balances in the utility function is justified by assuming
that the use of money facilitates transactions. This modeling shortcut guarantees the
usage of money even though holding money per se does not yield a positive real return.4
2Note that a possible superscript i to distinguish individual variables is suppressed throughput the
analysis for the sake of better legibility.
3Therefore, we obtain the subsequent first and second partial derivatives of the utility function (2.1)
with respect to the single variables:
∂U
∂C
= C−ρ > 0,
∂2U
∂C2
= (−ρ)C−ρ−1 < 0,
∂U
∂(MP )
= χ
(
M
P
)−ε
> 0,
∂2U
∂(MP )
2
= (−ε)χ
(
M
P
)−ε−1
< 0,
∂U
∂(−L) = γL
−ξ > 0,
∂2U
∂(−L)2 = ξγL
−ξ−1 < 0.
1 minus each of the parameters represents the elasticity of the partial utility function in one of the
three arguments, denoted by the respective subscript, with respect to this very argument:
²UC ,C :=
∂U
∂C
C
UC
= C−ρ
C
C1−ρ
1−ρ
= 1− ρ,
²UM
P
,MP
:=
∂U
∂(MP )
M
P
UM
P
= χ
(
M
P
)−ε M
P
χ
1−ε
(
M
P
)1−ε = 1− ε,
²U(−L),(−L) :=
∂U
∂(−L)
(−L)
U(−L)
= γL−ξ
L
γ
1−ξL
1−ξ = 1− ξ.
4Note, however, that some New Open Economy Macroeconomic models abstract from explicitly
modeling liquidity services provided by the use of money (see, e.g., Clarida et al. 2002, p. 882).
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The utility function of the representative foreign household is the same as (2.1),
except that C∗ may differ from C, as well as M∗ from M , P ∗ from P , χ∗ from χ, γ∗
from γ, and L∗ from L.5
Moreover, the total domestic consumption index C from above is defined as a
population-weighted per-capita Cobb-Douglas composite of domestic and foreign com-
modity bundles, which implicitly assumes that all consumption goods are tradable and
that there are no trading costs:6
Ct :=
Cnt,HC
1−n
t,F
nn(1− n)1−n . (2.2)
The commodity bundles CH and CF are CES composites of differentiated final goods
produced at home (CH) or abroad (CF ) as in Dixit & Stiglitz (1977):
7
Ct,H :=
[(
1
n
) 1
θ
∫ n
0
Ct(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
, (2.3)
Ct,F :=
[(
1
1− n
) 1
θ
∫ 1
n
Ct(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
. (2.4)
The preference for differentiated goods expresses the households’ love of variety. As
one can see from (2.2), the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
commodity bundles σCH ,CF equals 1 (Cobb-Douglas specification). From (2.3) and (2.4)
we see that the elasticity of substitution across two individual goods z, z′ produced
within a country σC(z),C(z′) equals θ (CES specification, θ > 1 for an equilibrium to
exist).8
Note further that in the present analysis domestic households are assumed to hold and derive utility
from holding domestic money only, whereas foreign households are assumed to hold and derive utility
from using foreign money only.
5As one can see here, real and nominal foreign variables are denoted by a superscript asterisk. In
addition, nominal foreign variables are denominated in foreign currency. This holds except for interna-
tionally traded bonds, where foreign bond holdings indexed by a superscript asterisk are denominated
in domestic currency.
6As a consequence, there is no source for the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect as described in
Obstfeld & Rogoff (1996, pp. 210-216). Furthermore, the total domestic consumption index (2.2)
is population-weighted for the CPI (2.5) below to have the usual form rather than a form such as, e.g.,
in Clarida et al. (2002, p. 882).
7Alternatively, we could treat imported goods as production factors rather than consumption goods
as in McCallum & Nelson (2001), which we will not consider in our analysis.
8
|σCH ,CF | :=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d
(
CH
CF
)
d
(
dCH
dCF
) dCHdCF
CH
CF
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1,
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The domestic CPI is again a Cobb-Douglas composite of domestic and foreign pro-
ducer price indices (PPIs):
Pt = P
n
t,HP
1−n
t,F , (2.5)
where these subindices are CES composites of domestic and foreign final goods prices:
Pt,H =
[
1
n
∫ n
0
Pt(z)
1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
, (2.6)
Pt,F =
[
1
1− n
∫ 1
n
Pt(z)
1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
. (2.7)
For a derivation of the domestic CPI (2.5), the domestic PPI (2.6) as well as the
domestic demand functions for individual and composite domestic goods, see Appendix
2.8. The foreign PPI in domestic currency (2.7), domestic demand curves for individual
and composite foreign goods as well as all foreign indices can be derived analogously.
Assume that the law of one price holds for consumers across all individual goods at
all times:
Pt(z) = StP
∗
t (z) ∀z ∈ [0, 1], (2.8)
where S denotes the endogenously determined nominal exchange rate in price quotation
(domestic currency units in terms of foreign currency units).
Thus, as domestic and foreign households are characterized by identical preferences,
the law of one price implies that absolute purchasing power parity (PPP) always holds
for the CPI (2.5), even though relative PPP (stating that changes in domestic and
foreign price levels should be equal in the long run) would be the more realistic statement
(see Obstfeld & Rogoff 1996, pp. 200-202):
Pt = StP
∗
t . (2.9)
The demand functions of the representative domestic household for individual domestic
|σC(z),C(z′)| :=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
d
[
C(z)
C(z′)
]
d
[
dC(z)
dC(z′)
] dC(z)dC(z′)
C(z)
C(z′)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = θ.
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C(h) and foreign goods C(f) read as follows:
Ct(h) =
1
n
[
Pt(h)
Pt,H
]−θ
Ct,H , (2.10)
Ct(f) =
1
1− n
[
Pt(f)
Pt,F
]−θ
Ct,F , (2.11)
where z = h ∈ [0, n] denotes a typical differentiated good z produced at home and
z′ = f ∈ (n, 1] another typical differentiated good z′ produced abroad.
As we can see from equations (2.10) and (2.11), demand for individual goods is
decreasing in its own price relative to the respective domestic or foreign PPI.9 Note
that θ does not only denote the elasticity of substitution between any two individual
goods, but also the price elasticity of demand for any individual good faced by each
producer.10
Equation (2.2) implies that the demand curves for the composite domestic and
foreign goods, CH and CF , are given by:
Ct,H = n
(
Pt,H
Pt
)−1
Ct, (2.12)
Ct,F = (1− n)
(
Pt,F
Pt
)−1
Ct. (2.13)
Now we make use of the fact that world consumption Cw equals the population weighted
sum of total domestic and total foreign consumption, where Cw then denotes per capita
as well as total world consumption since world population is normalized to 1:
Cwt := nCt + (1− n)C∗t . (2.14)
Combining (2.14) with equations (2.8), (2.10), (2.11), (2.12), and (2.13) we finally
obtain the global demand functions for individual domestic and foreign goods in terms
9
∂C(h)
∂P (h)
= (−θ) 1
n
[
P (h)
PH
]−θ−1
CH
PH
< 0.
10
²C(h),P (h) :=
∂C(h)
∂P (h)
P (h)
C(h)
= (−θ) 1
n
[
P (h)
PH
]−θ−1
CH
PH
P (h)n
[
P (h)
PH
]θ
C−1H = −θ.
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of (total) world consumption:11
Cwt (h) =
[
Pt(h)
Pt,H
]−θ (
Pt,H
Pt
)−1
Cwt , (2.15)
Cwt (f) =
[
Pt(f)
Pt,F
]−θ (
Pt,F
Pt
)−1
Cwt . (2.16)
2.2.2 Households
The representative domestic household maximizes her objective functional (2.1) subject
to the following sequence of intertemporal budget constraints (in nominal terms) with
respect to her decision variables Ct,Mt, Bt, and Lt:
WtLt + (1 + it−1)Bt−1 +Mt−1 + Γt(h) ≥ PtCt +Mt +Bt + Ptτt. (2.17)
As an example for a typical flow budget constraint, inequality (2.17) states that the
household’s period t expenditure (right-hand side) must not exceed period t income
(left-hand side).12 W denotes the endogenously determined nominal wage being the
remuneration for supplying labor, which is identical across households (L = L(h)), on
the perfectly competitive labor market. it−1 denotes the (short-run) nominal interest
rate between period t − 1 and period t on riskless one-period non-government bonds
Bt−1 carried over from period t−1. These nominal bonds are denominated in domestic
currency and are supposed to be internationally tradable.13
Money holdings Mt−1 can also be transferred from t− 1 to t, but yield no nominal
return. Consumption goods, however, are perishable and cannot be stored. Γt(h)
are instantaneous profits of the representative household acting as a producer of an
individual, differentiated domestic good h, which will be explained in more detail below.
Finally, let τ denote non-distortionary real lump-sum taxes.
11
Cwt (h) = nCt(h)+(1−n)C∗t (h) =
[
Pt(h)
Pt,H
]−θ (
Pt,H
Pt
)−1
[nCt+(1−n)C∗t ] =
[
Pt(h)
Pt,H
]−θ (
Pt,H
Pt
)−1
Cwt .
12
PtCt = Pt,HCt,H + Pt,FCt,F =
∫ n
0
Pt(h)Ct(h)dh+
∫ 1
n
Pt(f)Ct(f)df.
13Note that one could generalize this formulation by assuming that domestic and foreign households
had access to a complete portfolio of state-contingent Arrow-Debreu securities, both domestically and
internationally tradable, as in Clarida et al. (2002) in order to guarantee for the completeness of
(international) financial markets.
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Again, for the representative foreign household the intertemporal budget constraint
is the same as (2.17). Since internationally traded bonds are supposed to be denomi-
nated in domestic currency, foreign bond holdings in domestic currency B∗, however,
first have to be divided by the nominal exchange rate before they enter the foreign
intertemporal budget constraint: B∗/S. Moreover, W ∗ may differ from W , i∗ from i,
Γ∗(f) from Γ(h), as well as τ ∗ from τ . Hence, the sequence of foreign intertemporal
budget constraints (in nominal terms) reads as follows:
W ∗t L
∗
t + (1 + i
∗
t−1)
B∗t−1
St−1
+M∗t−1 + Γ
∗
t (f) ≥ P ∗t C∗t +M∗t +
B∗t
St
+ P ∗t τ
∗
t .
Similar to Corsetti & Pesenti (2001, p. 427), this equation implies that the realized
nominal return on internationally traded bonds at the beginning of period t in foreign
currency is given by:
(1 + i∗t−1) =
St−1
St
(1 + it−1). (2.18)
It is useful to introduce the domestic real interest rate r, which can be obtained via the
subsequent Fisher relation:
(1 + rt−1) ≡ Pt−1
Pt
(1 + it−1).
Note that an analogous equation to the preceding one also holds for the foreign real
interest rate r∗. If we substitute for 1+ i∗t−1 by (2.18) in the foreign analog to the above
equation, we will obtain that real interest rates are equal across countries: r = r∗.14
The maximization of the utility function (2.1) subject to the budget constraint (2.17)
then holding with equality is undertaken by maximizing the corresponding Lagrangian
and yields the subsequent first order conditions for a utility maximum:
C−ρt
Pt
= β(1 + it)Et
[
C−ρt+1
Pt+1
]
. (2.19)
This is the intertemporal Euler equation for real consumption stating that the marginal
rate of substitution between real consumption in t and in t+ 1 equals their discounted
relative prices.
Moreover, we obtain that in a utility maximum the marginal rate of substitution
between real money balances and real consumption equals the opportunity costs of
14This is the reason why the home and the foreign country can be treated as symmetric countries,
even though there is only one, domestic-currency denominated bond in this world.
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holding money:
χ
(
Mt
Pt
)−ε
C−ρt
=
it
1 + it
. (2.20)
Note that equation (2.20) can be rearranged in order to get the following money demand
equation:(
Mt
Pt
)ε
= χ
1 + it
it
Cρt ,
where we can see that the higher total real consumption, the higher is demand for real
money balances.
Finally, we also get the subsequent labor supply equation:
γ
L−ξt
C−ρt
=
Wt
Pt
, (2.21)
which states that the marginal rate of substitution between labor and real consumption
equals their relative prices, the real consumer wage. For a derivation of conditions
(2.19), (2.20), and (2.21) see Appendix 2.8.
Note that analogous equations to (2.19), (2.20), and (2.21) also hold abroad.
2.2.3 Firms
Let us assume further that agents at home and abroad do not only act as utility max-
imizing households, but also as profit maximizing producers of final goods, which are
producible without the input of intermediate goods. In contrast to their role as house-
holds whose preferences are assumed to be identical, all commodities are differentiated
in order to satisfy the households’ love of variety.
Hence, there is the possibility to raise individual goods’ prices P (h), P (f) above
marginal cost without the risk of dropping out of the market. In other words, non-zero
profits are feasible in this model of monopolistic competition.
Let individual domestic output be produced according to the following linear pro-
duction function:
Yt(h) = AtLt(h). (2.22)
This is a production function in labor only. For the sake of simplicity, physical capital
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is omitted as additional input factor throughout the analysis. This step can be justified
by the short- to medium-run perspective of the model. A is a random variable denoting
an exogenous aggregate productivity shock, which can be interpreted as a transitory
process innovation.
Households need not be self-employed, but it is assumed that domestic firms can
employ domestic labor only as well as foreign firms shall be allowed to employ foreign
labor only. In other words, there is no migration in this world.
Individual foreign output is produced using the same technology (2.22) as at home.
Nonetheless, Y ∗(f) may differ from Y (h), A∗ from A, as well as L∗(f) from L(h).
Producers’ instantaneous profits Γt(h) are given by:
Γt(h) = Pt(h)Yt(h)−WtLt(h). (2.23)
Relative to the producer’s own price, equation (2.23) rearranges to:
Γt(h)
Pt(h)
= Yt(h)− Wt
Pt(h)
Lt(h) = Yt(h)− Wt
Pt(h)
Yt(h)
At
= Yt(h)− κtYt(h), (2.24)
where we have made use of the production function (2.22). In (2.24) κ := W/[P (h)A]
is defined as individual real marginal production cost.
For now, assume all goods prices to be flexible. Then each domestic producer charges
the same price denoted by the domestic PPI (PH = P (h)). Thus, instantaneous profits
rearrange to:
Γt(h) = Pt,HYt(h)−WtLt(h). (2.25)
Maximizing equation (2.25) with respect to Y (h) and using the fact that in case of
goods market clearing the output of a single producer equals global demand for the
differentiated good (Y (h) = Cw(h)), we get the standard first order condition for a
profit maximum in a model of monopolistic competition:
∂Γt(h)
∂Yt(h)
= Pt,H + Yt(h)
∂Pt,H
∂Yt(h)
−Wt∂Lt(h)
∂Yt(h)
= Pt,H
(
1 +
1
²C(h),P (h)
)
−Wt 1
At
= Pt,H
(
1 +
1
−θ
)
−Wt 1
At
= 0
⇒ Wt
Pt,HAt
=
θ − 1
θ
:= κflext . (2.26)
Note that an analogous equation to (2.26) also holds abroad and that κflex = (κ∗)flex =
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(θ − 1)/θ.
Equation (2.26) states that in a profit maximum associated with flexible prices, the
corresponding real marginal production cost defined as κflex equals (θ − 1)/θ.15
2.3 Market clearing under flexible prices
Before introducing nominal rigidities in Section 2.4, we will first consider the benchmark
case of market equilibria in a world with completely flexible prices.
2.3.1 World bond and goods markets
For the derivation of the subsequent equations and their relation to one another see
Appendix 2.8.
Let us begin with the equilibrium conditions on the world markets for domestic and
foreign goods denoted in domestic currency:
Pt,HYt = PtC
w
t , (2.27)
Pt,FY
∗
t = PtC
w
t , (2.28)
where the left-hand side of equation (2.27) denotes global supply of and the right-hand
side global demand for domestic goods.
Note that an analogous interpretation for (2.28) also holds abroad.
Equations (2.27) and (2.28) immediately collapse to the definition of the terms of
trade (TOT):
Tt :=
Pt,F
Pt,H
=
StP
∗
t,F
Pt,H
=
Yt
Y ∗t
, (2.29)
which is the ratio of imported goods’ and exported goods’ prices from the home coun-
try’s perspective.
Using the domestic intertemporal budget constraint (2.17) plus further manipula-
tions eventually yield the domestic and foreign balance of payment identities:
Pt,HYt − PtCt + it−1Bt−1 ≡ Bt −Bt−1, (2.30)
Pt,FY
∗
t − PtC∗t + it−1B∗t−1 ≡ B∗t −B∗t−1 (2.31)
15Note that if we solved equation (2.26) for PH , we would obtain the domestic PPI as a mark-up
on marginal unit labor costs W/A: PH = [θ/(θ − 1)]W/A with θ/(θ − 1) = 1/κflex denoting the
flexible-price mark-up factor.
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with the left-hand side of equation (2.30) representing the home country’s current ac-
count and the right-hand side its capital account.
Note that an analogous interpretation for (2.31) also holds abroad.
Internationally tradable bonds are supposed to be in zero net world supply:
nBt + (1− n)B∗t = 0. (2.32)
Assuming that international bond holdings have initially been zero B0 = B
∗
0 = 0
together with (2.14), (2.30), (2.31), and (2.32) implies that Bt = B
∗
t = 0 at all times
according to Corsetti & Pesenti (2001, pp. 430-432) and Obstfeld & Rogoff
(2001, p. 8).16 Then equations (2.30) and (2.31) simplify to the following:
Ct =
Pt,HYt
Pt
, (2.33)
C∗t =
Pt,FY
∗
t
Pt
. (2.34)
Using the definition of the TOT (2.29) the preceding equations can be rewritten as:
Ct = T
n−1
t Yt, (2.35)
C∗t = T
n
t Y
∗
t . (2.36)
These are the conditions for domestic and foreign goods market clearing, which im-
ply that households across countries always consume exactly their real incomes (see
Obstfeld & Rogoff 2001, p. 8).
Moreover, B0 = B
∗
0 = 0 together with (2.14), (2.30), (2.31), and (2.32) also implies
that Ct = C
∗
t = C
w
t at all times such that
Ct = C
∗
t = C
w
t = nCt + (1− n)C∗t = nT n−1t Yt + (1− n)T nt Y ∗t = Y nt (Y ∗t )1−n,
while making use of (2.35) and (2.36).
As a consequence, consumption shares across countries are not only time-constant
but even equal (see Obstfeld & Rogoff 2001, p. 8). Since current and capital
accounts between the two countries are in balance at all times and in all possible states
of the world, the mechanism of adjustment to shocks in the world economy will only be
16More precisely, Cobb-Douglas preferences for the domestic and foreign commodity bundles as in
(2.2) together with producer-currency pricing and the absence of preference shocks imply under the
assumption of completely flexible prices that any shock that reduces the supply of output of a country
will increase its price in equal proportion. Thus, the value of its real income remains unchanged and
the allocation under complete markets can be achieved without trade in bonds.
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represented by movements in the TOT, but not by changes in the countries’ net asset
positions.
2.3.2 National money markets and world currency market
The government is assumed to set its expenditures equal to its revenues at all times
such that its budget is always in balance and no seignorage can occur (see Obstfeld
& Rogoff 1996, p. 523):17
Mt −Mt−1 + Ptτt = 0. (2.37)
Note that an analogous equation to (2.37) also holds abroad.
Equation (2.37) describes domestic money supply. Combining (2.37) with (2.20)
and using the condition for domestic goods market clearing (2.35), one obtains two
equations in M , which can be set equal and eventually solved for P :
Pt =
Mt−1
χ
1
ε
(
1+it
it
) 1
ε
(T nt Y
∗
t )
ρ
ε + τt
.
Making use of (2.9), an analogous equation in P can be computed abroad such that
both equations can be set equal and finally solved for S:
St =
Mt−1
[
(χ∗)
1
ε
(
1+i∗t
i∗t
) 1
ε
(T nt Y
∗
t )
ρ
ε + τ ∗t
]
M∗t−1
[
χ
1
ε
(
1+it
it
) 1
ε
(T n−1t Yt)
ρ
ε + τt
] .
As we can see from the above formula, the current equilibrium nominal exchange rate
St positively depends on past domestic nominal money balancesMt−1, current domestic
opportunity costs of holding money it/(1 + it), current foreign output Y
∗
t , and current
foreign real lump-sum taxes τ ∗t . The dependence on the remaining variables is of oppo-
site sign, except for the current TOT Tt, whose influence is ambiguous. An increase of
S illustrates a depreciation of the domestic currency, whereas a decrease characterizes
an appreciation.
17One could extend the model by introducing government spending (shocks) (see Obstfeld &
Rogoff 2001, pp. 37-38), which we will not consider in our analysis.
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2.3.3 National labor markets
Notice from equations (2.21) and (2.26) that the real wage differs between consumers
and producers because they use different price indices. The ratio between real producer
and real consumer wage is known as one type of wedge in Labor Economics (see, e.g.,
Landmann & Jerger 1999, pp. 136-138) and equals PH/P
n
HP
1−n
F = (PH/PF )
1−n =
T n−1 in the present set-up.
Nonetheless, by combining (2.21), (2.26), and (2.35) with the CPI (2.5) we obtain
two equations in W/P = (W/PH)T
n−1 which can be solved for L:
Lt = T
(n−1)(ρ−1)
ξ
t
(
At
γ
)− 1
ξ
(
θ − 1
θ
)− 1
ξ
Y
ρ
ξ
t . (2.38)
Equation (2.38) states that in an equilibrium on the perfectly competitive labor market,
domestic employment positively depends on the aggregate productivity shock A and
flexible-price real marginal production cost (θ − 1)/θ, but negatively on the TOT T
and domestic output Y .
Note that an analogous equation to (2.38) also holds abroad.
Combining equation (2.38) with the production function (2.22) and solving for Y ,
we finally obtain the domestic flexible-price equilibrium output Y flex:
Y flext = T
(n−1)(ρ−1)
ξ−ρ
t A
ξ−1
ξ−ρ
t
(
θ
θ − 1
) 1
ξ−ρ
γ
1
ξ−ρ . (2.39)
The domestic flexible-price equilibrium output positively depends on the aggregate
productivity shock A, yet negatively on the TOT T and the flexible-price mark-up
factor θ/(θ − 1).
Note that an analogous equation to (2.39) also holds abroad.
2.4 A New Keynesian framework
After having drawn the DSGE set-up and derived optimality conditions for both house-
holds and firms (Section 2.2) as well as market clearing conditions under flexible prices
(Section 2.3), let us now turn to the New Keynesian framework. In order to establish
this type of framework, we have to introduce some form of nominal rigidity in addition
to the assumption of monopolistic competition. In the present case, we will concen-
trate on sticky prices and forego sticky nominal wages as done, e.g., by Corsetti &
Pesenti (2001).
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Log-linearizing the alternative market clearing and optimality conditions in the
neighborhood of the non-stochastic zero-inflation steady state will lead to a canoni-
cal representation of the equilibrium of the model consisting of a dynamic IS curve, a
New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), and some form of monetary policy rule for each
country, as well as an equation for the TOT.
As there are two countries, altogether we will obtain a system of seven log-linear
equations. This form makes the model analytically tractable, especially for empirical
applications.18
Finally, we assume the monetary policy rules introduced below to be different across
countries. This is one of the crucial assumptions of the present analysis.
2.4.1 Dynamic IS curves
It is straightforward to derive the dynamic IS curves for both countries by log-linearizing
the domestic intertemporal Euler equation for real consumption (2.19) and its foreign
analog around the non-stochastic zero-inflation steady state as shown in Appendix 2.8.
Accordingly, we obtain:
yˆt = Et[yˆt+1] +
1
ρ
{Et[pit+1]− iˆt} − (1− n)Et[∆tt+1], (2.40)
yˆ∗t = Et[yˆ
∗
t+1] +
1
ρ
{Et[pi∗t+1]− iˆ∗t}+ nEt[∆tt+1]. (2.41)
Note that except for all types of interest rates, lower-case Latin letters denote natural
logarithms of the corresponding variables. Usually, the hats above these log variables
signify percentage deviations from their zero-inflation steady-state values. However,
for all types of interest rates, these hats denote deviations measured in percentage
points. The zero-inflation steady-state values themselves are denoted by upper bars.
Note further that i¯ = i¯∗ = r¯ = r¯∗ = (1− β)/β holds for the zero-inflation steady-state
nominal and real interest rates, both at home and abroad.19
These two dynamic IS curves represent aggregate demand in both countries, where
(2.40) can be interpreted as follows: current domestic demand is higher than its zero-
inflation steady-state value if the expected domestic output deviation Et[yˆt+1] is positive
(interpretable as an expected peak in the domestic business cycle). There is also a clear
18In contrast to Corsetti & Pesenti (2001) who present a closed-form solution of their (deter-
ministic) model, the log-linear approximation used here is considered to be advantageous since the link
to empirical applications is immediate.
19This can easily be obtained by solving the zero-inflation steady-state version of the domestic
intertemporal Euler equation for real consumption (2.19) and its foreign analog for i¯ and i¯∗, respectively
(C−ρt = Et[C
−ρ
t+1] = C¯
−ρ, Pt = Et[Pt+1] = P¯ ).
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positive relation of current demand to expected CPI inflation Et[pit+1] := Et[pt+1]− pt
(households consume more today if prices are expected to augment in the future) and
a negative relation to current deviations from the zero-inflation steady-state nominal
interest rate iˆt (investing in nominal bonds is relatively attractive compared to buying
consumption goods).
Moreover, there are also spill-over effects from abroad, which affect current domestic
demand through expected movements in the TOT Et[∆tt+1]: current domestic demand
negatively depends on an expected increase in the TOT since TOT expected to augment
mean that imported goods become more expensive relative to domestic goods.20 (1 −
n) denotes the degree of openness of the home country to the foreign country (see
Gal´ı 2008, pp. 155-156). Since the degree of openness coincides with the size of the
foreign country due the definition of the domestic CPI (2.2), there is no home bias in
consumption, different to what is discussed in Pappa (2004, pp. 770-771).
Note that an analogous interpretation for (2.41) also holds abroad.
2.4.2 New Keynesian Phillips curves
The NKPCs for both countries can be derived by log-linearizing the price-setting equa-
tions of domestic and foreign firms around the non-stochastic zero-inflation steady-state
as shown in Appendix 2.8. In order to obtain the short-run trade-off between PPI in-
flation and the output gap represented by a Phillips curve it is necessary to assure price
stickiness in addition to monopolistic competition.
This will be done by introducing Calvo (1983) contracts, which means that each
producer is only allowed to reset her price with probability (1− δ) in any given period,
independent of the time since the last adjustment. Therefore, a measure of (1 − δ) of
firms reset theirs prices each period, while a measure of δ of firms keep their prices
constant and simply adjust their individual output in order to meet demand. 1/(1− δ)
then captures the average duration of a price (see Gal´ı 2008, p. 43):
pit,H = βEt[pit+1,H ] +
(1− δ)(1− δβ)
δ
κˆt, (2.42)
pi∗t,F = βEt[pi
∗
t+1,F ] +
(1− δ∗)(1− δ∗β)
δ∗
κˆ∗t . (2.43)
In equation (2.42), pit,H := pt,H − pt−1,H is defined as current domestic PPI inflation,
which typically differs from domestic CPI inflation in an open economy. The NKPC
20The TOT are expected to increase over time if either the domestic currency is expected to depre-
ciate or if expected foreign PPI inflation will be higher than expected domestic PPI inflation, where
these rates of inflation will be discussed below in more detail.
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(2.42) states that current domestic PPI inflation pit,H is an increasing function of both
expected domestic PPI inflation Et[pit+1,H ] and the deviation of current domestic real
marginal production cost from its zero-inflation steady-state value κˆt := κt − κflext .
Note that an analogous interpretation for (2.43) also holds abroad. However, δ∗ is
assumed to differ from δ and κ∗ also from κ, although κflex = (κ∗)flex = (θ − 1)/θ.
Furthermore, let us assume that setting a new price at home and setting a new price
abroad are stochastically independent events. As domestic and foreign firms both set
theirs prices in the currency of the countries where they are located, the present model
features producer currency pricing, which is one of the possible occurrences of pricing
to market.21
Nonetheless, we want to express equations (2.40), (2.41), (2.42), and (2.43) in terms
of the output gap, which shall be defined as the difference between actual and flexible-
price output deviations: xt := yˆt − yˆflext and x∗t := yˆ∗t − (yˆ∗t )flex. In order to rewrite
equations (2.42) and (2.43) in terms of x and x∗, respectively, we have to take a closer
look at the ratio of the sticky-price real marginal production cost κt and its flexible-price
counterpart κflext as given by (2.25):
κt
κflext
=
Wt
Pt,HAt
θ−1
θ
=
θWtT
1−n
t
(θ − 1)PtAt . (2.44)
Combining equation (2.44) with the labor supply curve (2.21), the production function
(2.22), and the condition for domestic goods market clearing (2.35), we obtain:
κt
κflext
=
θγ
(
Yt
At
)−ξ
T 1−nt
(θ − 1)(T n−1t Yt)−ρAt
=
θ
θ − 1γA
ξ−1
t T
(n−1)(ρ−1)
t Y
ρ−ξ
t =
(
Yt
Y flext
)ρ−ξ
, (2.45)
where Y flext denotes the domestic flexible-price equilibrium output as given by equation
(2.39). Log-linearizing this expression around the zero-inflation steady-state yields:
κˆt = (ρ− ξ)(yˆt − yˆflext ) = (ρ− ξ)xt. (2.46)
Hence, by using (2.46) equations (2.40), (2.41), (2.42), and (2.43) rearrange to:
xt = Et[xt+1] +
1
ρ
{Et[pit+1]− iˆt} − (1− n)Et[∆tt+1] + Et[yˆflext+1 ]− yˆflext , (2.47)
21This specification has already been adopted in the theoretical literature (see, e.g., Clarida et al.
2002, p. 885) and can also be justified by empirical evidence for most of the G7 countries (see Leith
& Malley 2007, p. 420).
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x∗t = Et[x
∗
t+1] +
1
ρ
{Et[pi∗t+1]− iˆ∗t }+ nEt[∆tt+1] + Et[(yˆ∗t+1)flex]− (yˆ∗t )flex, (2.48)
pit,H = βEt[pit+1,H ] + µxt + ut, (2.49)
pi∗t,F = βEt[pi
∗
t+1,F ] + µ
∗x∗t + u
∗
t (2.50)
with µ := [(1 − δ)(1 − δβ)(ρ − ξ)]/δ (µ > 0) and µ∗ := [(1 − δ∗)(1 − δ∗β)(ρ − ξ)]/δ∗
(µ∗ > 0) representing the slope coefficients of the NKPCs with respect to the domestic
(foreign) output gap. In addition, ut denotes an exogenously given, stationary AR(1)
process of the form ut = ζuut−1 + ηu,t (0 < ζu < 1) with the exogenous error term ηu
assumed to be i.i.d. ∼ N(0, σ2ηu). This AR(1) process can be interpreted as a transitory
cost-push shock reflecting determinants of real marginal production cost which do not
move proportionally with the output gap (see Clarida et al. 2001, pp. 250-251).
The two NKPCs represent aggregate supply in both countries and are isomorphic
to their closed-economy counterparts, where (2.49) can be interpreted as follows: the
positive short-run trade-off between current domestic PPI inflation pit,H and the current
domestic output gap xt can be seen.
22 However, this is not really a trade-off to be
exploited since pit,H is also positively related to (discounted) expected domestic PPI
inflation βEt[pit+1,H ].
23
Note that an analogous interpretation for (2.50) also holds abroad. However, u∗
is uncorrelated with u such that domestic and foreign cost-push shocks are country-
specific.
It is useful that the following holds for Et[yˆ
flex
t+1 ]− yˆflext in case one makes use of the
log-linear version of the current domestic flexible-price equilibrium output according to
(2.39) and its expected counterpart:
Et[yˆ
flex
t+1 ]− yˆflext = Et[yflext+1 ]− yflext
=
(n− 1)(ρ− 1)
ξ − ρ Et[tt+1] +
ξ − 1
ξ − ρEt[at+1] +
1
ξ − ρ ln
(
θ
θ − 1
)
+
1
ξ − ρ ln γ
− (n− 1)(ρ− 1)
ξ − ρ tt −
ξ − 1
ξ − ρat −
1
ξ − ρ ln
(
θ
θ − 1
)
− 1
ξ − ρ ln γ
=
(n− 1)(ρ− 1)
ξ − ρ Et[∆tt+1] +
ξ − 1
ξ − ρEt[∆at+1], (2.51)
where at is assumed to follow an exogenously given, stationary AR(1) process of the
22Note that NKPCs such as (2.49) and (2.50) in terms of the output gap sometimes are referred to
as aggregate supply (AS) curves (see Clarida et al. 2001, p. 250).
23If, for instance, some institution had the power to raise domestic output above its flexible-price
value (given the deviations from its zero-inflation steady-state value) by raising pit,H , not only pit,H but
also βEt[pit+1,H ] would have to rise for (2.49) to hold with equality. This means that if output were
kept on this artificially high level for an extended period of time, the respective expected inflation rates
would continue to rise at accelerating speed, which is described by the so-called acceleration theorem.
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form at = ζaat−1 + ηa,t (0 < ζa < 1) with the exogenous error term ηa assumed to be
i.i.d. ∼ N(0, σ2ηa).
Note that an analogous equation to (2.51) also holds abroad. However, a∗ is un-
correlated with a such that domestic and foreign aggregate productivity shocks are
country-specific.
In consequence, the dynamic IS curves (2.47) and (2.48) rearrange to:
xt = Et[xt+1] +
1
ρ
{Et[pit+1]− iˆt}+ (n− 1)(ξ − 1)
ξ − ρ Et[∆tt+1] +
ξ − 1
ξ − ρEt[∆at+1],(2.52)
x∗t = Et[x
∗
t+1] +
1
ρ
{Et[pi∗t+1]− iˆ∗t }+
n(ξ − 1)
ξ − ρ Et[∆tt+1] +
ξ − 1
ξ − ρEt[∆a
∗
t+1]. (2.53)
Finally, we prefer to express these dynamic IS curves in terms of PPI rather than CPI
inflation, which can be achieved by using the subsequent log-linear representation of
the TOT (2.29): tt := st + p
∗
t,F − pt,H . Subtracting this expression from its expected
analog we get: Et[∆tt+1] = Et[∆st+1]+Et[pi
∗
t+1,F ]−Et[pit+1,H ] = Et[pit+1,F ]−Et[pit+1,H ].
Combining this outcome with the log-linear versions of the domestic CPI (2.5) and its
foreign equivalent, we obtain the following relations between expected CPI and expected
PPI inflation at home and abroad:
Et[pit+1] ≡ Et[pit+1,H ]− (n− 1)Et[∆tt+1], (2.54)
Et[pi
∗
t+1] ≡ Et[pi∗t+1,F ]− nEt[∆tt+1]. (2.55)
Substituting for Et[pit+1] by (2.54) and for Et[pi
∗
t+1] by (2.55), the dynamic IS curves
(2.52) and (2.53) change to the following:
xt = Et[xt+1] +
1
ρ
{Et[pit+1,H ]− iˆt}+ ϑEt[∆tt+1] + ξ − 1
ξ − ρEt[∆at+1], (2.56)
x∗t = Et[x
∗
t+1] +
1
ρ
{Et[pi∗t+1,F ]− iˆ∗t}+ ϑ∗Et[∆tt+1] +
ξ − 1
ξ − ρEt[∆a
∗
t+1], (2.57)
where ϑ := [(n − 1)(ξρ − ξ)]/[(ξ − ρ)ρ] (ϑ > 0) and ϑ∗ := [n(ξρ − ξ)]/[(ξ − ρ)ρ]
(ϑ∗ < 0) holds for the slope coefficients of the dynamic IS curves with respect to the
expected movements in the TOT. In consequence, we need an equation that expresses
these movements as a function of the remaining endogenous variables. Let us use
the log-linear version of equation (2.18), which reads iˆt−1 = ∆st + iˆ∗t−1, in order to
substitute for ∆st in the log-linear representation of current movements in the TOT
∆tt = ∆st + pi
∗
t,F − pit,H . Hence, we obtain:
∆tt = iˆt−1 − iˆ∗t−1 + pi∗t,F − pit,H . (2.58)
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2.4.3 Monetary policy rules
With the derivation of equations (2.49), (2.50), (2.56), (2.57), and (2.58) we have de-
rived a system of five log-linear expectational difference equations. However, with
x,x∗,piH ,pi∗F ,∆t,ˆi,ˆi
∗ we have seven endogenous variables, which gives us two more vari-
ables than equations. Therefore, we need two more equations representing domestic and
foreign monetary policy as Taylor (1993) type interest-rate rules in order to obtain a
determined system of equations.
FollowingWoodford (2003, pp. 90-101), these interest-rate rules comprise a feed-
back from (some of) the endogenous variables. In Woodford (2003), those interest-
rate rules are first incorporated into a Neo-Wicksellian cashless economy, but Wood-
ford (2003, pp. 101-106) also shows that rules of this form produce equivalent results
in case of monetary frictions, e.g., in case of a MIU model such as given by equation
(2.1). Even though the Woodford (2003) results have been derived for the closed
economy, they are supposed to hold for the open economy, too, which is due to the
isomorphism of the models.
The feedback is introduced to circumvent price level (and inflation) indeterminacy
as shown by Sargent & Wallace (1975), which is typically associated with purely
exogenous interest-rate targets (see Woodford 2003, p. 86). In case the latter type
of modeling is avoided, the monetary aggregate is not a superior policy instrument in
comparison to the short-run nominal interest rate. Moreover, it is assumed that the
central banks are committed to their rules rather than they implement new rules on
a period-by-period basis. This is done to overcome time inconsistency of monetary
policy.24
Hereinafter, the two monetary authorities will be called ECB at home and Fed
abroad. As a consequence, the home country will be denoted EU and the foreign
country US.
These two non-optimizing central banks are assumed to conduct their monetary
policies autonomously while taking as given the policy actions of the respective other
monetary authority. This assumption differs, for instance, from Clarida et al. (2002),
Pappa (2004), Benigno & Benigno (2006), or Engel (2009) who discuss cooperative
and non-cooperative equilibria of optimizing central banks among other possibilities.
A particular reason why we neglect cooperative solutions is the finding that there are
only quantitatively negligible welfare gains from cooperation between the ECB and the
Fed for empirically plausible parameter constellations (see Pappa 2004, pp. 770-774).
24For a debate on discretion versus commitment in monetary policy and possible welfare gains from
the latter see, e.g., Clarida et al. (1999, pp. 1670-1671) or Gal´ı (2008, chapter 5).
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Even though the central banks’ targeting rules fulfill a similar purpose in the EU
and the US, it can be justified to assume that they differ up to a certain degree. This
is due to the diverging statutes of the ECB and the Fed.
Therefore, the interest-rate rules differ to the extent that the Fed is supposed to
conduct its monetary policy by considering current US PPI inflation pi∗t,F and the current
US output gap x∗t , while, for the sake of simplicity, the ECB imposes its monetary policy
by taking into account current EU PPI inflation pit,H only. This difference is due to
the fact that all conceivable policy goals of the ECB besides price stability can be
interpreted as secondary.
Hence, the two interest-rate rules read:
iˆt = αpit,H + ωiˆt−1 + vt (2.59)
⇔ it = αpit,H + ωit−1 + (1− ω)¯i+ vt,
iˆ∗t = α
∗pi∗t,F + ι
∗x∗t + ω
∗iˆ∗t−1 + v
∗
t (2.60)
⇔ i∗t = α∗pi∗t,F + ι∗x∗t + ω∗it−1 + (1− ω∗)¯i∗ + v∗t .
The ECB’s interest rate rule (2.59) can be interpreted as follows: α (α > 0) denotes
the sensitivity of the ECB to current domestic PPI inflation pit,H . Since past decisions
cannot be ignored under commitment (see Pappa 2004, p. 754), the rule incorporates
some degree of inertia of the monetary policy instrument i itself, which is measured by
the parameter ω (0 < ω < 1). The parameter 1 − ω, however, measures the degree of
adjustment to the zero-inflation steady-state value of the nominal interest rate i¯.
Note that the feature of interest-rate inertia is rather an empirical finding than an
implication of the statutes of the central banks (see Woodford 2003, pp. 95-96).
Following Gal´ı & Monacelli (2005, p. 723), both rules (2.59) and (2.60) could also
be denoted PPI (or domestic) inflation-based Taylor rules (DITR) as opposed to CPI
inflation-based Taylor rules (CITR) or a credible peg for the nominal exchange rate.
These are the three suboptimal monetary policies compared to the optimal monetary
policy benchmark in the Gal´ı & Monacelli (2005) model. We will not take up these
other possibilities of monetary policy design here, but will employ a CITR later on in
Chapter 4.
In (2.59), vt denotes an exogenously given, stationary AR(1) process of the form
vt = ζvvt−1 + ηv,t (0 < ζv < 1) with the exogenous error term ηv assumed to be i.i.d.
∼ N(0, σ2ηv). This AR(1) process can be interpreted as a transitory monetary policy
shock, where a positive realization of ηv denotes a contractionary shock (see Gal´ı 2008,
p. 51).
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Note that an analogous interpretation for (2.60) also holds for the US. However, α∗
may differ from α as well as ω∗ from ω. Moreover, v∗ is uncorrelated with v such that
domestic and foreign monetary policy shocks are country-specific. ι∗ (ι∗ > 0) denotes
the sensitivity of the Fed to the current foreign output gap x∗t , where ι = 0 is assumed
to hold for the ECB. Since the signs of the elasticities of the central banks’ policy
instruments to endogenous variables are all positive so that they react anti-cyclically to
their changes, the policies can alternatively be characterized as having a lean against
the wind property (see Clarida et al. 1999, p. 1672).
2.5 Determinacy of the rational expectations equi-
librium
To investigate whether there exists a determinate rational expectations equilibrium to
the system of expectational difference equations (2.49), (2.50), (2.56), (2.57), (2.58),
(2.59), and (2.60) we have to rearrange it in matrix form:
Ay = Bx+ u, (2.61)
where the vectors of unknowns y,x and the vector of disturbance terms u read as
follows:
y :=

xt
x∗t
pit,H
pi∗t,F
∆tt
iˆt−1
iˆ∗t−1

,x :=

Et[xt+1]
Et[x
∗
t+1]
Et[pit+1,H ]
Et[pi
∗
t+1,F ]
Et[∆tt+1]
iˆt
iˆ∗t

,u :=

ξ−1
ξ−ρEt[∆at+1]
ξ−1
ξ−ρEt[∆a
∗
t+1]
ut
u∗t
0
−ω−1vt
−(ω∗)−1v∗t

.
34
The coefficient matrices A,B, however, read:
A :=

1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
−µ 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 −µ∗ 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 −1 1 −1 1
0 0 α
ω
0 0 1 0
0 ι
∗
ω∗ 0
α∗
ω∗ 0 0 1

,
B :=

1 0 ρ−1 0 ϑ −ρ−1 0
0 1 0 ρ−1 ϑ∗ 0 −ρ−1
0 0 β 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 β 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ω−1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 (ω∗)−1

.
To determine the eigenvalues of the system of equations (2.61), it has to be rearranged
in the following form:
y =Mx+ v, (2.62)
where M := A−1B and v := A−1u. Moreover, A−1 denotes the inverse of A, which
exists because A is quadratic and det(A) = 1.
The matrices A−1 and M and the vector v read as follows:
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A
−
1
=
                      
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
µ
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
µ
∗
0
1
0
0
0
−
µ
(
ω
+
α
)
ω
µ
∗
ω
∗ +
µ
∗
α
∗ +
ι
∗
ω
∗
−
ω
+
α
ω
ω
∗ +
α
∗
ω
∗
1
1
−
1
−
µ
α
ω
0
−
α ω
0
0
1
0
0
−
µ
∗
α
∗ +
ι
∗
ω
∗
0
−
α
∗
ω
∗
0
0
1
                      ,
M
=
                        
1
0
ρ
−
1
0
ϑ
−
ρ
−
1
0
0
1
0
ρ
−
1
ϑ
∗
0
−
ρ
−
1
µ
0
µ ρ
+
β
0
µ
ϑ
−
µ ρ
0
0
µ
∗
0
µ
∗ ρ
+
β
µ
∗
ϑ
∗
0
−
µ
∗ ρ
−
µ
(
ω
+
α
)
ω
µ
∗
ω
∗ +
µ
∗
α
∗ +
ι
∗
ω
∗
−
µ
(
ω
+
α
)
ω
ρ
−
(
ω
+
α
)
β
ω
µ
∗
ω
∗ +
µ
∗
α
∗ +
ι
∗
ω
∗
ρ
+
(ω
∗ +
α
∗ )
β
ω
∗
−
µ
(
ω
+
α
)
ϑ
ω
+
(µ
∗
ω
∗ +
µ
∗
α
∗ +
ι
∗ )
ϑ
∗
ω
∗
µ
(
ω
+
α
)
ω
ρ
+
ω
−
1
−
µ
∗
ω
∗ +
µ
∗
α
∗ +
ι
∗
ω
∗
ρ
−
(ω
∗ )
−
1
−
µ
α
ω
0
−
µ
α
ω
ρ
−
α
β
ω
0
−
µ
α
ϑ
ω
µ
α
ω
ρ
+
ω
−
1
0
0
−
µ
∗
α
∗ +
ι
∗
ω
∗
0
−
µ
∗
α
∗ +
ι
∗
ω
∗
ρ
−
α
∗
β
ω
∗
−
(µ
∗
α
∗ +
ι
∗ )
ϑ
∗
ω
∗
0
µ
∗
α
∗ +
ι
∗
ω
∗
ρ
+
(ω
∗ )
−
1
                        ,
v
=
                             
(
ξ
−
1
)
E
t
[∆
a
t
+
1
]
ξ
−
ρ
(
ξ
−
1
)
E
t
[∆
a
∗ t+
1
]
ξ
−
ρ
µ
(
ξ
−
1
)
E
t
[∆
a
t
+
1
]
ξ
−
ρ
+
u
t
µ
∗
(
ξ
−
1
)
E
t
[∆
a
∗ t+
1
]
ξ
−
ρ
+
u
∗ t
−
µ
(
ω
+
α
)
(
ξ
−
1
)
E
t
[∆
a
t
+
1
]
ω
(
ξ
−
ρ
)
+
(µ
∗
ω
∗ +
µ
∗
α
∗ +
ι
∗ )
(
ξ
−
1
)
E
t
[∆
a
∗ t+
1
]
ω
∗
(
ξ
−
ρ
)
−
(
ω
+
α
)
u
t
ω
+
(ω
∗ +
α
∗ )
u
∗ t
ω
∗
−
v
t ω
+
v
∗ t
ω
∗
−
µ
α
(
ξ
−
1
)
E
t
[∆
a
t
+
1
]
ω
(
ξ
−
ρ
)
−
α
u
t
ω
−
v
t ω
−
(µ
∗
α
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where det(M) = 0.
The impact of the single disturbances contained in v on the structural equations
of the model can be characterized as follows. The aggregate productivity shocks a, a∗
affect the respective dynamic IS curves, NKPCs, and interest rate rules. The cost-push
shocks u, u∗, however, only influence the respective NKPCs and interest-rate rules. The
monetary policy shocks v, v∗ have a sole impact on the respective interest-rate rules. All
macroeconomic shocks spill over abroad since they explicitly affect the TOT equation
(2.58).
2.5.1 Analytical solution
The system of equations (2.62) consists of two predetermined variables (ˆit−1, iˆ∗t−1) and
five non-predetermined ones (xt, x
∗
t , pit,H , pi
∗
t,F ,∆tt). Comparable to the case discussed
for the closed economy in Gal´ı (2008, p. 56), there is a unique stationary solution
of (2.62) if and only if the coefficient matrix M has five eigenvalues k inside and two
eigenvalues k′ on or outside the complex unit circle (sufficient condition for equilibrium
determinacy). If there were more than five stable eigenvalues, there would be multiple
stationary solutions (indeterminacy). If there were more than two unstable eigenvalues
instead, no stationary solution would exist at all (non-existence).
By computing the characteristic determinant det(M−kI7) we obtain one eigenvalue
k = 0 and a sixth-degree polynomial in k, which cannot be solved analytically.25
In consequence, we have to assign sensible numerical values to the model parameters
in order to determine the remaining eigenvalues of M.
2.5.2 Calibration
The numerical exercise is carried out as follows. First, the EU and the US can be
treated as approximately equal-sized countries such that n = 1 − n = 0.5.26 β = 0.97
is assumed to hold for the intertemporal discount factor. This implies i¯ = i¯∗ = r¯ =
r¯∗ = (1 − β)/β ≈ 0.03 for the zero-inflation steady-state nominal and real interest
rates across countries. Furthermore, ξ = −1 such that ²UL,L = ²U∗L,L∗ = 2 holds for the
partial elasticity of the utility function with respect to domestic (foreign) labor. The
sensitivity of the Fed to the current foreign output gap shall be fixed (ι∗ = 0.5), where
this number corresponds to the original value estimated by Taylor (1993) for the Fed
for the time from 1987 to 1992.
25This polynomial is not displayed here, but its Matlab code is available on request.
26Note that we would obtain qualitatively similar calibration and simulation results for n 6= 0.5.
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The Taylor principle, which states that the monetary authority ought to react to
an increase in current PPI inflation by augmenting its policy instrument more than
one for one in order to account for a determinate rational expectations equilibrium
(see Woodford 2003, p. 40), is assumed to be fulfilled by both central banks (α =
α∗ = 1.5).27 The degrees of nominal interest-rate inertia across countries shall also be
fixed (ω = ω∗ = 0.1) implying that both monetary authorities are supposed to place
relatively more weight (1 − ω = 1 − ω∗ = 0.9) on the adjustment of their short-run
policy instruments to their common zero-inflation steady-state value.
Moreover, let us set ρ = 0.8 such that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
of real consumption 1/ρ = 1.25. Hence, we get the following for the slope coefficients
ϑ, ϑ∗ of the dynamic IS curves (2.56) and (2.57) with respect to expected movements
in the TOT:
ϑ =
(0.5− 1)[(−1) · 0.8− (−1)]
[(−1)− 0.8]0.8 ≈ 0.07,
ϑ∗ =
0.5[(−1) · 0.8− (−1)]
[(−1)− 0.8]0.8 ≈ −0.07.
Finally, let us set the degree of price stickiness to δ = δ∗ = 0.75 across countries,
which corresponds to an average duration of a price of four periods. This implies the
following for the slope coefficients µ, µ∗ of the NKPCs (2.49) and (2.50) with respect
to the domestic (foreign) output gap:
µ = µ∗ =
(1− 0.75)(1− 0.75 · 0.97)[0.8− (−1)]
0.75
≈ 0.16.
Calculating the characteristic determinant det(M− kI7) while using the above param-
eter configuration yields the subsequent numerical eigenvalues:
k1 = 0,
k2 = 0.5441,
k3 = 0.8176 + 0.2411i,
k4 = 0.8176− 0.2411i,
k5 = 0.9775,
27Note that the Taylor principle in its purest form is not a necessary condition for equilibrium
determinacy for an interest-rate rule of type (2.60). Instead, the condition µ∗(α∗−1)+(1−β)ι∗ > 0 is
a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium determinacy in case of a contemporaneous interest-
rate rule (see Bullard & Mitra 2002, pp. 1125-1126). For a graphical representation of determinacy
and indeterminacy regions for contemporaneous and forward-looking interest-rate rules seeGal´ı (2008,
pp. 77-80).
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k6 = 13.3372,
k7 = 18.2548.
Since M contains five stable (k1 to k5) and two unstable eigenvalues (k6 and k7), there
is a unique stationary solution to the system of equations (2.62) such that the rational
expectations equilibrium is determinate.
2.6 Impulse-response analysis
After having assured determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium, we want to
investigate how the endogenous variables of the model react to simulated transitory
shocks at home and abroad. This impulse-response analysis can also be viewed as
additional robustness test for the goodness of the present model specification.
For this purpose, let us assume the following autocorrelation coefficients of the
domestic and foreign productivity, cost-push, and monetary policy shocks: ζa = ζ
∗
a =
ζu = ζ
∗
u = ζv = ζ
∗
v = 0.8.
28
Using the above specification and starting from the non-stochastic zero-inflation
steady state, we entail impulses in period 1 on the exogenous error terms ηa, η
∗
a, ηu, η
∗
u,
ηv, η
∗
v in terms of one standard deviation of +
√
0.4 on their expected value of 0. The
impulse-response analysis is carried out by employing the Dynare preprocessor for
Matlab while performing a Monte Carlo simulation with 10100 draws, where the first
100 draws are used as burn-in draws before computing the usual summary statistics,
which are given below.29
The six figures below show the responses of the output gaps x, x∗, PPI inflation
rates piH , pi
∗
F , movements in the TOT ∆t, nominal interest rates iˆ, iˆ
∗, and the relevant
shock variables themselves to (orthogonalized) impulses on the various exogenous error
28We propose this relatively high serial correlation of the transitory shock variables mainly for
illustrative reasons. Qualitatively, we would obtain the same results if we used smaller autocorrelation
coefficients.
29The software is downloadable in its current version from
http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/. For all computations associated with the impulse-
response analysis it uses the pure perturbation algorithm developed by Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe
(2004, pp. 764-765) as default option. The Dynare program code for Matlab is not reported here,
but is available on request.
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terms for a time range of 40 periods.30
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Figure 2.1: EU productivity shock
A detailed interpretation of the results that can be seen from Figures 2.1 to 2.6 can
be found in the following.
1. The EU output gap, PPI inflation and nominal interest rates decrease before they
return to their zero-inflation steady-state values in response to an impulse on the
EU productivity shock (Figure 2.1). The TOT first augment, then drop below
their zero-inflation steady-state value until they gradually converge. There is also
an impact on all US endogenous variables, which is of opposite sign and quanti-
tatively small.
30Note that the following is assumed for the variance-covariance matrix of the exogenous error terms:
V ar(η) =

σ2ηa 0 0 0 0 0
0 σ2η∗a 0 0 0 0
0 0 σ2ηu 0 0 0
0 0 0 σ2η∗u 0 0
0 0 0 0 σ2ηv 0
0 0 0 0 0 σ2η∗v

.
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Figure 2.2: US productivity shock
2. The US output gap, PPI inflation and nominal interest rates decrease before they
return to their zero-inflation steady-state values in response to an impulse on the
US productivity shock (Figure 2.2). The TOT first decrease, then jump above
their zero-inflation steady-state value until they gradually converge. There is also
an impact on all EU endogenous variables of opposite sign, which is quantitatively
larger compared to the impact of the EU productivity shock on foreign variables.
3. The EU output gap decreases, yet the EU PPI inflation and nominal interest rates
increase before all endogenous variables return to their zero-inflation steady-state
values in response to an impulse on the EU cost-push shock (Figure 2.3). The
TOT first plummet, then jump above their zero-inflation steady-state value until
they gradually converge. There is also an impact on all US endogenous variables,
which is of opposite sign except for the US output gap.
4. The US output gap decreases, yet the US PPI inflation and nominal interest rates
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Figure 2.3: EU cost-push shock
increase before all endogenous variables return to their zero-inflation steady-state
values in response to an impulse on the US cost-push shock (Figure 2.4). The
TOT first augment, then drop below their zero-inflation steady-state value until
they gradually converge. There is also an impact on all EU endogenous variables,
which is of opposite sign except for the EU output gap.
5. The EU output gap, PPI inflation and nominal interest rates decrease before all
endogenous variables return to their zero-inflation steady-state values in response
to an impulse on the EU monetary policy shock (Figure 2.5). The TOT augment
before they return to their zero-inflation steady-state value without any sudden
drops to the negative. There is also an impact on all US endogenous variables,
which is of the same sign.
6. The US output gap, PPI inflation and nominal interest rates decrease before all
endogenous variables return to their zero-inflation steady-state values in response
to an impulse on the US monetary policy shock (Figure 2.6). The TOT plummet
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Figure 2.4: US cost-push shock
before they return to their zero-inflation steady-state value without any sudden
jumps to the positive. There is also an impact on all EU endogenous variables,
which is of the same sign.
The deviation of the EU output gap from the zero-inflation steady state is higher
than the one of the US output gap for all three types of disturbances in case they are
home-made. However, the picture is ambiguous for PPI inflation and nominal interest
rates. None of the shocks discussed above is able to raise output above its flexible-price
equilibrium level, neither in the EU nor in the US. Instead, output in both countries
drops in response to all entailed impulses before it gradually converges. The negative
effect on output is not surprising in context of cost-push shocks, but needs somewhat
more explanation concerning the remaining two types of disturbances.
The negative influence of the productivity shocks on the economy contradicts one
of the central implications of the standard RBC model, namely a positive correlation
of productivity (shocks) and output. Findings for a closed-economy New Keynesian
model, which are similar to the present results, are reported, e.g., in Gal´ı (2002, pp.
17-18).31 This finding also seems to be plausible according to empirical studies, which
31The technical reason for this phenomenon is that a positive technology shock hits flexible-price
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Figure 2.5: EU monetary policy shock
show in addition that technology shocks do not seem to be a significant source for the
creation of business cycles at all, which contradicts another central implication of the
standard RBC model, namely that technology shocks ought to be the dominant driving
force for the creation of business cycles (see Gal´ı & Rabanal 2004, pp. 36-39).
Contrary to Corsetti & Pesenti (2001, pp. 435-439), negative realizations of
v, v∗, which correspond to expansionary monetary policy shocks, always have a prosper
thyself and beggar thy neighbor effect since they influence the TOT for the benefit of
EU (US) resident households by decreasing them below (raising them above) their zero-
inflation steady-state value. In addition, this effect induces a rise of both EU and US
output above their flexible-price values.32
Finally, statistical moments, correlations, and autocorrelations of the simulated en-
dogenous variables are given in Tables 2.1 to 2.3 below.
As one can see from Table 2.1, the explanation why for almost any impulse the
equilibrium output (2.39) harder than actual output (2.22), which needs time to adjust.
32Note, however, that monetary policy shocks in Corsetti & Pesenti (2001) are modeled in terms
of permanent and unexpected changes in money supply. Moreover, we interpret the prosper/beggar
effect somewhat differently since we do not formulate an explicit welfare criterion but stick to the
common interpretation of the TOT as laid out in Section 2.3.
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Figure 2.6: US monetary policy shock
Table 2.1: Moments of simulated variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variance Skewness Exc. Kur.
x 0.118737 5.457627 29.785693 0.012991 -0.091208
x∗ -0.022633 3.210084 10.304640 0.074824 -0.199552
piH 0.002329 1.474853 2.175191 -0.019620 0.097960
pi∗F 0.018958 2.635538 6.946059 -0.046841 -0.042459
∆t -0.025424 2.123355 4.508637 -0.013460 0.046453
iˆ -0.016873 1.748576 3.057518 0.000733 0.009221
iˆ∗ 0.024047 2.549748 6.501216 -0.064055 -0.093567
deviation of x is notably higher than of x∗ may be found in the differing interest-rate
rules for the ECB (2.59) and the Fed (2.60). The positive and fixed sensitivity of the Fed
to the current US output gap ceteris paribus absorbs part of the impulses transmitted
through the system of equations (2.62). This additional channel works like an attenuator
to exogenous disturbances, which does not exist for the EU by assumption. As a
consequence, the simulated variance of the domestic output gap σ˜2x is almost three
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Table 2.2: Correlation of simulated variables
Variable x x∗ piH pi∗F ∆t iˆ iˆ
∗
x 1.0000 0.0269 -0.4315 0.0360 -0.2352 -0.7875 0.0453
x∗ 0.0269 1.0000 0.0001 -0.8655 -0.1809 -0.0011 -0.9041
piH -0.4315 0.0001 1.0000 -0.0368 -0.1235 0.8854 -0.0406
pi∗F 0.0360 -0.8655 -0.0368 1.0000 0.2703 -0.0538 0.9924
∆t -0.2352 -0.1809 -0.1235 0.2703 1.0000 0.0630 0.2258
iˆ -0.7875 -0.0011 0.8854 -0.0538 0.0630 1.0000 -0.0620
iˆ∗ 0.0453 -0.9041 -0.0406 0.9924 0.2258 -0.0620 1.0000
Table 2.3: Autocorrelation of simulated variables
Variable t− 1 t− 2 t− 3 t− 4 t− 5
x 0.8131 0.6528 0.5266 0.4261 0.3462
x∗ 0.8226 0.6641 0.5340 0.4327 0.3536
piH 0.7975 0.6489 0.5270 0.4262 0.3480
pi∗F 0.8014 0.6423 0.5125 0.4104 0.3284
∆t 0.1119 0.0553 0.0302 0.0286 0.0236
iˆ 0.8276 0.6715 0.5432 0.4382 0.3584
iˆ∗ 0.8230 0.6620 0.5296 0.4254 0.3426
times as high as the simulated variance of the foreign output gap σ˜2x∗ :
σ˜2x
σ˜2x∗
=
29.785693
10.304640
≈ 2.89.
On the contrary, the simulated variance of the foreign PPI inflation rate σ˜2pi∗F is more
than three times as high as the simulated variance of the domestic PPI inflation rate
σ˜2piH :
σ˜2pi∗F
σ˜2piH
=
6.946059
2.175191
≈ 3.19.
This means that if the ECB implemented its monetary policy by following the interest-
rate rule (2.59), sustaining price stability would be better attainable than if, e.g., it
were using an interest-rate rule as proposed for the Fed (2.60) instead. Nonetheless,
this advantage can only be reached at the expense of relatively high fluctuations in
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the EU output gap, which is a trade-off commonly observed in the Monetary Policy
literature.
2.7 Concluding remarks
The main results of the present chapter, which have already been stated in the intro-
ductory Section 2.1, shall again be summarized in the following.
Simulated aggregate productivity shocks have a negative impact on EU and US
output, a result already described for the closed economy by Gal´ı (2002). Simulated
cost-push as well as contractionary monetary policy shocks also have a negative impact
on EU and US output.
In contrast to Corsetti & Pesenti (2001), expansionary monetary policy shocks
always have a prosper thyself and beggar thy neighbor effect since they influence the
TOT for the benefit of EU (US) resident households by decreasing them below (raising
them above) their zero-inflation steady-state value. In addition, this effect would induce
a rise of both domestic and foreign output above their flexible-price values.
If the ECB implemented the interest-rate rule proposed in the present article, it
would encounter lower fluctuations in EU PPI inflation compared to an interest-rate
rule as proposed for the Fed. This is consistent with the ECB’s paramount objective
of price stability. However, this advantage only holds at the expense of relatively high
fluctuations in the EU output gap; a trade-off commonly observed in the Monetary
Policy literature.
Besides possible theoretical extensions to the model as summarized, e.g., in Gal´ı
(2008, chapter 8) and as referred to in Chapter 1, an immediate application of the
present New Keynesian framework is an empirical one.
In Chapter 3, we want to do that using quarterly Euro area and US data to esti-
mate the model parameters while employing Bayesian techniques. Moreover, we want
to analyze impulse responses based on the estimated model and perform out-of-sample
forecasts for the model’s endogenous variables in comparison to a classically estimated
VAR model and the additive seasonal Holt-Winters method. Finally, we evaluate the
forecasting performance of all three forecasting models and of uniformly combined fore-
casts.
In Chapter 4, we will shift the focus from the two large open economies to the
interior of one of them, namely the EU. Here we use quarterly Austrian and Hungarian
data to measure the forecast accuracy of new variants of the model in comparison to a
number of (Bayesian) (vector) autoregressive benchmarks.
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2.8 Appendix to Chapter 2
2.8.1 Price indices and demand curves
The derivation of all price indices and demand curves follows the ideas in Obstfeld
& Rogoff (1996, pp. 662, 664) for the basic Obstfeld & Rogoff (1995) model.
Consumption-based consumer price index and demand curves for composite
goods The representative domestic household maximizes
C =
CnHC
1−n
F
nn(1− n)1−n
with respect to CH subject to the budget constraint
PC = PHCH + PFCF .
Hence, using the Lagrangian, we get:
Λ =
CnHC
1−n
F
nn(1− n)1−n − λ(PHCH + PFCF − PC)→ maxCH
⇒ ∂Λ
∂CH
=
nCn−1H C
1−n
F
nn(1− n)1−n − λPH = 0.
Solving this expression for CH , one obtains the subsequent preliminary demand function
for the composite domestic good:
CH = λ
1
n−1P
1
n−1
H
n
1− nCF .
Multiplying the preceding equation with PH , one obtains:
PHCH = λ
1
n−1P
n
n−1
H
n
1− nCF ,
with PHCH = nPC. Now combine the preceding equation with the preliminary demand
function from above. Then one gets for CH equation (2.12):
CH = n
(
PH
P
)−1
C.
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Analogously, one gets for CF equation (2.13):
CF = (1− n)
(
PF
P
)−1
C.
Plugging these two equations into the definition of C, one gets:
C =
[
n
(
PH
P
)−1
C
]n [
(1− n) (PF
P
)−1
C
]1−n
nn(1− n)1−n =
(
PH
P
)−n(
PF
P
)n−1
C.
Solving this for P , one finally obtains equation (2.5):
P = P nHP
1−n
F .
Consumption-based producer price index and demand curves for individual
goods The representative domestic household maximizes
CH =
[(
1
n
) 1
θ
∫ n
0
C(h)
θ−1
θ dh
] θ
θ−1
with respect to C(h) subject to the budget constraint
PHCH =
∫ n
0
P (h)C(h)dh.
Hence, using the Lagrangian, we get:
Λ =
[(
1
n
) 1
θ
∫ n
0
C(h)
θ−1
θ dh
] θ
θ−1
− λ
[∫ n
0
P (h)C(h)dh− PHCH
]
→ max
C(h)
⇒ ∂Λ
∂C(h)
=
[(
1
n
) 1
θ
∫ n
0
C(h)
θ−1
θ dh
] 1
θ−1 (
1
n
) 1
θ
C(h)−
1
θ − λP (h) = 0.
Solving this expression for C(h), one obtains the subsequent preliminary demand func-
tion for individual domestic goods:
C(h) = P (h)−θ
 λ[( 1
n
) 1
θ
∫ n
0
C(h)
θ−1
θ dh
] 1
θ−1 ( 1
n
) 1
θ

−θ
.
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Multiplying the preceding equation with P (h), one obtains:
P (h)C(h) = P (h)1−θ
 λ[( 1
n
) 1
θ
∫ n
0
C(h)
θ−1
θ dh
] 1
θ−1 ( 1
n
) 1
θ

−θ
.
Taking the integral from 0 to n over both sides of this equation, one gets:
∫ n
0
P (h)C(h)dh =
∫ n
0
P (h)1−θdh
 λ[( 1
n
) 1
θ
∫ n
0
C(h)
θ−1
θ dh
] 1
θ−1 ( 1
n
) 1
θ

−θ
,
with
∫ n
0
P (h)C(h)dh = PHCH . Now combine the preceding equation with the prelimi-
nary demand function from above. Then one gets for C(h):
C(h) = P (h)−θ
PHCH∫ n
0
P (h)1−θdh
.
Plugging this into the definition of CH , one gets:
CH =
{(
1
n
) 1
θ
∫ n
0
[
P (h)−θ
PHCH∫ n
0
P (h)1−θdh
] θ−1
θ
dh
} θ
θ−1
.
Dividing this formula by CH and raising both sides of the resulting equation to the
power of (θ − 1)/θ, we obtain:
1
θ−1
θ =
(
1
n
) 1
θ
∫ n
0
[
P (h)−θ
PH∫ n
0
P (h)1−θdh
] θ−1
θ
dh,
which can be solved for PH to finally obtain the domestic PPI given by equation (2.6):
PH =
[
1
n
∫ n
0
P (h)1−θdh
] 1
1−θ
.
Plugging this formula into the last given equation in C(h), one eventually gets equation
(2.10):
C(h) =
1
n
[
P (h)
PH
]−θ
CH .
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2.8.2 First order conditions for a utility maximum
The representative household maximizes
Ut = Et
{ ∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
C1−ρs
1− ρ +
χ
1− ε
(
Ms
Ps
)1−ε
− γ
1− ξL
1−ξ
s
]}
with respect to the decision variables Ct,Mt, Bt, Lt subject to the intertemporal budget
constraint (in real terms)
Wt
Pt
Lt + (1 + it−1)
Bt−1
Pt
+
Mt−1
Pt
+
Γt(h)
Pt
= Ct +
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
+ τt.
Hence, using the Lagrangian, we get:
Λt = Et
{ ∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
C1−ρs
1− ρ +
χ
1− ε
(
Ms
Ps
)1−ε
− γ
1− ξL
1−ξ
s
]
− λs
[
Ws
Ps
Ls + (1 + is−1)
Bs−1
Ps
+
Ms−1
Ps
+
Γs(h)
Ps
− Cs − Ms
Ps
− Bs
Ps
− τs
]}
→ max
Ct,Mt,Bt,Lt,λt
with {λ}∞s=t denoting a sequence of Lagrange multipliers.
⇒ ∂Λt
∂Ct
= C−ρt − λt(−1) = 0,
∂Λt
∂Mt
= χ
(
Mt
Pt
)−ε
1
Pt
− λt
(
− 1
Pt
)
− βEt
[
λt+1
Pt+1
]
= 0,
∂Λt
∂Bt
= −λt
(
− 1
Pt
)
− β(1 + it)Et
[
λt+1
Pt+1
]
= 0,
∂Λt
∂Lt
= −γL−ξt − λt
Wt
Pt
= 0,
∂Λt
∂λt
= −
[
Wt
Pt
Lt + (1 + it−1)
Bt−1
Pt
+
Mt−1
Pt
+
Γt(h)
Pt
− Ct − Mt
Pt
− Bt
Pt
− τt
]
= 0.
From the first partial derivative one obtains C−ρt = −λt and therefore C−ρt+1 = −λt+1.
Plugging this into the fourth one, one gets equation (2.21):
γ
L−ξt
C−ρt
=
Wt
Pt
.
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Now, by using C−ρt = −λt and C−ρt+1 = −λt+1, one obtains from the third partial
derivative equation (2.19):
C−ρt
Pt
= β(1 + it)Et
[
C−ρt+1
Pt+1
]
.
Finally, plugging the above expression into the second partial derivative yields equation
(2.20):
χ
(
Mt
Pt
)−ε
C−ρt
=
it
1 + it
.
2.8.3 Equilibrium conditions on world bond and goods mar-
kets
The subsequent derivation is based on Obstfeld & Rogoff (2001, pp. 7-9), which
itself is based on reasoning by Corsetti & Pesenti (2001, pp. 430-433).
Start with the market clearing condition for a single good z:
Yt(z) = nCt(z) + (1− n)C∗t (z).
Assuming, for instance, that good z is a typical domestic good such that z = h ∈ [0, n]
and multiplying the preceding equation with Pt(h) one obtains:
Pt(h)Yt(h) = nPt(h)Ct(h) + (1− n)Pt(h)C∗t (h).
Taking the integral from 0 to n and using equations (2.6) and (2.10) yields:∫ n
0
Pt(h)Yt(h)dh = nPt,HCt,H + (1− n)Pt,HC∗t,H .
Because of equations (2.12) and (2.14) this expression implies:∫ n
0
Pt(h)Yt(h)dh = n
2PtCt + (1− n)nPtC∗t = nPtCwt ,
where the right-hand side of the above equation denotes global demand for domestic
goods in domestic currency. Since Y denotes domestic per-capita output, the left-hand
side of the equation can alternatively be written as nPt,HYt, which yields the subsequent
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equilibrium condition on the world market for domestic goods (2.27):
Pt,HYt = PtC
w
t .
Note that the equilibrium condition on the world market for foreign goods (2.28) can
be derived analogously.
Both equations immediately collapse to the definition of the TOT given by equation
(2.29):
Tt :=
Pt,F
Pt,H
=
StP
∗
t,F
Pt,H
=
Yt
Y ∗t
.
Furthermore, substituting equation (2.23) for the domestic household’s instantaneous
profits into the domestic intertemporal budget constraint (2.17) we get:
(1 + it−1)Bt−1 +Mt−1 + Pt(h)Yt(h) = PtCt +Mt +Bt + Ptτt.
Integrating from 0 to n and using
∫ n
0
Pt(h)Yt(h)dh = nPt,HYt one obtains:
(1 + it−1)Bt−1 +Mt−1 + Pt,HYt = PtCt +Mt +Bt + Ptτt.
Due to the government’s budget constraint (2.37) the preceding equation rearranges to
the domestic balance of payments identity (2.30):
Pt,HYt − PtCt + it−1Bt−1 ≡ Bt −Bt−1.
Note that the foreign balance of payments identity (2.31) can be derived analogously.
2.8.4 Dynamic IS curves
First rewrite the domestic Euler equation for real consumption (2.19) as follows:
C−ρt = β(1 + it)PtEt
[
C−ρt+1
Pt+1
]
.
After having done so, we plug the condition for domestic goods market clearing (2.35)
into the preceding equation:
(T n−1t Yt)
−ρ = β(1 + it)PtEt
[
(T n−1t+1 Yt+1)
−ρ
Pt+1
]
.
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The non-stochastic zero-inflation steady-state version of this equations reads as follows:
(T¯ n−1Y¯ )−ρ = β(1 + i¯)P¯
(T¯ n−1Y¯ )−ρ
P¯
.
The ratio of the last two equations then reads:
(
T n−1t Yt
T¯ n−1Y¯
)−ρ
=
1 + it
1 + i¯
Pt
Et
[
(Tn−1t+1 Yt+1)
−ρ
Pt+1
]
(T¯ n−1Y¯ )−ρ
.
By taking the natural logarithm of this ratio, one obtains:
−ρ[(n− 1)tt + yt − (n− 1)t¯− y¯] = ln(1 + it)− ln(1 + i¯) + pt − Et[pt+1]
− ρ{(n− 1)Et[tt+1] + Et[yt+1]}+ ρ[(n− 1)t¯+ y¯].
Note that in approximation ln(1+it) ≈ it and ln(1+i¯) ≈ i¯. Moreover, the approximation
lnEt[Ψt+1] ≈ Et[Ψt+1] − 1 = Et[Ψt+1 − 1] ≈ Et[lnΨt+1] = Etψt+1 assures for the
exchangeability of the ln and expectations operators for a generic random variable Ψ.
Subsequently, Et[pit+1] := Et[pt+1]−pt shall be defined as the expected CPI inflation
rate in period t+ 1. In addition, let hatted variables denote the percentage deviations
from their zero-inflation steady-state values (yˆt := yt − y¯, Et[yˆt+1] := Et[yt+1]− y¯, iˆt :=
it − i¯).
Taking this into account and canceling the term ρ(n − 1)t¯ on both sides, the last
equation rearranges to:
−ρ(n− 1)tt − ρyt + ρy¯ = iˆt − Et[pit+1]− ρ(n− 1)Et[tt+1]− ρEt[yt+1] + ρy¯.
Solving this for yˆt, one finally obtains the domestic dynamic IS curve (2.40):
yˆt = Et[yˆt+1] +
1
ρ
{Et[pit+1]− iˆt} − (1− n)Et[∆tt+1].
Note that the foreign dynamic IS curve (2.41) can be derived analogously.
2.8.5 New Keynesian Phillips curves
In period t, a domestic producer willing to reset her price maximizes her expected
discounted future profits with respect to Pt(h):
Et
{ ∞∑
s=t
δs−tβs−t
(
Cws
Cwt
)−ρ [
Pt(h)
Ps,H
Ys(h)− κsYs(h)
]}
→ max
Pt(h)
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βs−t(Cws /C
w
t )
−ρ is a stochastic discount factor, which denotes the marginal rate of
substitution of real (world) consumption between periods s and t. Note that here
one has made use of equation (2.24). In case of goods market clearing output of an
individual producer equals global demand for the differentiated good (Y (h) = Cw(h)).
Note further that the condition Pt(h) = Ps(h) during the length of the contract implies
for the global demand function (2.15) for a representative domestic good:
Cws (h) =
[
Pt(h)
Ps,H
]−θ (
Ps,H
Ps
)−1
Cws .
Substituting this into the above equation yields
Et
{ ∞∑
s=t
(δβ)s−t
(
Cws
Cwt
)−ρ [(
Pt(h)
Ps,H
)1−θ (
Ps,H
Ps
)−1
Cws − κs
(
Pt(h)
Ps,H
)−θ (
Ps,H
Ps
)−1
Cws
]}
→ max
Pt(h)
and gives as the subsequent first order condition:
Et
{ ∞∑
s=t
(δβ)s−t
(
Cws
Cwt
)−ρ
1
Ps,H
[
(1− θ)
(
Pt(h)
Ps,H
)−θ (
Ps,H
Ps
)−1
+ θκs
(
Pt(h)
Ps,H
)−θ−1(
Ps,H
Ps
)−1]
Cws
}
= 0.
Solving this for Pt(h)/Pt,H , one gets the following price-setting equation:
Pt(h)
Pt,H
=
θ
θ − 1
Et
{∑∞
s=t(δβ)
s−t
[
κs
(
Ps,H
Pt,H
)θ (
Ps,H
Ps
)−1
(Cws )
1−ρ
]}
Et
{∑∞
s=t(δβ)
s−t
[(
Ps,H
Pt,H
)θ−1 (
Ps,H
Ps
)−1
(Cws )
1−ρ
]} .
Now consider the case where everybody resets their prices (δ = 0). As each producer
charges the same price (PH = P (h)), the above equation collapses to the following :
Pt(h)
Pt,H
=
θ
θ − 1κt = 1.
Again we get the real marginal production cost associated with a flexible-price equilib-
rium κflex:
κflext =
θ − 1
θ
.
Now let us return to the case of sticky prices (δ > 0). From the domestic PPI (2.6) one
gets the subsequent law of motion:
P 1−θt,H = (1− δ)Pt(h)1−θ + δP 1−θt−1,H .
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Log-linearizing the preceding formula around the zero-inflation steady-state price level
P¯H yields the following percentage deviations:
pˆt,H = (1− δ)pˆt(h) + δpˆt−1,H .
Now reformulate the price-setting equation as follows:
Et
{ ∞∑
s=t
(δβ)s−t
[(
Ps,H
Pt,H
)θ−1(
Ps,H
Ps
)−1
(Cws )
1−ρ
]}
Qt
=
θ
θ − 1Et
{ ∞∑
s=t
(δβ)s−t
[
κs
(
Ps,H
Pt,H
)θ (
Ps,H
Ps
)−1
(Cws )
1−ρ
]}
,
where Qt := Pt(h)/Pt,H .
If one log-linearizes this equation around the zero-inflation steady-state, one finally
obtains the subsequent percentage deviations (Q¯ = 1, [θ/(θ − 1)]κflext = 1):
ln
[
(C¯w)1−ρ
1− δβ
]
+
1
(C¯w)1−ρ
1−δβ
{
(C¯w)1−ρ
1− δβ qˆt +
∞∑
s=t
(δβ)s−t(C¯w)1−ρ[(1− ρ)cˆws + (θ − 1)(Et[pˆs,H ]− pˆt,H) + (−1)(Et[pˆs,H ]− Et[pˆs])]
}
= ln
[
(C¯w)1−ρ θθ−1κ
flex
t
1− δβ
]
+
1
(C¯w)1−ρ
1−δβ
{ ∞∑
s=t
(δβ)s−t(C¯w)1−ρ[(1− ρ)cˆws + Et[κˆs] + θ(Et[pˆs,H ]− pˆt,H) + (−1)(Et[pˆs,H ]− Et[pˆs])]
}
,
where most of the terms cancel out.
Solving the remainder for qˆt + pˆt,H , one gets:
qˆt + pˆt,H = (1− δβ)
∞∑
s=t
(δβ)s−t{Et[pˆs,H ] + Et[κˆs]}
= (1− δβ)(pˆt,H + κˆt) + δβ{Et[qˆt+1] + Et[pˆt+1,H ]}
⇔ qˆt = (1− δβ)κˆt + δβ{Et[qˆt+1] + Et[pit+1,H ]},
where Et[pit+1,H ] := Et[pˆt+1,H ] − pˆt,H . Due to qˆt := pˆt(h) − pˆt,H and pˆt(h) = [1/(1 −
δ)]pˆt,H − [δ/(1− δ)]pˆt−1,H , it follows that qˆt = [δ/(1− δ)]pit,H . Plugging this result into
the above equation one finally obtains the domestic NKPC (2.42):
pit,H = βEt[pit+1,H ] +
(1− δ)(1− δβ)
δ
κˆt.
Note that the foreign NKPC (2.43) can be derived analogously.
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Chapter 3
Estimation, structural analysis, and
forecasting performance
3.1 Introduction
The present chapter deals with two important applications of DSGE models: estimation
and forecasting. These empirical applications are of importance since, e.g., large-scale
DSGE models such as the NAWM are regularly used by the ECB and other central
banks for macroeconomic projection and policy analysis within the Euro area (see
Christoffel et al. 2008, p. 4). Despite misspecification, especially those large-scale
DSGE models seem to be accurate enough to be used for reliable policy analysis and
projection (see DelNegro et al. 2005, p. 4).
The small-scale sticky-price two-country DSGE model of the Euro area and the
US being our first model under scrutiny is the one developed in Chapter 2 and is
characterized by diverging interest-rate rules assigned to the monetary authorities of
the two countries, the ECB on the one hand and the Fed on the other. The interest-
rate rules differ since they reflect the diverging statutes of these two central banks. The
impact of the ECB’s and the Fed’s differing legal statutes on their monetary policy
functions also seems to be empirically plausible (see Sahuc & Smets 2008, pp. 512-
514).
We want to estimate this DSGE model by employing Bayesian inference, which
will be discussed in more detail later. Role-model closed-economy papers of the Euro
area using Bayesian techniques that are frequently cited in the literature are Smets &
Wouters (2003) concerning estimation and Smets & Wouters (2004) concerning
forecasting. For a general overview of Bayesian inference in DSGE models, the reader
is referred to An & Schorfheide (2007).
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Since VARs of infinite order represent unconstrained versions of DSGE models (see
Rubaszek & Skrzypczyn´ski 2008, p. 499), such models are suitable as plausibility
tests for the causality structure of DSGE models that is imposed by economic theory.
Hence, the second model under scrutiny is of the atheoretical VAR type. Even for VARs
of finite order on which we have to rely in practice, Kascha & Mertens (2009) show
that those can be good approximations to the dynamic behavior of DSGE models.
Differing from a major part of the literature on the topic (see, e.g., Adolfson et
al. 2007, pp. 306-309 or Rubaszek & Skrzypczyn´ski 2008, pp. 505-511), we do not
estimate and forecast with a Bayesian VAR (BVAR) for now (see Lu¨tkepohl 2005,
pp. 222-229 for a characterization) since we think that assuming the availability of
prior information for VAR estimation does not deliver the most unconstrained VAR
model possible. Later on in Chapter 4, we will also present an application of several
BVAR models.
Besides Smets & Wouters (2007) and Rubaszek & Skrzypczyn´ski (2008)
who both investigate the forecasting performance of closed-economy DSGE models of
the US, there are many more examples for estimated and/or forecasted DSGE models
applying Bayesian techniques such as Adolfson et al. (2007) who investigate the
forecasting performance of an open-economy DSGE model of the Euro area. While
Smets & Wouters (2004, 2007) and Adolfson et al. (2007) find that their DSGE
models are able to forecast well in comparison to (B)VAR benchmarks, Rubaszek &
Skrzypczyn´ski (2008) obtain mixed results.
Further analyses are, e.g., Gal´ı & Rabanal (2004) who find that a traditional
RBC model does not fit well postwar US data. Moreover, Sahuc & Smets (2008)
explore reasons for observed differences in the amplitude of the interest-rate cycles of
the ECB and the Fed since 1999 while estimating medium-scale DSGE models of the
Euro area and the US separately.
The main results of the analysis based on quarterly OECD data ranging from 1994Q1
until 2009Q1 are summarized in the following.
The estimated DSGE model qualitatively reproduces the findings of the calibrated
one from Chapter 2 with respect to most of the parameter values and to impulses
responses on the various exogenous error terms. Nonetheless, the degrees of price
stickiness in both countries are lower and the degrees of interest-rate inertia across
countries are higher than expected prior to estimation.
Estimating an unconstrained VAR(1) does not yield the identical causal relation-
ships as implied by the DSGE. However, Granger causality tests suggest a rather com-
plex causality structure including causalities between real and nominal variables across
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countries. In addition, impulse responses based on the VAR(1) sometimes differ from
the ones obtained for the DSGE.
Both models and the additive seasonal Holt-Winters method, a simple univariate
extrapolation method serving as a benchmark, were not able to predict the severeness
or, at least, the evolution of the economic and financial crisis for the forecasting period
from 2007Q2 until 2009Q1 since the current crisis is so at odds with regular economic
activity.
Finally, we obtain that the accuracy of DSGE forecasts, measured by the root
mean squared forecasting error and the mean absolute forecasting error, can compete
well with the accuracy of VAR(1), Holt-Winters, and uniformly combined forecasts in
times of usual economic performance. In two cases, the DSGE is able to significantly
outperform some of the rival forecasting models, but only at the 10% level.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the two
models under scrutiny. Section 3.3 outlines the estimation methodology, followed by
the presentation of the OECD data used for launching the estimation in Section 3.4.
Section 3.5 states the estimation results for both models. The chapter proceeds with an
impulse-response analysis in Section 3.6 and out-of-sample forecasts of the two models
and the additive seasonal Holt-Winters method in Section 3.7. In Section 3.8, we
continue with measuring the forecast accuracy of all three forecasting models as well
as a uniformly combined forecast. Finally, Section 3.9 concludes. Additional tables are
given in Appendix 3.10.
3.2 Two models
Subsequently, we introduce the two models that will be under examination throughout
the remainder of the present chapter of this dissertation.
3.2.1 A two-country DSGE model with diverging interest-rate
rules
The first model under scrutiny is a canonical log-linear representation of the fully micro-
founded two-country DSGE framework of the Euro area (EU) and the US developed in
Chapter 2. For the reader’s convenience, we again state the model’s seven structural
equations and briefly summarize its properties. Variables indexed by superscript aster-
isks denote foreign, i.e. US, variables. As we will see in Chapter 4, this model can be
applied to other pairs of countries, too. Therefore, we choose to stick to this generic
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notation.
xt = Et[xt+1] +
1
ρ
{Et[pit+1,H ]− iˆt}+ (n− 1)(ξρ− ξ)
(ξ + ρ)ρ
Et[∆tt+1] +
ξ + 1
ξ + ρ
Et[∆at+1], (3.1)
x∗t = Et[x
∗
t+1] +
1
ρ
{Et[pi∗t+1,F ]− iˆ∗t }+
n(ξρ− ξ)
(ξ + ρ)ρ
Et[∆tt+1] +
ξ + 1
ξ + ρ
Et[∆a
∗
t+1], (3.2)
pit,H = βEt[pit+1,H ] +
(1− δ)(1− δβ)(ρ+ ξ)
δ
xt + ut, (3.3)
pi∗t,F = βEt[pi
∗
t+1,F ] +
(1− δ∗)(1− δ∗β)(ρ+ ξ)
δ∗
x∗t + u
∗
t , (3.4)
∆tt = iˆt−1 − iˆ∗t−1 + pi∗t,F − pit,H + dt, (3.5)
iˆt = αpit,H + ωiˆt−1 + vt, (3.6)
iˆ∗t = α
∗pi∗t,F + ι
∗x∗t + ω
∗iˆ∗t−1 + v
∗
t . (3.7)
The determined system of expectational difference equations (3.1) to (3.7) consists of
Euro area and US dynamic IS curves representing Euro area and US aggregate demand
as given by equations (3.1) and (3.2), which can be derived by log-linearizing Euro area
and US intertemporal Euler equations for real consumption around the non-stochastic
zero-inflation steady state while making use of the goods market clearing conditions for
Euro area and US final goods.
In addition, we have Euro area and US NKPCs representing Euro area and US
aggregate supply as given by equations (3.3) and (3.4), which can be derived by log-
linearizing the price-setting equations of monopolistically competitive Euro area and
US final goods firms around the non-stochastic zero-inflation steady-state under the
assumption of producer currency pricing. Moreover, we have an equation that relates
current movements in the TOT ∆t to the other nominal endogenous variables as given
by equation (3.5).
The remaining endogenous variables in this two-country model are the Euro area
and US output gaps x, x∗, Euro area and US PPI inflation rates piH , pi∗F , and the Euro
area and US short-run nominal interest rates iˆ, iˆ∗, where the latter are determined by
the interest-rate rules of the ECB (3.6) and the Fed (3.7), respectively.
In the present case, we assume that the divergence of the central banks’ statutes,
which has been mentioned in Section 3.1, materializes as follows: besides current US
PPI inflation, measured by the sensitivity α∗ (α∗ > 0), the Fed takes into account
the current US output gap, measured by the sensitivity ι∗ (ι∗ > 0), whereas the ECB
is supposed to implement its monetary policy by considering current Euro area PPI
inflation only, measured by the sensitivity α (α > 0). Moreover, ω, ω∗ (0 < ω, ω∗ < 1)
denote the degrees of interest-rate inertia of the ECB and the Fed, respectively.
From the Euro area and US CES period utility functions we obtain the coefficient
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of relative risk aversion in consumption ρ (0 < ρ < 1) and the inverse of the elasticity
of labor supply ξ (ξ > 0), whereby the inverse of ρ denotes the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution of real consumption 1/ρ in the Euro area and US dynamic IS curves
(3.1) and (3.2).1
n denotes the country size of the Euro area and 1 − n the country size of the US
such that world population is normalized to 1. [(n− 1)(ξρ− ξ)]/[(ξ + ρ)ρ] > 0 denotes
the slope coefficient of the Euro area dynamic IS curve (3.1) with respect to expected
movements in the TOT. [n(ξρ−ξ)]/[(ξ+ρ)ρ] < 0, however, denotes the slope coefficient
of the US dynamic IS curve (3.2).
In the Euro area and US NKPCs (3.3) and (3.4), we further encounter the intertem-
poral discount factor β (0 < β < 1). [(1− δ)(1− δβ)(ρ+ ξ)]/δ > 0 represents the slope
coefficient of the Euro area NKPC (3.3) with respect to the Euro area output gap.
[(1 − δ∗)(1 − δ∗β)(ρ + ξ)]/δ∗ > 0, however, represents the slope coefficient of the US
NKPC (3.4). Finally, δ, δ∗ (0 < δ, δ∗ < 1) denote the degrees of price stickiness in the
Euro area and the US, respectively, and originate from introducing nominal rigidities
in terms of Calvo (1983) contracts.
The above framework comprises various transitory macroeconomic disturbances,
which read as follows:
at = ζaat−1 + ηa,t, (3.8)
a∗t = ζ
∗
aa
∗
t−1 + η
∗
a,t, (3.9)
ut = ζuut−1 + ηu,t, (3.10)
u∗t = ζ
∗
uu
∗
t−1 + η
∗
u,t, (3.11)
dt = ζddt−1 + ηd,t, (3.12)
vt = ζvvt−1 + ηv,t, (3.13)
v∗t = ζ
∗
vv
∗
t−1 + η
∗
v,t. (3.14)
We assume that 0 < ζ < 1 holds for all autocorrelation coefficients ζ such that the
stochastic processes (3.8) to (3.14) are all stationary. All exogenous error terms η are
assumed to be i.i.d. ∼ N(0, σ2η) and uncorrelated, such that Et[ηt] = 0, Et[ηtη′t] = Ση,
and Et[ηtη
′
s] = 0 holds (s 6= t), where Ση denotes the corresponding variance-covariance
matrix.
The single macroeconomic shocks can be interpreted as follows. a, a∗ denote country-
1Note that we have to account for ξ having the opposite sign compared to Chapter 2 in equations
(3.1) to (3.4) since the prior distribution we wish to assign to this parameter in Section 3.3 is only
defined for non-negative real numbers.
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specific aggregate productivity shocks. u, u∗ denote country-specific cost-push or in-
flationary shocks. d denotes a global measurement error component comparable to
Adolfson et al. (2007, p. 297). This assumption differs from Chapter 2 and is mainly
introduced at this point since the movements in the TOT will be the variable we will
have to construct ourselves in Section 3.4, which is why we introduce a measurement
error here. v, v∗ denote country-specific monetary policy or interest-rate shocks.
3.2.2 An unconstrained vector autoregressive model
The second model under scrutiny is rather simple. It is an atheoretical VAR model of lag
order p, which a priori neither imposes constraints concerning causality between vari-
ables nor declares some of the variables exogenous. It reads as follows (see Lu¨tkepohl
2005, p. 13):
yt = ν+M1yt−1+...+Miyt−i+...+Mpyt−p+εt, t = 0,±1,±2, ..., i = 1, ..., p. (3.15)
Using the same variables as introduced for the DSGE model above, we have yt :=
(xt, x
∗
t , pit,H , pi
∗
t,F ,∆tt, it, i
∗
t )
′, which is a 7×1-dimensional vector of unknowns. Moreover,
Mi are 7×7-dimensional fixed coefficient matrices. ν := (νx, νx∗ , νpiH , νpi∗F , ν∆t, νi, νi∗)′ is
a fixed 7×1-dimensional vector of intercept terms, which allows for a possible non-zero
mean Et[yt]. Finally, εt is a 7 × 1-dimensional vector of exogenous error terms, for
which Et[εt] = 0, Et[εtε
′
t] = Σε, and Et[εtε
′
s] = 0 holds (s 6= t), where Σε denotes the
corresponding variance-covariance matrix.
3.3 Estimation methodology
Let us now turn to the basic elements of Bayesian inference, which is commonly used
to estimate the structural parameters of DSGE models. Basically, there are three
main differences associated with Bayesian estimation in comparison, e.g., to GMM as
summarized by An & Schorfheide (2007, p. 123). These differences are sometimes
seen to be advantageous by adherents of Bayesian techniques.
1. Bayesian estimation is system-based, which means that it fits the solved DSGE
model to a vector of aggregate time series. Unlike GMM, it does not depend on
specific equilibrium relations such as Euler equations for real consumption.
2. The estimation is based on the likelihood function generated by the DSGE model
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rather than on comparing divergences between DSGE and VAR impulse responses.
3. Prior probability density functions (PDF) of the model parameters, which will be
introduced below, add information to the estimation procedure.
The question of how to efficiently estimate the unconstrained VAR(p) model (3.15),
however, is a straightforward issue. Since there are only lagged values of endogenous
variables on the right-hand side of (3.15), we can safely apply standard ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimation (see Lu¨tkepohl 2005, p. 71).
3.3.1 Bayesian inference
As laid out in Lu¨tkepohl (2005, pp. 222-223), it is assumed in the Bayesian approach
that non-sample information on a generic parameter vector ψ available prior to estima-
tion is summarized in its prior PDF g(ψ). The sample information on ψ, however, is
summarized in its sample PDF given by f(y|ψ), which is algebraically identical to the
likelihood function l(ψ|y). Applying Bayes’ theorem, we can establish the subsequent
relation between these two pieces of information, where f(y) denotes the unconditional
sample density:
g(ψ|y) = f(y|ψ)g(ψ)
f(y)
.
The preceding equation states that the distribution of ψ conditional on the sample
information contained in y can be summarized by g(ψ|y), which is known as posterior
PDF. In other words, the posterior distribution, which contains all information available
for the parameter vector ψ, is proportional to the likelihood function times the prior
PDF:2
g(ψ|y) ∝ f(y|ψ)g(ψ) = l(ψ|y)g(ψ).
Since the posterior distribution cannot be determined analytically, we have to adopt a
type of Monte-Carlo Markov-Chain (MCMC) sampling algorithm to simulate the distri-
bution of the parameter vector ψ (see Christoffel et al. 2008, pp. 34-35). MCMCs
are commonly applied to Bayesian inference techniques because they are relatively easy
2By reweighting the likelihood function by a prior, the so-called dilemma of absurd parameter
estimates (An & Schorfheide 2007, pp. 124-125) can be circumvented, which would otherwise
result in probably unrealistic posterior means. That is why pure maximum likelihood estimation is
not as prominent in DSGE estimation as Bayesian inference.
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to implement and less intensive in research time compared to other sampling methods
such as importance sampling (see Bauwens et al. 1999, pp. 83-84). In particular, we
adopt the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm whose steps shall be briefly outlined in
the following (see Koop 2003, pp. 92-94).
1. Choose a starting value ψ0.
2. Take a candidate draw ψ˜ from the candidate generating density q = (ψs−1;ψ).
3. Calculate its acceptance probability Prob(ψs−1; ψ˜).
4. Set ψs = ψ˜ with probability Prob(ψs−1; ψ˜) (candidate draw is accepted) and
ψs = ψs−1 with probability 1− Prob(ψs−1; ψ˜) (candidate draw is discarded).
5. Repeat steps 2 to 4 S times.
6. Take the average over the S draws h(ψs), hˆS = 1/S
∑S
s=1 h(ψ
s), in order to obtain
an estimate of E[h(ψ)|y].
In practice, we have to discard some S0 initial draws to reduce the impact of our choice
for the starting value ψ0. Moreover, the precise formula for the acceptance probability
Prob(ψs−1; ψ˜) is given by:
Prob(ψs−1; ψ˜) = min
[
g(ψ = ψ˜|y)q(ψ˜;ψ = ψs−1)
g(ψ = ψs−1|y)q(ψs−1;ψ = ψ˜) ; 1
]
,
where g(ψ = ψ˜|y) denotes the posterior distribution conditional on the sample infor-
mation contained in y evaluated at the point ψ = ψ˜, whereas q(ψ˜;ψ = ψs−1) denotes
the density of the random variable ψ evaluated at the point ψ = ψs−1.
3.3.2 Calibration and prior distributions
In the present framework, the parameters introduced in Section 3.2 constitute the pa-
rameter vector ψ := (n, β, ρ, ξ, δ, δ∗, α, α∗, ι∗, ω, ω∗, ζa, ζ∗a , ζu, ζ
∗
u, ζd, ζv, ζ
∗
v , σηa , ση∗a , σηu , ση∗u ,
σηd , σηv , ση∗v)
′, which is subject to estimation based on quarterly data. The means of
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the proposed prior distributions are taken from the calibration section of Chapter 2,
whereby the parameters n and β are assumed to be fixed throughout the analysis. We
set n = 1 − n = 0.5 since the Euro area and the US can be treated as approximately
equal-sized countries. Differing from Chapter 2, however, we set β = 0.99, which implies
quarterly zero-inflation steady-state nominal and real interest rates across countries of
i¯ = i¯∗ = r¯ = r¯∗ = (1 − β)/β ≈ 0.01. This corresponds to annualized zero-inflation
steady-state interest rates of approximately 4%.
What makes the present calibration still differ from well-known articles of the empiri-
cal DSGE literature such as Smets & Wouters (2003, pp. 1142-1143) or Rubaszek
& Skrzypczyn´ski (2008, p. 505) is that with ρ = 0.8, ξ = 1, α = α∗ = 1.5, and
ω = ω∗ = 0.1 we assume that the prior means of some of the parameters to be esti-
mated are a bit lower than usually done. Concerning the chosen value for the coefficient
of relative risk aversion in consumption ρ, the domain of this parameter 0 < ρ < 1 as
implied by the theoretical model from Chapter 2 prevents us from setting it equal to
ρSW = 1. In addition, ρSW = 1 would result in canceling out the TOT effects in the
dynamic IS curves (3.1) and (3.2).
Not setting the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply equal to ξSW = 2 implies a
somewhat high elasticity of labor supply of 1 prior to estimation. However, a value of
ξ = 1 is seen as a good compromise between the micro Labor and macro Business Cycle
literature (see Gal´ı et al. 2007, p. 47). If the posterior means of these and the other
parameters were to differ substantially from their prior means, this will be indicated by
the estimation results anyway.
Table 3.1 given below summarizes the prior information on the various parameters
contained in the vector ψ, where the choice of prior PDFs follows [1] common suggestions
in the literature as laid out in An & Schorfheide (2007, pp. 127-130), and [2] the
domain of the various parameters as implied by theory. The different prior PDFs are
documented, e.g., in Bauwens et al. (1999, pp. 290-294). The inverse gamma prior
PDF is extensively used in the literature for residual variances according to Bauwens
et al. (1999, p. 292) and reflects the fact that there is only little prior information
available for these parameters (see Christoffel et al. 2008, p. 40).
Employing the Dynare preprocessor forMatlab, we will use the inverse gamma-1
rather than the inverse gamma prior and choose to estimate standard deviations rather
than variances, where an infinite standard deviation around the mean of the standard
deviation to be estimated assures a closed-form solution. This is necessary in order to
be able to derive the scale and shape parameters of the inverse gamma-1 prior PDF (see
Adjemian 2007, p. 7). Note that similar to Chapter 2, there is a unique stationary
65
solution to the system of equations (3.1) to (3.7) for the selected parameter values
since there are five eigenvalues inside and two eigenvalues on or outside the complex
unit circle of the corresponding coefficient matrix, which is the sufficient condition
for equilibrium determinacy in case of two predetermined variables (ˆit−1, iˆ∗t−1) and five
non-predetermined ones (xt, x
∗
t , pit,H , pi
∗
t,F ,∆tt).
Table 3.1: Prior information
Parameter Domain Prior PDF Mean Std. Dev.
ρ [0, 1) Beta 0.8 0.025
ξ [0,+∞) Gamma 1 0.25
δ [0, 1) Beta 0.75 0.1
δ∗ [0, 1) Beta 0.75 0.1
α (−∞,+∞) Normal 1.5 0.1
α∗ (−∞,+∞) Normal 1.5 0.1
ι∗ (−∞,+∞) Normal 0.5 0.25
ω [0, 1) Beta 0.1 0.05
ω∗ [0, 1) Beta 0.1 0.05
ζa [0, 1) Beta 0.8 0.05
ζ∗a [0, 1) Beta 0.8 0.05
ζu [0, 1) Beta 0.8 0.05
ζ∗u [0, 1) Beta 0.8 0.05
ζd [0, 1) Beta 0.8 0.05
ζv [0, 1) Beta 0.8 0.05
ζ∗v [0, 1) Beta 0.8 0.05
σηa [0,+∞) Inv. Gamma-1 0.02 +∞
ση∗a [0,+∞) Inv. Gamma-1 0.02 +∞
σηu [0,+∞) Inv. Gamma-1 0.02 +∞
ση∗u [0,+∞) Inv. Gamma-1 0.02 +∞
σηd [0,+∞) Inv. Gamma-1 0.02 +∞
σηv [0,+∞) Inv. Gamma-1 0.02 +∞
ση∗v [0,+∞) Inv. Gamma-1 0.02 +∞
3.4 Quarterly data for the Euro area and the US
We want to estimate quarterly models of the Euro area and US economies using OECD
data for the time from 1994Q1 until 2009Q1, which means that we have 61 observations
altogether. Note that we have to limit our analysis to the time after 1994Q1 because
there are no data available on Euro area short-run nominal interest rate prior to this
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date.3 The OECD data are either taken from OECD (2008) (output gaps) or from
OECD (2010) (all other variables).
• The Euro area and US output gaps x, x∗ are calculated from the natural logarithm
of the actual volume at constant prices of the respective seasonally and working-
day adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) minus the natural logarithm of the
volume at constant prices of the respective potential output of the total economy.
• The Euro area and US PPI inflation rates piH , pi∗F are proxied by the percentage
change to the previous period of the domestic producer price indices in manufac-
turing. We restrict ourselves to these prices since we assume that firms employ
producer currency pricing and that only final goods are produced and traded.
• We have to construct the TOT ∆t ourselves, which is done by employing the
following formula (see Chapter 2): ∆tt = ∆st + pi
∗
t,F − pit,H , where ∆st denotes
the first difference of the natural logarithm of the monthly average of the nominal
exchange rate of Euro (from 1994Q1 until 1998Q4 of European Currency Units,
ECU) per US Dollar.
• The nominal interest rates in per cent per annum of the ECB and the Fed i, i∗ are
proxied by the subsequent time series: the three-month Euro Interbank Offered
Rate (EURIBOR) in case of i and the three-month nationally traded certificates
of deposit issued by commercial banks in case of i∗.4 Both interest rates have to be
subtracted by their common annualized zero-inflation steady-state value ≈ 0.04
before entering the DSGE estimation in order to obtain the desired percentage-
point deviations iˆ, iˆ∗. In the case of the VAR(p), this constraint on the nominal
interest rates is not imposed by the model, but will also be accounted for to assure
3Note that we choose to employ interbank rates as a reasonable compromise between central bank
and retail interest rates since, e.g., households usually decide for their asset holdings according to the
interest rates offered by commercial banks.
4We are aware of the fact that the ECB has been operating no sooner than January 1999. This
means that the time series used for the Euro area short-run nominal interest rate during the period
from 1994Q1 until 1998Q4 is a synthetic rate calculated by using national rates, London Interbank
Offered Rate (LIBOR) where available, weighted by GDP (see OECD 2010). A rejection of this
approximation would shorten the sample. It would be possible to even extend the sample prior to
1994Q1 by employing the former German short-run nominal interest rate FIBOR (Frankfurt Interbank
Offered Rate) as predecessor of the EURIBOR since also the Deutsche Bundesbank could be seen as
predecessor of the ECB. Since there are many contrary opinions on this issue, we will stick to our
original suggestion.
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comparability of the two models. Moreover, the actual means of the nominal
interest rates in both countries roughly correspond to 0.04 during the estimation
period, anyway (¯i = 0.0395 for the Euro area and i¯∗ = 0.0430 for the US).
The subsequent graphs plot the various variables in levels for the period under scrutiny,
whereby EU is used to indicate Euro area variables in all graphs and tables below.
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Figure 3.1: Euro area and US output gaps
As we can conclude from Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the output gaps and PPI inflation
rates are negative in both the Euro area and the US from 2008Q3 (output gaps) or
2008Q4 (PPI inflation rates), respectively, onwards. This reflects the global economic
downturn associated with the present economic and financial crisis. The comovement
of the graphs of the output gaps of both economies indicates a positive correlation of
Euro area and US business cycles. The TOT as given in Figure 3.3 have been beneficial
for US resident households from 2008Q3 onwards. The values of the Euro area and US
nominal interest rates as given in Figure 3.4 have already been below their common
zero-inflation steady-state value since 2008Q1 (US) or 2009Q1 (Euro area), which may
reflect countercyclical monetary policy by both central banks designed to mitigate the
impact of the crisis. This countercyclical policy seems to have already positively affected
the interbank markets across countries, too.
In our opinion, the current crisis is so much at odds with regular economic behavior
that including the observations during the period from 2007Q2 until 2009Q1 would
harm the goodness of the estimation and of the structural analysis thereafter. Hence,
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Figure 3.2: Euro area and US PPI inflation rates
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Figure 3.3: Terms of trade
we restrict our estimation sample to the period from 1994Q1 until 2007Q1, which leaves
us 53 observations.
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Figure 3.4: Euro area and US nominal interest rates
The year 2007 is typically associated with the initial point of the crisis (see, e.g.,
the timeline by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).5 Chow break-point tests in the
work of Cˇiha´k et al. (2009, p. 13) further suggest August 2007 as split point between
pre-crisis and crisis for the ECB’s short-run and several market interest rates of the
Euro area. If we observe the data underlying Figures 3.1 to 3.4, we can conclude that
at least in 2007Q1 no unusual economic activity is recognizable regarding our variables
of interest. Therefore, we choose to keep the observations of 2007Q1 for our estimation
sample. Nonetheless, having the actual observations for the period of crisis will allow us
to compare them with out-of-sample forecasts of the two rival models and a benchmark
later on in Section 3.7.
3.5 Estimation results
In the following, we want to summarize the estimation results based on the above OECD
data both for the DSGE (3.1) to (3.14) and the VAR(p) (3.15).
5See http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline.
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3.5.1 DSGE
Employing the Dynare preprocessor for Matlab we obtain the subsequent results
for estimating the DSGE model (3.1) to (3.14) while using Bayesian techniques for 53
observations ranging from 1994Q1 to 2007Q1. The options specified in the estimation
command associated with the MH algorithm whose selected values differ from the de-
fault values, shall be briefly discussed in the following (see Mancini-Griffoli 2007,
pp. 52-53).6
• mh_replic=50000 denotes the number of replications within each MH simulation
S, whereby S0 = 25000 initial replications are discarded as burn-in draws.
• mh_nblocks=5 states the number of runs of MH simulations or the number of
parallel MCMCs, respectively.
• mh_jscale=0.25 denotes the scale to be used for the candidate generating density
q = (ψs−1;ψ) in the MH algorithm.
• mh_init_scale=0 gives us the scale to be used for drawing the initial value ψ0 of
all the MCMCs.
The estimation results in terms of the posterior means and a 90% confidence interval
around these means are summarized in Table 3.2 below.
We will briefly discuss the most important results (see Table 3.2) in the following.
The posterior means of the parameters stemming from the utility function (ρ, ξ) and
of the sensitivities of both central banks towards current PPI inflation (α, α∗) are a bit
higher than their prior means. The posterior mean of ι∗, however, is a bit lower. There
seem to be higher degrees of interest-rate inertia in both the Euro area and the US
(ω, ω∗) than believed prior to the estimation. I.e. both central banks put more weight
on past realizations of the nominal interest rates (it−1, i∗t−1) than on their common
zero-inflation steady-state value (¯i = i¯∗).
Interestingly, the posterior means of δ, δ∗ suggest that the degrees of price stickiness
in both countries are much lower than expected, maybe because producer prices are able
to react more flexible to business cycle fluctuations than consumer prices. The posterior
means of the Euro area and US degrees of price stickiness both imply an average
6The Dynare program code for Matlab is not reported here, but is available on request.
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Table 3.2: DSGE estimation results
Parameter Prior Mean Post. Mean 90% Conf. Int. Prior PDF Prior Std. Dev.
ρ 0.8000 0.8436 0.8123 0.8776 Beta 0.0250
ξ 1.0000 1.0313 0.5931 1.4597 Gamma 0.2500
δ 0.7500 0.3706 0.2956 0.4439 Beta 0.1000
δ∗ 0.7500 0.4007 0.3161 0.4863 Beta 0.1000
α 1.5000 1.5890 1.4340 1.7422 Normal 0.1000
α∗ 1.5000 1.5710 1.4128 1.7224 Normal 0.1000
ι∗ 0.5000 0.4161 0.0270 0.7993 Normal 0.2500
ω 0.1000 0.4381 0.3155 0.5650 Beta 0.0500
ω∗ 0.1000 0.4304 0.3028 0.5626 Beta 0.0500
ζa 0.8000 0.8392 0.7864 0.8945 Beta 0.0500
ζ∗a 0.8000 0.8179 0.7613 0.8793 Beta 0.0500
ζu 0.8000 0.8929 0.8533 0.9355 Beta 0.0500
ζ∗u 0.8000 0.8584 0.8044 0.9141 Beta 0.0500
ζd 0.8000 0.7015 0.6097 0.7916 Beta 0.0500
ζv 0.8000 0.6434 0.5544 0.7314 Beta 0.0500
ζ∗v 0.8000 0.6312 0.5289 0.7349 Beta 0.0500
σηa 0.0200 0.0376 0.0262 0.0490 Inv. Gamma-1 +∞
ση∗a 0.0200 0.0449 0.0324 0.0574 Inv. Gamma-1 +∞
σηu 0.0200 0.0076 0.0049 0.0102 Inv. Gamma-1 +∞
ση∗u 0.0200 0.0088 0.0052 0.0126 Inv. Gamma-1 +∞
σηd 0.0200 0.0412 0.0343 0.0474 Inv. Gamma-1 +∞
σηv 0.0200 0.0104 0.0085 0.0123 Inv. Gamma-1 +∞
ση∗v 0.0200 0.0152 0.0124 0.0180 Inv. Gamma-1 +∞
duration of a price of approximately two quarters: 1/(1 − δ) ≈ 1.5888, 1/(1 − δ∗) ≈
1.6686.
As pointed out by Pichler (2008, pp. 10-11), we have to interpret the parameter
estimates with a grain of salt. This is due to the fact that the likelihood function of
some of the parameters may be almost flat or it may feature several local maxima,
two problems typically associated with the estimation of DSGE models using Bayesian
inference. One solution to these issues could be to calibrate rather than estimate more
of the parameters, especially those that are said to be weakly identified. In Chapter 4,
we will pick up this idea and keep the parameters stemming from the utility function,
ρ and ξ, fixed during estimation.
Figures 3.5 to 3.7 below display the prior distributions (solid gray line), the posterior
distributions (solid black line), as well as the posterior modes that are calculated from
the numerical optimization of the posterior kernel (dashed green line) for the various
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parameters. According to Mancini-Griffoli (2007, p. 59), the fact that the mode
expressed by the dashed green line and the mode of the posterior distribution are almost
equal gives us confidence in the goodness of the estimation. The fact that the posterior
distributions of some of the parameters differ from their prior distributions signifies that
in these cases the observed data are particularly able to provide additional information
(see Christoffel et al. 2008, p. 42).
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Figure 3.5: Priors and posteriors I
Finally, Figure 3.8 below gives us additional confidence that the aggregated estima-
tion results based on the eigenvalues of the variance-covariance matrix of each parameter
over the five parallel MCMCs are sensible, since both the red and the blue line, which
are based on differing initial values, remain (almost) constant over all draws for the
three displayed specific measures and converge in the end. interval reports an 80%
confidence interval around the parameter mean, m2 a specific measure of variance, and
m3 a specific measure of skewness (see Mancini-Griffoli 2007, p. 58). For each of
the runs of MH simulations we obtain an acceptance probability Prob(ψs−1; ψ˜) of about
50%.
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Figure 3.6: Priors and posteriors II
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Figure 3.7: Priors and posteriors III
3.5.2 VAR
Before we estimate the VAR(p) model (3.15), we first have to determine the appropriate
lag order. The maximum lag order supported by EViews for VAR estimation for
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Figure 3.8: MCMC multivariate diagnostics
the given number of variables is p = 6. The Schwarz (SC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQ)
information criteria for this preliminary estimation, however, suggest that the optimal
lag order is p = 1 as can be seen from Table 3.7 in Appendix 3.10. Unlike, e.g., Akaike’s
information criterion (AIC), SC and HQ are strongly consistent information criteria (see
Lu¨tkepohl 2005, pp. 150-151). Since we lose as little information as possible by using
only one lag, we follow their recommendation and restrict our attention to the analysis of
the subsequent simple VAR(1) model, which enables us to use 52 observations ranging
from 1994Q2 until 2007Q1, one observation less than in case of the DSGE (3.1) to
(3.14), for launching the estimation:
yt = ν +M1yt−1 + εt. (3.16)
The OLS estimation results of the VAR(1) model (3.16) including standard errors,
t-statistics, and the usual summary statistics are given in Table 3.3 below. Significant
t-statistics are indicated by boldface numbers.
As we can conclude from the t-statistics in Table 3.3, VAR(1) estimation suggests
that there is a statistically significant, positive influence of past values of Euro area and
US output gaps on their respective current values, which is not too surprising. There is
also a statistically significant, negative impact of the past Euro area output gap on the
current US nominal interest rate. We further observe a statistically significant, positive
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Table 3.3: VAR(1) estimation results
Vector Autoregression Estimates
Date: 05/20/10 Time: 15:55
Sample (adj.): 1994Q2 2007Q1
Incl. obs.: 52 after adjustments
Std. errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
X EU X US PI EU PI US TOT I EU I US
X EU(-1) 0.766383 -0.136643 -0.298464 -0.446885 -0.440509 -0.039116 -0.423885
(0.04827) (0.08861) (0.13424) (0.17722) (0.74646) (0.05341) (0.07161)
[15.8774] [-1.54216] [-2.22342] [-2.52160] [-0.59013] [-0.73241] [-5.91930]
X US(-1) 0.173376 0.871283 0.384487 0.473280 0.481585 0.064219 0.238397
(0.05944) (0.10910) (0.16529) (0.21822) (0.91914) (0.06576) (0.08818)
[2.91706] [7.98591] [2.32615] [2.16882] [0.52395] [0.97653] [2.70363]
PI EU(-1) 0.208025 -0.071884 0.493498 0.274085 -2.911130 0.369345 0.267275
(0.07693) (0.14122) (0.21395) (0.28246) (1.18971) (0.08512) (0.11413)
[2.70404] [-0.50902] [2.30664] [0.97036] [-2.44693] [4.33906] [2.34178]
PI US(-1) -0.191877 -0.000978 -0.164483 -0.127614 1.457977 -0.165792 -0.081844
(0.05995) (0.11006) (0.16673) (0.22013) (0.92717) (0.06634) (0.08895)
[-3.20039] [-0.00888] [-0.98650] [-0.57973] [1.57251] [-2.49925] [-0.92015]
TOT(-1) 0.006889 0.006172 0.004321 4.55E-05 0.084019 -0.004914 0.011651
(0.00908) (0.01666) (0.02524) (0.03332) (0.14036) (0.01004) (0.01346)
[0.75899] [0.37043] [0.17120] [0.00136] [0.59862] [-0.48935] [0.86531]
I EU(-1) -0.031524 -0.200199 0.183641 0.154181 -0.366408 0.896498 0.038799
(0.04936) (0.09061) (0.13727) (0.18122) (0.76331) (0.05461) (0.07323)
[-0.63868] [-2.20957] [1.33784] [0.85078] [-0.48003] [16.4154] [0.52984]
I US(-1) 0.052954 0.071359 -0.123698 -0.186613 1.027763 0.057739 0.938502
(0.02991) (0.05490) (0.08317) (0.10980) (0.46249) (0.03309) (0.04437)
[1.77065] [1.29983] [-1.48728] [-1.69950] [2.22222] [1.74488] [21.1522]
C -0.000602 -0.000356 0.002438 0.003498 -0.001024 -0.001794 -0.002181
(0.00042) (0.00077) (0.00117) (0.00154) (0.00649) (0.00046) (0.00062)
[-1.43442] [-0.46258] [2.08933] [2.27062] [-0.15774] [-3.86417] [-3.50274]
R-squared 0.964201 0.922108 0.336724 0.249272 0.309584 0.976353 0.972490
Adj. R-squared 0.958506 0.909716 0.231202 0.129838 0.199745 0.972591 0.968113
Sum sq. resids 0.000208 0.000701 0.001610 0.002806 0.049778 0.000255 0.000458
S.E. equation 0.002175 0.003993 0.006049 0.007986 0.033635 0.002407 0.003227
F-statistic 169.2995 74.41225 3.191050 2.087108 2.818529 259.5268 222.2027
Log likelihood 249.3569 217.7720 196.1706 181.7246 106.9523 244.0965 228.8451
Akaike AIC -9.282959 -8.068153 -7.237332 -6.681717 -3.805859 -9.080635 -8.494044
Schwarz SC -8.982768 -7.767961 -6.937141 -6.381526 -3.505667 -8.780444 -8.193852
Mean dependent -0.004399 -0.000339 0.004652 0.005402 -0.002205 -0.001036 0.003124
S.D. dependent 0.010677 0.013287 0.006898 0.008561 0.037599 0.014536 0.018070
Determinant resid cov. (df adj.) 1.09E-33
Determinant resid cov. 3.40E-34
Log likelihood 1487.210
Akaike information criterion -55.04656
Schwarz criterion -52.94522
impact of past Euro area PPI inflation on the current Euro area nominal interest rate,
which may indicate the relatively high inflation awareness of the ECB. Past observations
of US PPI inflation influence the current Euro area output gap significantly negatively.
Moreover, there is a statistically significant, positive impact of past values of the area
and US nominal interest rates on on their respective current values, which corroborates
our idea of the existence of interest-rate smoothing from Chapter 2. In addition, only
the means of the Euro area and the US nominal interest rates seem to significantly
differ from zero.
By performing autocorrelation LM tests with 10 lags as summarized in Table 3.8 in
Appendix 3.10, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of residuals
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for most of the lags. White heteroskedasticity tests without cross terms as given in
Table 3.9 in Appendix 3.10 cannot reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity of the
residual variances. However, as all equations in (3.16) have the same regressors, the
presence of autocorrelation and/or heteroskedasticity would not render OLS estimation
inefficient since it would be equivalent to generalized least squares (GLS) estimation
(see Lu¨tkepohl 2005, p. 71). We further conclude from Table 3.10 in Appendix 3.10
that Jarque-Bera tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that residuals are normally
distributed for the single variables with two degrees of freedom each.
Moreover, we want to investigate whether there are causal relationships between
(some of) the endogenous variables according to the data. We check for pairwise
Granger causality between the variables, whereby causality within this concept means
that if some generic random variable z is said to cause another generic random variable
z′, preceding information on the former variable should help to improve forecasting the
latter (see Lu¨tkepohl 2005, p. 41).
As shown in Table 3.11 in Appendix 3.10, Granger causality tests with ten lags reject
the null hypothesis of no Granger causality for the subsequent relationships (at least at
the 10% significance level): x→ iˆ, x∗ → piH , iˆ→ x∗, pi∗F → piH , iˆ→ piH , iˆ∗ → pi∗F , iˆ→ iˆ∗.
Besides these seven direct causal relationships, there may be even more indirect ones,
which cannot be immediately retrieved. Thus, the causality structure as a whole may
be quite complex. From the seven identified causal relationships, three are between
nominal and real variables.
3.6 Impulse-response analysis
Impulse-response analysis together with Granger causality testing in a VAR(p) setting
is sometimes summarized under the term structural analysis (see Lu¨tkepohl 2005, pp.
41-66). Although testing for Granger causality in a DSGE framework is unnecessary,
comparing impulse responses based on estimated DSGEs to those based on estimated
VARs is quite common in the literature (see, e.g., Christiano et al. 2005 or DelNe-
gro et al. 2005).
The impulse-response analysis for both the DSGE (3.1) to (3.14) and the VAR(1)
(3.16) is carried out in terms of one standard deviation on the respective residuals
(ηˆ or εˆ). Due to possible cross-correlations of residuals, Cholesky decompositions are
applied to the residual variance-covariance matrices while using the subsequent ordering
of variables: x, x∗, piH , pi∗F ,∆t, iˆ, iˆ
∗.
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3.6.1 DSGE
In case of the DSGE (3.1) to (3.14), Figures 3.9 to 3.15 below show the posterior dis-
tributions of Bayesian impulse-response functions of the various endogenous variables,
which are computed from the estimated parameter values and residual variances as
obtained from their respective posterior distributions (seeMancini-Griffoli 2007, p.
54).
5 10 15 20
−15
−10
−5
x 10−4 x_eu
5 10 15 20
2
4
6
x 10−5 x_us
5 10 15 20
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
x 10−3 pi_eu
5 10 15 20
0.5
1
1.5
2
x 10−4 pi_us
5 10 15 20
−5
0
5
x 10−3 tot
5 10 15 20
−8
−6
−4
−2
x 10−3 i_eu
5 10 15 20
1
2
3
x 10−4 i_us
Figure 3.9: Euro area productivity shock
Qualitatively, the results obtained from Figures 3.9 to 3.12, which shall be summa-
rized in the following for the reader’s convenience, are very similar to those obtained in
Chapter 2 for the calibrated model including the negative impact of a home-made pro-
ductivity shock on own output and the undesirable response of the TOT to a home-made
contractionary monetary policy shock. The major difference to Chapter 2, however, is
the presence of responses to an impulse on the global measurement error component as
shown by Figure 3.13.
1. The EU output gap, PPI inflation and nominal interest rates decrease before they
return to their zero-inflation steady-state values in response to an impulse on the
EU productivity shock (Figure 3.9). The TOT first augment, then drop below
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Figure 3.10: US productivity shock
their zero-inflation steady-state value until they gradually converge. There is also
an impact on all US endogenous variables, which is of opposite sign and quanti-
tatively small.
2. The US output gap, PPI inflation and nominal interest rates decrease before they
return to their zero-inflation steady-state values in response to an impulse on the
US productivity shock (Figure 3.10). The TOT first decrease, then jump above
their zero-inflation steady-state value until they gradually converge. There is also
an impact on all EU endogenous variables of opposite sign, which is quantitatively
larger compared to the impact of the EU productivity shock on foreign variables.
3. The EU output gap decreases, yet the EU PPI inflation and nominal interest rates
increase before all endogenous variables return to their zero-inflation steady-state
values in response to an impulse on the EU cost-push shock (Figure 3.11). The
TOT first plummet, then jump above their zero-inflation steady-state value until
they gradually converge. There is also an impact on all US endogenous variables,
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Figure 3.11: Euro area cost-push shock
which is of opposite sign except for the US output gap.
4. The US output gap decreases, yet the US PPI inflation and nominal interest rates
increase before all endogenous variables return to their zero-inflation steady-state
values in response to an impulse on the US cost-push shock (Figure 3.12). The
TOT first augment, then drop below their zero-inflation steady-state value until
they gradually converge. There is also an impact on all EU endogenous variables,
which is of opposite sign except for the EU output gap.
5. The Euro area output gap, PPI inflation and nominal interest rates increase
before all endogenous variables return to their zero-inflation steady-state values
in response to an impulse on the global measurement error component (Figure
3.13). The TOT augment before they return to their zero-inflation steady-state
value without any sudden drops to the negative. The impact on all US endogenous
variables is of opposite sign.
6. The EU output gap, PPI inflation and nominal interest rates decrease before all
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Figure 3.12: US cost-push shock
endogenous variables return to their zero-inflation steady-state values in response
to an impulse on the EU monetary policy shock (Figure 3.14). The TOT augment
before they return to their zero-inflation steady-state value without any sudden
drops to the negative. There is also an impact on all US endogenous variables,
which is of the same sign.
7. The US output gap, PPI inflation and nominal interest rates decrease before all
endogenous variables return to their zero-inflation steady-state values in response
to an impulse on the US monetary policy shock (Figure 3.15). The TOT plummet
before they return to their zero-inflation steady-state value without any sudden
jumps to the positive. There is also an impact on all EU endogenous variables,
which is of the same sign.
3.6.2 VAR
Figure 3.16 below shows the responses of the various endogenous variables on the seven
different impulses for the VAR(1) (3.16) in combined graphs.
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Figure 3.13: Global measurement error component
We will forego to interpret every single impulse response of the VAR(1) model, but
as far as the results obtained from Figure 3.16 substantially differ from those obtained
from Figures 3.9 to 3.15, they shall be briefly discussed in the following. What most
VAR(1) impulse responses have in common and what makes them differ from the DSGE
impulse responses, however, is that they show oscillating behavior and that it takes them
almost twice as long to converge.
From an economic theory perspective, the difference in impulse responses on Euro
area and US productivity shocks between the DSGE (3.1) to (3.14) and the VAR(1)
(3.16) is of special interest. The negative impact of productivity shocks on actual
output across countries in case of the DSGE reproduces the findings of the calibrated
DSGE from Chapter 2, which in turn is in line with Gal´ı (2002, pp. 17-18) and Gal´ı
& Rabanal (2004, pp. 36-37). The positive impact of productivity shocks on actual
output across countries in case of the VAR(1), however, is closer to the ideas of the
RBC literature (blue and red lines in Figure 3.16).
This make-believe contradiction can be explained as follows: since potential (or
flexible-price equilibrium) output is assumed to be hit more severe than actual output
by a positive technology shock because of the structure of the DSGE model (see Chapter
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Figure 3.14: Euro area monetary policy shock
2), actual output simply needs time to adjust. Because of the different structure of the
VAR(1) model, this phenomenon is not present in the latter case.
Again contrary to the DSGE (3.1) to (3.14) there does not seem to be any noteworthy
effect at all of Euro and US nominal interest rates on the TOT so that prosper thyself or
beggar thy neighbor effects in spirit of Corsetti & Pesenti (2001) are not observable
for VAR(1) (3.16) impulse responses.
3.7 Out-of-sample forecasting
Starting from the forecast origin 2007Q1, we perform out-of-sample mean forecasts of
the DSGE (3.1) to (3.14) on the one hand and the VAR(1) (3.16) on the other for a
forecast horizon of two years or eight quarters, i.e. until 2009Q1, to check if one of the
models were able to predict the severeness or, at least, the evolution of the economic
and financial crisis.
The reason why we employ out-of-sample forecasting is that using all information
available up to the forecast origin, the maximum information set possible, assures op-
timal prediction in the sense that the associated mean squared forecast error (MSFE),
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Figure 3.15: US monetary policy shock
which is interpretable as the squared loss of forecasting, is minimized (see Lu¨tkepohl
2005, pp. 32-35).
In addition, we want to compare the forecast accuracy of the two models under
scrutiny with the forecast accuracy of one of the many model-free extrapolation methods
to serve as a benchmark (see Chatfield 2001, pp. 97-98): the additive seasonal Holt-
Winters method (HW), which is a generalization of the various univariate exponential
smoothing procedures accounting for possible trend and seasonal components:7
Lt,z = τ1,z(zt,z − St−s,z) + (1− τ1,z)(Lt−1,z + Tt−1,z), (3.17)
Tt,z = τ2,z(Lt,z − Lt−1,z) + (1− τ2,z)Tt−1,z, (3.18)
St,z = τ3,z(zt,z − Lt,z) + (1− τ3,z)St−s,z. (3.19)
In (3.17) to (3.19), zt denote actual values of the various variables, Lz the corresponding
local level, Tz the corresponding local trend, and Sz the corresponding additive seasonal
factor. As we investigate quarterly data, we have the following length of the seasonal
7Note that other univariate benchmarks, e.g. from the AR(I)MA class, would also be feasible and
will be taken up in Chapter 4.
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Figure 3.16: VAR(1) impulse responses
cycle: s = 4. The various smoothing parameters τ1,z, τ2,z, τ3,z (0 < τ1,zτ2,z, τ3,z < 1) are
estimated in EViews by minimizing the sum of squared errors.
Figures 3.17 to 3.20 below plot once more the actual values (blue lines) of the various
endogenous variables for the time period from 2007Q2 until 2009Q1 and also the eight-
step-ahead predictors of the three forecasting models: DSGE (3.1) to (3.14) (red lines),
VAR(1) (3.16) (orange lines), and HW (3.17) to (3.19) (green lines).
As we can see from Figure 3.17, only in case of the Euro area output gap the two
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Figure 3.17: Euro area and US output gaps – actual and forecasted values
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Figure 3.18: Euro area and US PPI inflation rates – actual and forecasted values
models could identify the downward swing of the business cycle, whereas for the US
output gap the extrapolation method performed better. In the case of PPI inflation
and the TOT none of the three methods was able to replicate the actual behavior
of these variables across countries (see Figures 3.18 and 3.19). Taking a look at the
nominal interest rates across countries, again the two models could at least indicate the
downward trend in the given period (see Figure 3.20).
Nonetheless, we have to conclude that none of the forecasting models was able to
predict at least the evolution of the crisis as a whole: the output gaps across countries
were way more negative than the three forecasting models were able to predict and
so were PPI inflation rates. Also the nominal interest rates were closer to their zero-
lower bound towards the end of the forecast horizon than the forecasting models could
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Figure 3.19: Terms of trade – actual and forecasted values
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Figure 3.20: Euro area and US nominal interest rates – actual and forecasted values
predict. As a consequence, shortening the sample by leaving out this period of irregular
economic behavior could indeed have added to improve the goodness of the estimation
and of the structural analysis in Sections 3.5 and 3.6.
3.8 Measuring forecast accuracy
If we now assess the forecasting performance of the DSGE (3.1) to (3.14), the VAR(1)
(3.16), and the HW (3.17) to (3.19) by quantitative measures of forecast accuracy we
have to rely on out-of-sample forecasts for a test set that lies within a period of regular
economic activity. Therefore, we want to compare the accuracy of the one-step-ahead
predictor for the time period from 2006Q2 until 2007Q1. In general, a better forecast
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accuracy of the DSGE (3.1) to (3.14) relative to the VAR(1) (3.16) would justify the
constraints in the DSGE as imposed by economic theory relative to the unconstrained
VAR specification (see Rubaszek & Skrzypczyn´ski 2008, p. 499).
We evaluate the forecasting performance of the one-step-ahead predictor for 2006Q2,
2006Q3, 2006Q4, and 2007Q1.8 Hence, each of the four training sets comprises 49
observations so that we obtain four predictions based on estimations of equal quality:
1994Q1-2006Q1, 1994Q2-2006Q2, 1994Q3-2006Q3, and 1994Q4-2006Q4.
One commonly used quantitative forecast measure is the already mentioned MSFE,
which reads as follows for each of the seven variables (see Chatfield 2001, p. 150):
MSFE :=
1
m
N∑
t=N−m+1
[zt − zˆt−1(1)]2 ,
where zt again denote actual and zˆt−1(1) forecasted values of the various variables and
m = 4 the number of one-step-ahead forecasts.
Nonetheless, we want to indicate the loss of forecasting in terms of standard de-
viations rather than variances, which could ease the interpretation. Therefore, we
introduce the root mean squared forecast error (RMSFE), which simply is the square
root of the MSFE:
RMSFE :=
√√√√ 1
m
N∑
t=N−m+1
[zt − zˆt−1(1)]2.
Another commonly used linear measure of forecast accuracy is the mean absolute fore-
cast error (MAFE), which is given in the following (see Chatfield 2001, p. 150):
MAFE :=
1
m
N∑
t=N−m+1
|zt − zˆt−1(1)| .
This measure is more sensitive to small deviations from zero compared to the other
ones presented, but less sensitive to large deviations since it is not computed based on
squared losses. Besides the RMSFE and the MAFE used here, there are several other
measures of forecast accuracy (see, e.g., Chatfield 2001, chapter 6 for an overview).
Finally, empirical studies often suggest that combined forecasts yield more accurate
forecasts than the underlying single forecasts that are built on possibly misspecified
forecasting models (see Chatfield 2001, pp. 101-102). Hence, we choose to calculate
8Due to the computational burden associated with DSGE estimation, we restrict ourselves to re-
estimate all three forecasting models only four times on a quarterly basis.
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the various measures of forecast accuracy for an average of the forecasted values based
on the DSGE (3.1) to (3.14), the VAR(1) (3.16), and HW (3.17) to (3.19). As opposed
to multiple encompassing tests in spirit of Harvey & Newbold (2000), we simply
assign uniform weights since recent simulation experiments have shown little evidence
for the superiority of test-based combination compared to uniform weighting for the
one-step-ahead predictor in typical forecasting situations (see Costantini et al. 2010,
p. 11):
fCOMB =
1
3
fDSGE +
1
3
fV AR(1) +
1
3
fHW . (3.20)
Subsequently, Table 3.4 shows the RMSFE, whereas Table 3.5 shows the MAFE as
obtained for the DSGE (3.1) to (3.14), the VAR(1) (3.16), HW (3.17) to (3.19), and
the combined forecast (3.20) for the various endogenous variables, where the smallest
RMSFE and MAFE values for the single variables are given in boldface numbers.
Table 3.4: RMSFE of rival models
Model x x∗ piH pi∗F ∆t iˆ iˆ
∗
DSGE 0.0044 0.0034 0.0085 0.0198 0.0077 0.0026 0.0042
V AR(1) 0.0006 0.0062 0.0069 0.0153 0.0338 0.0021 0.0021
HW 0.0025 0.0042 0.0075 0.0161 0.0280 0.0003 0.0037
COMB 0.0021 0.0042 0.0074 0.0166 0.0197 0.0013 0.0014
Table 3.5: MAFE of rival models
Model x x∗ piH pi∗F ∆t iˆ iˆ
∗
DSGE 0.0040 0.0025 0.0075 0.0191 0.0064 0.0024 0.0034
V AR(1) 0.0006 0.0058 0.0060 0.0143 0.0318 0.0021 0.0016
HW 0.0021 0.0039 0.0066 0.0150 0.0192 0.0002 0.0033
COMB 0.0018 0.0035 0.0064 0.0161 0.0170 0.0011 0.0014
Observing Tables 3.4 and 3.5, we can derive the following. The RMSFE and the
MAFE qualitatively deliver the same results. The DSGE (3.1) to (3.14) performs best
for the US output gap and for the TOT. The VAR(1) (3.16) outperforms all other
models in case of the Euro area output gap and both PPI inflation rates. The HW
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benchmark (3.17) to (3.19) is able to predict best the Euro area nominal interest rate.
Only in the case of the US nominal interest rate the combined forecast (3.20) delivers
the most accurate result.
Finally, we want to investigate if the forecasting model characterized by the lowest
RMSFE/MAFE per variable can significantly outperform the remaining three forecast-
ing models. In doing so, we employ Diebold & Mariano (1995) (DM) tests. The null
hypothesis of this test is that the loss differentials (square of true minus forecasted val-
ues) of two different forecasting models LD(Model1), LD(Model2) are identical. The
DM test statistic is calculated as follows and is asymptotically ∼ N(0, 1) distributed:
DM :=
LD(Model1)− LD(Model2)√
V ar(Numerator)
.
The forecasting model under examination, i.e. Model1, would indeed significantly
outperform another model if the corresponding DM test statistic were significantly
different from zero and negative. In order to interpret the results from Table 3.6 below
correctly, we have to check whether the modulus of the DM test statistic is significantly
greater than zero as indicated by the one-sided p-value. Significance at the 10% level
is indicated by (∗), at the 5% level by (∗∗), and at the 1% level by (∗∗∗).
Taking a look at Table 3.6, we can conclude that we indeed see statistically signifi-
cant outperformance of the forecasting model characterized by the lowest RMSFE/MAFE
per variable in some cases. The VAR(1) improves at the 10% level on the DSGE for x
as well as on the combined forecast for pi∗F . The DSGE, however, improves at the 10%
level on the VAR(1) for x∗ and ∆t. The HW benchmark significantly outperforms the
DSGE at the 10% level and the VAR(1) even at the 1% level for iˆ. In case of piH and
iˆ∗ the best-performing models per variable (VAR(1) for piH , combined forecast for iˆ∗)
seem to forecast equally well as the remaining three forecasting models.
3.9 Concluding remarks
Putting things together, we want to summarize once more the key findings obtained
from the above analysis, which constitutes an empirical application of DSGE models.
The estimated DSGE model qualitatively reproduces the findings of the calibrated
one from Chapter 2 with respect to most of the parameter values and to impulses
responses on the various exogenous error terms. Nonetheless, the degrees of price
stickiness in both countries are lower and the degrees of interest-rate inertia across
countries are higher than expected prior to estimation.
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Table 3.6: DM test statistics
Variable Models under comparison DM test statistic One-sided p-value
x V AR(1) vs. DSGE -1.3009∗ 0.0966
V AR(1) vs. HW -0.9843 0.1625
V AR(1) vs. COMB -0.9364 0.1745
x∗ DSGE vs. V AR(1) -1.4136∗ 0.0787
DSGE vs. HW -0.4125 0.3400
DSGE vs. COMB -0.6187 0.2681
piH V AR(1) vs. DSGE -0.5962 0.2755
V AR(1) vs. HW -0.3029 0.3810
V AR(1) vs. COMB -0.9935 0.1602
pi∗F V AR(1) vs. DSGE -0.7880 0.2153
V AR(1) vs. HW -0.1872 0.4258
V AR(1) vs. COMB -1.5907∗ 0.0558
∆t DSGE vs. V AR(1) -1.4498∗ 0.0736
DSGE vs. HW -0.6096 0.2711
DSGE vs. COMB -0.8572 0.1957
iˆ HW vs. DSGE -1.5630∗ 0.0590
HW vs. V AR(1) -2.8197∗∗∗ 0.0024
HW vs. COMB -1.1266 0.1300
iˆ∗ COMB vs. DSGE -0.9064 0.1824
COMB vs. V AR(1) -0.4139 0.3395
COMB vs. HW -1.0396 0.1493
Estimating an unconstrained VAR(1) does not yield the identical causal relation-
ships as implied by the DSGE. However, Granger causality tests suggest a rather com-
plex causality structure including causalities between real and nominal variables across
countries. In addition, impulse responses based on the VAR(1) sometimes differ from
the ones obtained for the DSGE.
Both models and the additive seasonal Holt-Winters method, a simple univariate
extrapolation method serving as a benchmark, were not able to predict the severeness
or, at least, the evolution of the economic and financial crisis for the forecasting period
from 2007Q2 until 2009Q1 since the current crisis is so at odds with regular economic
activity.
Finally, we obtain that the accuracy of DSGE forecasts, measured by the RMSFE
and the MAFE, can compete well with the accuracy of VAR(1), Holt-Winters, and uni-
formly combined forecasts. In two cases, the DSGE is able to significantly outperform
some of the rival forecasting models, but only at the 10% level.
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3.10 Appendix to Chapter 3
Table 3.7: Lag order selection criteria
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
Endogenous variables:
X EU X US PI EU PI US TOT I EU I US
Exogenous variables: C
Date: 05/20/10 Time: 15:43
Sample: 1994Q1 2007Q1
Included observations: 48
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 1083.224 NA 7.90e-29 -44.84269 -44.56980 -44.73956
1 1398.260 525.0588 1.24e-33* -55.92749 -53.74442* -55.10250*
2 1427.942 40.81247 3.16e-33 -55.12256 -51.02931 -53.57572
3 1466.872 42.17456 6.91e-33 -54.70300 -48.69956 -52.43429
4 1511.555 35.37429 1.88e-32 -54.52313 -46.60951 -51.53256
5 1662.022 75.23355* 1.63e-33 -58.75093* -48.92712 -55.03850
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
Table 3.8: Autocorrelation LM tests
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h
Date: 05/21/10 Time: 10:02
Sample: 1994Q1 2007Q1
Included observations: 52
Lags LM-Stat Prob
1 50.58592 0.4107
2 34.66013 0.9396
3 34.67918 0.9393
4 34.72418 0.9386
5 80.48746 0.0031
6 49.84059 0.4397
7 52.48338 0.3406
8 34.20719 0.9462
9 48.48202 0.4940
10 51.35996 0.3814
Probs from chi-square with 49 df.
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Table 3.9: White heteroskedasticity tests
VAR Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms
Date: 05/21/10 Time: 10:13
Sample: 1994Q1 2007Q1
Included observations: 52
Joint test:
Chi-sq df Prob.
410.3690 392 0.2515
Individual components:
Dependent R-squared F(14,37) Prob. Chi-sq(14) Prob.
res1*res1 0.221743 0.753009 0.7093 11.53063 0.6439
res2*res2 0.069429 0.197181 0.9989 3.610315 0.9974
res3*res3 0.316009 1.221017 0.3020 16.43244 0.2877
res4*res4 0.347451 1.407195 0.1985 18.06746 0.2037
res5*res5 0.316468 1.223616 0.3003 16.45635 0.2863
res6*res6 0.208172 0.694807 0.7647 10.82492 0.6997
res7*res7 0.224543 0.765270 0.6974 11.67622 0.6323
res2*res1 0.205830 0.684964 0.7738 10.70314 0.7092
res3*res1 0.230656 0.792352 0.6709 11.99412 0.6068
res3*res2 0.300976 1.137926 0.3602 15.65076 0.3352
res4*res1 0.192851 0.631456 0.8213 10.02827 0.7601
res4*res2 0.262143 0.938944 0.5290 13.63143 0.4775
res4*res3 0.313751 1.208305 0.3104 16.31504 0.2945
res5*res1 0.134668 0.411296 0.9617 7.002724 0.9346
res5*res2 0.236050 0.816605 0.6471 12.27459 0.5843
res5*res3 0.285573 1.056413 0.4247 14.84981 0.3885
res5*res4 0.245187 0.858485 0.6061 12.74975 0.5463
res6*res1 0.085973 0.248585 0.9963 4.470574 0.9919
res6*res2 0.199187 0.657359 0.7988 10.35770 0.7356
res6*res3 0.329965 1.301500 0.2528 17.15818 0.2478
res6*res4 0.309660 1.185485 0.3259 16.10233 0.3072
res6*res5 0.321969 1.254983 0.2804 16.74238 0.2702
res7*res1 0.162782 0.513857 0.9095 8.464673 0.8637
res7*res2 0.178314 0.573527 0.8681 9.272339 0.8132
res7*res3 0.289133 1.074937 0.4094 15.03492 0.3758
res7*res4 0.283599 1.046218 0.4332 14.74715 0.3957
res7*res5 0.336272 1.338979 0.2323 17.48613 0.2312
res7*res6 0.212891 0.714818 0.7459 11.07032 0.6805
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Table 3.10: Jarque-Bera normality tests
VAR Residual Normality Tests
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal
Date: 05/21/10 Time: 10:06
Sample: 1994Q1 2007Q1
Included observations: 52
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob.
1 -0.167268 0.242482 1 0.6224
2 0.566265 2.779018 1 0.0955
3 0.047331 0.019415 1 0.8892
4 -0.088543 0.067945 1 0.7944
5 -0.177099 0.271823 1 0.6021
6 -0.083489 0.060410 1 0.8058
7 -0.323550 0.907269 1 0.3408
Joint 4.348363 7 0.7389
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob.
1 1.745038 3.412348 1 0.0647
2 2.420606 0.727344 1 0.3937
3 2.420122 0.728561 1 0.3934
4 2.058128 1.922098 1 0.1656
5 1.947782 2.398853 1 0.1214
6 1.700503 3.658835 1 0.0558
7 2.158985 1.532496 1 0.2157
Joint 14.38053 7 0.0448
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.
1 3.654830 2 0.1608
2 3.506362 2 0.1732
3 0.747976 2 0.6880
4 1.990044 2 0.3697
5 2.670676 2 0.2631
6 3.719245 2 0.1557
7 2.439765 2 0.2953
Joint 18.72890 14 0.1756
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Table 3.11: Pairwise Granger causality tests
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Date: 05/21/10 Time: 10:59
Sample: 1994Q1 2007Q1
Lags: 10
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.
X US does not Granger Cause X EU 43 0.67939 0.7319
X EU does not Granger Cause X US 0.95513 0.5061
PI EU does not Granger Cause X EU 43 0.35857 0.9520
X EU does not Granger Cause PI EU 1.16930 0.3610
PI US does not Granger Cause X EU 43 1.09585 0.4068
X EU does not Granger Cause PI US 0.92800 0.5269
TOT does not Granger Cause X EU 43 1.17440 0.3579
X EU does not Granger Cause TOT 1.51097 0.2010
I EU does not Granger Cause X EU 43 1.35611 0.2633
X EU does not Granger Cause I EU 2.64184 0.0276
I US does not Granger Cause X EU 43 1.26621 0.3070
X EU does not Granger Cause I US 1.31270 0.2837
PI EU does not Granger Cause X US 43 0.78169 0.6457
X US does not Granger Cause PI EU 2.37630 0.0435
PI US does not Granger Cause X US 43 1.25974 0.3104
X US does not Granger Cause PI US 0.86239 0.5790
TOT does not Granger Cause X US 43 0.93548 0.5212
X US does not Granger Cause TOT 0.86492 0.5770
I EU does not Granger Cause X US 43 1.96580 0.0896
X US does not Granger Cause I EU 0.98045 0.4872
I US does not Granger Cause X US 43 1.04164 0.4433
X US does not Granger Cause I US 0.98586 0.4832
PI US does not Granger Cause PI EU 43 2.24297 0.0549
PI EU does not Granger Cause PI US 1.24243 0.3196
TOT does not Granger Cause PI EU 43 0.89177 0.5554
PI EU does not Granger Cause TOT 1.25337 0.3137
I EU does not Granger Cause PI EU 43 1.95584 0.0912
PI EU does not Granger Cause I EU 0.35167 0.9549
I US does not Granger Cause PI EU 43 1.08300 0.4152
PI EU does not Granger Cause I US 1.28794 0.2959
TOT does not Granger Cause PI US 43 1.52785 0.1951
PI US does not Granger Cause TOT 0.99948 0.4733
I EU does not Granger Cause PI US 43 1.59536 0.1732
PI US does not Granger Cause I EU 0.54570 0.8390
I US does not Granger Cause PI US 43 2.99300 0.0153
PI US does not Granger Cause I US 1.13350 0.3828
I EU does not Granger Cause TOT 43 0.83999 0.5973
TOT does not Granger Cause I EU 1.37077 0.2567
I US does not Granger Cause TOT 43 0.89385 0.5537
TOT does not Granger Cause I US 1.76188 0.1289
I US does not Granger Cause I EU 43 1.71166 0.1409
I EU does not Granger Cause I US 3.80672 0.0043
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Chapter 4
New variants of the DSGE model
and a different pair of countries
4.1 Introduction
Two-country DSGE models as the one developed in Chapter 2 are usually applied
for modeling economic interrelations between two large open economies such as the
EU (or the Euro area) and the US. As laid out in Chapter 3, the parameters of the
DSGE structure can be comfortably estimated by applying Bayesian techniques and the
estimated model can further be used for forecasting endogenous variables and assessing
the model’s forecasting performance compared to rival models. In principle, the latter
is also possible for small-open-economy DSGE models for which Gal´ı & Monacelli
(2005) can be taken as prototypical example.
Meanwhile, there exist estimated open-economy New Keynesian models, too, which
are explicitly tuned to the Austrian (see Breuss & Rabitsch 2009) and the Hungarian
economy (see Jakab & Vila´gi 2008). Similar models respecting country-specific
particularities also exist for many other small open economies (see, e.g., the estimated
model by Christiano et al. 2009 for the case of Sweden or the simulated model by
Cuche-Curti et al. 2009 for the case of Switzerland) and are usually developed and
used by the countries’ monetary authorities.
After concentrating on a pair of large countries such as the EU and the US, we
now shift the focus to the interior of one of these economies, namely the EU. We apply
the two-country model from Chapters 2 and 3 to Austria and Hungary, two European
countries of approximately equal size that share a common border and whose economies
should be treated as small, of course. In the case of small open economies, European
or world variables certainly have an impact on Austrian and Hungarian variables, but
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not vice versa. Austria and Hungary are being integrated within the European context
since the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. The integration is of political as well as
of economic nature since both countries are members of the EU (Austria since 1995,
Hungary since 2004) and, hence, also of the Common Market.
Alternatively, the subsequent exercise could be performed for two different regions
within one large economy, e.g. two other EU members or two US states. Basically, there
are three reasons why we want to concentrate on Austria and Hungary in particular.
1. As can be seen from recent numbers in Table 4.1 below (see OECD 2010), trade in
goods between the two countries (all commodities) is non-negligible compared to
trade with the countries’ largest trading partners (the EU of 27 for both countries)
and with the rest of the world. This may suggest that the impact of Austrian
and Hungarian macro variables on one another may be non-negligible as well (see
Section 4.3).
2. Austria and Hungary use different currencies (the Euro in Austria, the Forint in
Hungary) such that the nominal exchange rate of these two currencies typically
is not equal to 1. Besides PPI inflation rates, the nominal exchange rate then
constitutes an additional source for movements in the TOT.
3. If we neglect other countries in the analysis, we can isolate the impact Austrian
macro variables may have on Hungarian ones and vice versa.1
In this chapter, we want to compare the forecasting accuracy of the two-country
DSGE model from Chapter 2 and of several new variants thereof in terms of the RMSFE
with Bayesian and classical (vector) autoregressive benchmarks. In particular, we will
address the forecasting performance [1] of the original open-economy DSGE with PPI
inflation under the interest-rate rules, [2] of an open-economy DSGE with CPI inflation
under the interest-rate rules, [3] and of the closed-economy DSGE with CPI inflation
under the interest-rate rule that is nested in the open-economy structure. Consistently,
we employ open-economy as well as closed-economy benchmarks comprising different
vectors of endogenous variables.
Our hypothesis is the following: if the impact of economic interrelations between
Austria and Hungary were non-negligible, using open-economy models should add in-
1There are other studies on two neighboring countries within the EU that, e.g., explore the ef-
fects and transmission channels of macroeconomic shocks between these countries while neglecting the
remaining EU members (see Prettner & Kunst 2009 for the case of Austria and Germany).
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Table 4.1: Commodity trade of Austria and Hungary in 2008
Trade in goods Austria Hungary
Imports from the other country
(in per cent of imports 3.01% 7.10%
from the rest of the world)
Imports from the other country
(in per cent of imports 3.69% 9.04%
from the EU of 27)
Exports to the other country
(in per cent of exports 3.86% 5.61%
to the rest of the world)
Exports to the other country
(in per cent of exports 5.06% 6.26%
to the EU of 27)
formation to the forecasting procedure of the output gaps and CPI inflation rates, the
macro variables we are mostly interested in, so that those could be predicted more ac-
curately. These economic interrelations will be directly captured by movements in the
TOT and indirectly within the remaining variables. As the reader will see in Section
4.3, pairwise Granger causality tests already suggest that indeed preceding information
on some variables of one country should help to improve forecasting the variables of
central interest of the other.
As we will further see in Section 4.3, both Austrian and Hungarian variables are not
only positively correlated with one another, but are both strongly correlated with the
corresponding Euro area variables. Thus, distinctly Austrian time series cannot simply
be taken as proxies for Euro area time series.
For the short-run nominal interest rate and the currency of Austria we have to
rely on Euro area variables, anyway. By doing that, we can account for two things.
First, we can mitigate an omitted variable bias possibly caused by completely neglecting
the influence of Euro area variables, especially on the Austrian economy. Second, by
including Euro area variables we are able to capture some sort of rest of the world,
which the reader may expect to encounter in a typical small-open-economy analysis.
In addition to the different variants of the two-country DSGE model to be estimated
and forecasted with, there are some more differences to Chapter 3. We not only treat
a different pair of countries and, hence, use a different dataset, but also employ a
different calibration, which is based on Breuss & Rabitsch (2009) and is more likely
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to resemble plausible values for the structural parameters of the Austrian economy.
This time, we will concentrate on measuring forecasting accuracy with respect to rival
models. Since we only possess a small sample, we will keep the observations during the
economic and financial crisis for estimation and forecasting. Despite possible caveats
arising from this procedure, it may be interesting to see how well the variants of the
DSGE model are able to forecast in times of economic turmoil.
The main results of the analysis based on quarterly Eurostat and OECD data rang-
ing from 2000Q1 until 2009Q3 are summarized subsequently.
Bayesian and classically estimated (vector) autoregressive benchmarks deliver the
most accurate one-step-ahead forecasts in terms of the RMSFE for Austrian and Hun-
garian output gaps and CPI inflation rates with respect to the different variants of the
two-country DSGE model. However, the benchmarks cannot significantly outperform
the DSGE models. For three out of four variables (Austrian and Hungarian output
gaps, Hungarian CPI inflation) open-economy models perform best with respect to
other single forecasts.
If we additionally calculate various uniformly combined forecasts, again for three
out of four variables (Austrian and Hungarian output gaps, Austrian CPI inflation)
open-economy forecast combinations perform best with respect to other combined fore-
casts. In case of Austrian and Hungarian CPI inflation rates, the combined forecasts
perform better than their best single forecasts, where these two combined forecasts also
incorporate single DSGE forecasts.
Hence, we conclude that even if single DSGE forecasts were not able to deliver the
most accurate one-step-ahead forecasts, the additional information provided by these
forecasting models seems to be valuable for uniform forecast combination in case of
CPI inflation rates across countries. Since open-economy models deliver the lowest
RMSFE for three out of four variables across single and combined forecasts, taking
into account the non-negligible impact of economic interrelations between Austria and
Hungary indeed leads to a more accurate prediction of most of their macro variables. As
a consequence, applying the same forecasting models used here to calculate combined
forecasts of other pairs of regions within the EU or the US may be appealing for future
research.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 briefly outlines the
two-country DSGE model and introduces two new variants. Section 4.3 describes the
quarterly Eurostat and OECD data ranging from 2000Q1 until 2009Q3 to be used for
estimation and forecasting. Section 4.4 proceeds with calibration and prior distribu-
tions of the model parameters. Section 4.5 compares the forecast accuracy in terms
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of the RMSFE of out-of-sample one-step-ahead forecasts based on the variants of the
model with respect to several (B)(V)AR benchmarks and various uniformly combined
forecasts. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes. Additional tables are given in Appendix 4.7.
4.2 New variants of the DSGE model
For the reader’s convenience, we once again state the two-country DSGE model from
Chapters 2 and 3 in the following. Differing from the previous analysis and as mentioned
in Section 4.1, we now turn attention to the forecast accuracy of CPI inflation of both
countries under scrutiny. Therefore, we have to include equations (4.3) and (4.4), which
correspond to equations (2.54) and (2.55) from Chapter 2. e, e∗ again denote stationary
AR(1) measurement errors in spirit of Adolfson et al. (2007) as already introduced
for the TOT in Chapter 3.
The domestic country in the present case corresponds to Austria and the foreign
country, whose variables are indexed by superscript asterisks, corresponds to Hungary.
Besides that, all variables, parameters, and macroeconomic shocks are again defined as
in Chapters 2 and 3. One difference to the previous analysis is that from here onwards
we do not impose the a-priori restriction that the Austrian National Bank does not
react at all to the Austrian output gap, as can be seen in equation (4.7) by ι > 0.
xt = Et[xt+1] +
1
ρ
{Et[pit+1,H ]− iˆt}+ (n− 1)(ξρ− ξ)
(ξ + ρ)ρ
Et[∆tt+1] +
ξ + 1
ξ + ρ
Et[∆at+1], (4.1)
x∗t = Et[x
∗
t+1] +
1
ρ
{Et[pi∗t+1,F ]− iˆ∗t }+
n(ξρ− ξ)
(ξ + ρ)ρ
Et[∆tt+1] +
ξ + 1
ξ + ρ
Et[∆a
∗
t+1], (4.2)
pit = pit,H − (n− 1)∆tt + et, (4.3)
pi∗t = pi
∗
t,F − n∆tt + e∗t , (4.4)
pit,H = βEt[pit+1,H ] +
(1− δ)(1− δβ)(ρ+ ξ)
δ
xt + ut, (4.5)
pi∗t,F = βEt[pi
∗
t+1,F ] +
(1− δ∗)(1− δ∗β)(ρ+ ξ)
δ∗
x∗t + u
∗
t , (4.6)
iˆt = αpit,H + ιxt + ωiˆt−1 + vt, (4.7)
iˆ∗t = α
∗pi∗t,F + ι
∗x∗t + ω
∗iˆ∗t−1 + v
∗
t , (4.8)
∆tt = iˆt−1 − iˆ∗t−1 + pi∗t,F − pit,H + dt. (4.9)
In addition to the original model above, we introduce two new variants for estimation
and measurement of forecast accuracy.
First, we want to replace PPI by CPI inflation in the interest-rate rules (4.7) and
(4.8) and hence employ a CITR rather than a DITR (see Chapter 2 or Gal´ı & Mona-
celli 2005, p. 723). Since these equations stem from ad-hoc assumptions anyway, a
change in those variables does not alter the consistency of the rest of the model.
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Hence, for a CITR, equations (4.7) and (4.8) rearrange as follows:
iˆt = αpit + ιxt + ωiˆt−1 + vt,
iˆ∗t = α
∗pi∗t + ι
∗x∗t + ω
∗iˆ∗t−1 + v
∗
t .
Second, we notice that similar to Clarida et al. (2001) the closed-economy model of
Austria or Hungary, respectively, is incorporated in (4.1) to (4.9): if we set the country
size n = 1, the TOT effect in equation (4.1) disappears and the shock-free equation
(4.3) implies pi = piH .
Hence, for the closed economy the above model collapses to equations (4.1), (4.5),
and (4.7) once we have replaced PPI with CPI inflation:
xt = Et[xt+1] +
1
ρ
{Et[pit+1]− iˆt}+ ξ + 1
ξ + ρ
Et[∆at+1],
pit = βEt[pit+1] +
(1− δ)(1− δβ)(ρ+ ξ)
δ
xt + ut,
iˆt = αpit + ιxt + ωiˆt−1 + vt.
Altogether, we can now estimate and forecast with three different variants or four
different models.
• AUT/HUNPPI ,
• AUT/HUNHCPI ,
• AUTHCPI , and HUNHCPI .
4.3 Quarterly data for Austria and Hungary
Our sample of quarterly data for Austria and Hungary for the nine endogenous variables
ranges from 2000Q1 to 2009Q3 and only comprises 39 observations. The shortness of
the sample is due to the availability of PPI inflation rates for the Austrian economy.
The data are either taken from Eurostat (2010) (output gaps) or from OECD (2010)
(all other variables). More precisely, we use the subsequent time series.
• The Austrian and Hungarian output gaps x, x∗ are calculated from the natural
logarithm of the actual volume at constant prices of the respective seasonally and
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working-day adjusted GDP minus its Hodrick-Prescott filtered value.
• The Austrian and Hungarian CPI inflation rates pi, pi∗ are given by the percentage
change to the previous period of the harmonized consumer price indices.
• The Austrian and Hungarian PPI inflation rates piH , pi∗F are proxied by the per-
centage change to the previous period of the domestic producer price indices in
manufacturing. We again restrict ourselves to these prices since the model still
assumes that firms employ producer currency pricing and that only final goods
are produced and traded.
• The Austrian and Hungarian National Banks’ short-run nominal interest rates in
per cent per annum i, i∗ are proxied by the subsequent times series: the three-
month EURIBOR serving as official successor of the Vienna Interbank Offered
Rate (VIBOR) since January 1999 in case of i and the interest rate on unsecured
Hungarian Forint interbank lending transactions of three months’ duration in case
of i∗. Both interest rates have to be subtracted by their common annualized zero-
inflation steady-state value ≈ 0.04 before entering the DSGE estimation in order
to obtain the desired percentage-point deviations iˆ, iˆ∗ (see Section 4.4).
• Again, we have to calculate the TOT ∆t ourselves, which is done by employing
the subsequent formula ∆tt = ∆st + pi
∗
t,F − pit,H (see Chapters 2 and 3), where
∆st denotes the first difference of the natural logarithm of the monthly average
of the nominal exchange rate of Euro per Hungarian Forint.
Note that we are aware that the economic and financial crisis from 2007Q2 onwards
has affected Austria and Hungary, too. Differing from Chapter 3, however, we decide
to keep the observations after 2007Q1 in our sample because it already is very short.
Despite possible caveats arising from this procedure, it may be interesting to see how
well the variants of the DSGE model AUT/HUNPPI , AUT/HUNHCPI , AUTHCPI , and
HUNHCPI are able to forecast with respect to various benchmarks in times of economic
turmoil.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 below plot the variables of central interest for this chapter: Aus-
trian and Hungarian output gaps as well as CPI inflation rates. If we investigate Figure
4.1, we can conclude that due to the economic and financial crisis, both the Austrian
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(since 2009Q1) and the Hungarian (since 2008Q4) output gaps have been negative.
Taking a look at Figure 4.2, one can immediately see that Hungarian CPI inflation
has been notably higher and more volatile than its Austrian equivalent throughout the
sample and that CPI inflation in both countries follows some seasonal pattern.
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Figure 4.1: Austrian and Hungarian output gaps
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Figure 4.2: Austrian and Hungarian CPI inflation rates
103
As can be seen from Table 4.7 in Appendix 4.7, pairwise Granger causality tests
with four lags reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality for the subsequent
relationships (at least at the 10% significance level): x∗ → x, x → pi, x → iˆ,∆t →
x, x∗ → pi, x∗ → piH , x∗ → pi∗F , x∗ → iˆ, pi∗ → pi, pi → iˆ,∆t ↔ pi∗, iˆ → piH ,∆t → iˆ∗ with
↔ denoting a mutual causality, where cause and effect cannot be clearly distinguished.
Hence, the impact of Austrian and Hungarian macro variables on one another indeed
seems to be non-negligible in at least eight cases.
Tables 4.8 to 4.11 in Appendix 4.7 further show that not only Austrian and Hun-
garian variables are positively correlated with one another, but that both are strongly
correlated with their Euro area equivalents. The positive correlation of Hungarian with
Euro area variables is most prominent for the output gaps and PPI inflation rates, but
is also present for CPI inflation and nominal interest rates. In the case of Austrian vari-
ables, the correlation with Euro area variables is generally very high. The correlation
between Austrian and Euro area nominal interest rates, however, is perfect because we
employ the same time series.
Since Hungarian variables themselves are often highly correlated with Euro area
variables, Austrian times series cannot be simply interpreted as proxies for Euro area
time series. Nonetheless, the use of Euro area time series for some of the Austrian
variables (Euro area nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate of Euro per
Hungarian Forint to calculate the TOT) should mitigate an omitted variable bias, which
we would possibly face when completely ignoring Euro area variables.
4.4 Calibration and estimation
Before we assess the forecasting performance of the four models, we first have to cal-
ibrate and estimate them using the same Bayesian techniques as laid out in Chapter
3.2 The calibration itself, however, will be somewhat different and is based on Breuss
& Rabitsch (2009, pp. 139-144) for both countries. Hence, α = α∗ etc. Concerning
the choice of fixed parameter values as well as prior means and standard deviations for
their DSGE model of Austria, these authors are guided by previous studies on New
Keynesian models, e.g. Smets & Wouters (2003).
In order to tie in with most of the existing literature we choose to keep those
parameters fixed that are said to be weakly identified, i.e. the parameters stemming
from the utility function (2.1): β = 0.99, ρ = 0.67, ξ = 1.5. As before, β = 0.99
2Note that again all computations associated with Bayesian inference are again carried out using
the Dynare preprocessor for Matlab. All other computations are performed in EViews.
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implies zero-inflation steady-state nominal and real interest rates of approximately 4%
per annum for both countries. Since country size is not an economic parameter, we
fix it to n = 0.45, which roughly corresponds to the population of Austria relative to
Hungary in 2008 if the world were just made up of these two countries (Austria: approx.
8.3 million inhabitants, Hungary: approx. 10.0 million inhabitants, see OECD 2010).
The sensitivity of the central banks towards the current output gaps is also fixed to
ι = ι∗ = 0.2 since we only possess a small sample. In consequence, we use the prior
PDFs given in Table 4.2 below for the remaining parameters according to their domain
as implied by economic theory (see Chapter 3).
Table 4.2: Prior information
Parameter Domain Prior PDF Mean Std. Dev.
δ [0, 1) Beta 0.6 0.15
α (−∞,+∞) Normal 1.7 0.15
ω [0, 1) Beta 0.8 0.05
ζa [0, 1) Beta 0.8 0.05
ζe [0, 1) Beta 0.8 0.05
ζu [0, 1) Beta 0.8 0.05
ζv [0, 1) Beta 0.8 0.05
ζd [0, 1) Beta 0.8 0.05
σηa [0,+∞) Inv. Gamma-1 0.1 +∞
σηe [0,+∞) Inv. Gamma-1 0.1 +∞
σηu [0,+∞) Inv. Gamma-1 0.1 +∞
σηv [0,+∞) Inv. Gamma-1 0.1 +∞
σηd [0,+∞) Inv. Gamma-1 0.1 +∞
Bayesian estimation is carried out by employing the MH algorithm. The only dif-
ference to Chapter 3 is that we have to set mh_jscale=0.1 in case of AUT/HUNHCPI
to obtain a reasonable acceptance probability of 25% for each of the runs of MH simu-
lations.3
4.5 Measuring forecast accuracy
Differing from Chapter 3, we are only interested in forecasting the output gaps x, x∗
and CPI inflation rates pi, pi∗. We evaluate the forecasting performance of the one-step-
3Estimation results (posterior means and standard deviations, graphs of posterior PDFs) and con-
vergence results of the five parallel MCMCs for each of the models comparable to Chapter 3 are not
reported here but are available on request.
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ahead predictor for 2008Q4, 2009Q1, 2009Q2, and 2009Q3 so that each of the four
training sets (2000Q1-2008Q3, 2000Q2-2008Q4, 2000Q3-2009Q1, and 2000Q4-2009Q2)
comprises 35 observations.
Besides the four DSGE models AUT/HUNPPI , AUT/HUNHCPI , AUTHCPI , and
HUNHCPI , we will estimate and forecast with several multivariate (B)VAR and also
univariate AR benchmarks with ad-hoc lag length of p = 1 (see, e.g., Smets &
Wouters 2004, p. 847, Adolfson et al. 2007, p. 309, or Pichler 2008, p. 19
for other articles using (B)VAR benchmarks with ad-hoc lag order).4 Since we want
to investigate whether taking into account the economic interrelations between the two
countries can improve the predictive accuracy of their output gaps and CPI inflation
rates, we consistently employ closed- and open-economy (vector) autoregressive bench-
marks as done, e.g., by Adolfson et al. (2007, p. 306).
We distinguish the forecasts based on classically estimated VARs using OLS from
those that are estimated in a Bayesian fashion since the latter may constitute a more
natural benchmark for DSGEs as they use similar estimation techniques. Moreover,
unrestricted VARs may be overparameterized and, hence, may perform poorly in out-
of-sample forecasting (see Smets & Wouters 2007, p. 595). For BVAR estimation
and forecasting we employ the Minnesota prior, an informative prior developed by
Doan et al. (1984) for an otherwise unconstrained VAR with intercept. For further
details on the Minnesota prior see, e.g., Bauwens et al. (1999, pp. 269-272).
Thus, we employ the subsequent closed- and open-economy benchmarks (all with
lag order p = 1).
• AR(x), AR(x∗), AR(pi), AR(pi∗),
• (B)V AR(x, pi), (B)V AR(x∗, pi∗),
• (B)V AR(x, pi, piH), (B)V AR(x∗, pi∗, pi∗F ),
• (B)V AR(x, pi, iˆ), (B)V AR(x∗, pi∗, iˆ∗),
• (B)V AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗),
4For the generic VAR(p) model see equation (3.15) in Chapter 3.
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• (B)V AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗, piH , pi∗F ), and
• (B)V AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗, iˆ, iˆ∗).
Since the MAFE (usually) delivers qualitatively similar results as the RMSFE (see
Chapter 3), this time we concentrate on the RMSFE as the only quantitative measure of
forecast accuracy. Results of single forecasts are summarized in Table 4.3 below, where
the smallest RMSFE values for the single variables are given in boldface numbers.
Table 4.3: RMSFE of single forecasts
Model x x∗ pi pi∗
AUT/HUNPPI 0.0182 0.0240 0.0420 0.0258
AUT/HUNHCPI 0.1055 0.1579 0.0424 0.0283
AUTHCPI , HUNHCPI 0.0178 0.0239 0.0050 0.0166
AR(x), AR(x∗), AR(pi), AR(pi∗) 0.0174 0.0204 0.0045 0.0113
V AR(x, pi), V AR(x∗, pi∗) 0.0179 0.0204 0.0071 0.0102
V AR(x, pi, piH), V AR(x
∗, pi∗, pi∗F ) 0.0176 0.0201 0.0074 0.0099
V AR(x, pi, iˆ), V AR(x∗, pi∗, iˆ∗) 0.0167 0.0210 0.0069 0.0129
V AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗) 0.0161 0.0180 0.0071 0.0107
V AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗, piH , pi∗F ) 0.0167 0.0181 0.0076 0.0099
V AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗, iˆ, iˆ∗) 0.0161 0.0185 0.0071 0.0137
BV AR(x, pi), BV AR(x∗, pi∗) 0.0177 0.0205 0.0059 0.0109
BV AR(x, pi, piH), BV AR(x
∗, pi∗, pi∗F ) 0.0170 0.0200 0.0065 0.0115
BV AR(x, pi, iˆ), BV AR(x∗, pi∗, iˆ∗) 0.0172 0.0212 0.0058 0.0129
BV AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗) 0.0160 0.0208 0.0065 0.0107
BV AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗, piH , pi∗F ) 0.0156 0.0201 0.0066 0.0104
BV AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗, iˆ, iˆ∗) 0.0161 0.0217 0.0073 0.0095
Regarding single forecasts, we can conclude that BV AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗, piH , pi∗F ) deliv-
ers the highest forecast accuracy for x, V AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗) for x∗, AR(pi) for pi, and
BV AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗, iˆ, iˆ∗) for pi∗. Thus, Bayesian and classically estimated benchmarks
outperform the DSGE models in two cases each. The DSGE AUT/HUNHCPI deliv-
ers particularly high RMSFEs for the forecasts of the Austrian and Hungarian output
gaps. However, for three out of four variables, open-economy models are preferred over
closed-economy models.
In order to check whether the forecasting model characterized by the lowest RMSFE
per variable can significantly outperform the four DSGE models, we again employ DM
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tests (see Chapter 3). Significance at the 10% level would again be indicated by (∗),
at the 5% level by (∗∗), and at the 1% level by (∗∗∗). Nonetheless, as we see from
Table 4.4, none of the autoregressive benchmarks delivers significantly more accurate
forecasts than the four DSGE models, not even with respect to AUT/HUNHCPI .
Table 4.4: DM test statistics of single forecasts
Variable Models under comparison DM test statistic One-sided p-value
x BV AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗, piH , pi∗F ) vs. AUT/HUNPPI -0.6744 0.2500
BV AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗, piH , pi∗F ) vs. AUT/HUNHCPI -0.9167 0.1798
BV AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗, piH , pi∗F ) vs. AUTHCPI -0.6289 0.2647
x∗ V AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗) vs. AUT/HUNPPI -1.0141 0.1553
V AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗) vs. AUT/HUNHCPI -0.7749 0.2192
V AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗) vs. HUNHCPI -0.9989 0.1589
pi AR(pi) vs. AUT/HUNPPI -1.0153 0.1550
AR(pi) vs. AUT/HUNHCPI -1.1024 0.1351
AR(pi) vs. AUTHCPI -0.1137 0.4547
pi∗ BV AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗, iˆ, iˆ∗) vs. AUT/HUNPPI -0.7923 0.2141
BV AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗, iˆ, iˆ∗) vs. AUT/HUNHCPI -0.6771 0.2492
BV AR(x, x∗, pi, pi∗, iˆ, iˆ∗) vs. HUNHCPI -0.6245 0.2661
Similar to Chapter 3, we calculate the RMSFE of various uniformly combined fore-
casts. Besides a combined forecast across all forecasting models, we calculate com-
bined forecasts across DSGE models, (V)AR benchmarks, BVAR benchmarks, closed-
economy models, and open-economy models.
• COMBALL,
• COMBDSGE, COMBV AR, COMBBV AR,
• COMBCLOSED, and COMBOPEN .
Results of combined forecasts are given in Table 4.5 below, where the smallest RMSFE
values for the single variables are again given in boldface numbers.
Observing Table 4.5 we can conclude that with COMBBV AR, COMBV AR, and
COMBALL for three out of four variables (x, x
∗, pi) combinations including open-economy
forecasts are preferred. Only for pi∗ the purely closed-economy combined forecast
COMBCLOSED outperforms the other combinations. Moreover, with COMBALL and
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Table 4.5: RMSFE of combined forecasts
Model x x∗ pi pi∗
COMBALL 0.0184 0.0202 0.0038 0.0107
COMBDSGE 0.0406 0.0525 0.0269 0.0143
COMBV AR 0.0166 0.0195 0.0066 0.0108
COMBBV AR 0.0166 0.0207 0.0062 0.0109
COMBCLOSED 0.0173 0.0208 0.0056 0.0094
COMBOPEN 0.0209 0.0240 0.0078 0.0130
COMBCLOSED two combinations incorporating single DSGE forecasts deliver the low-
est RMSFEs among combined forecasts for Austrian and Hungarian CPI inflation rates.
Their RMSFEs are even lower than the ones of the single forecasts. Since single DSGE
forecasts are not significantly worse than the single most accurate forecasts per vari-
able, the additional information provided by the DSGEs as forecasting models seems
to be valuable for uniform forecast combination in case of CPI inflation rates across
countries.
Table 4.6 once again summarizes the results, where boldface letters denote the most
accurate model type across single and combined forecasts.
Table 4.6: Model type with lowest RMSFE across forecast types
Forecast type x x∗ pi pi∗
Single forecast Open-economy Open-economy Closed-economy Open-economy
Combined forecast Open-economy Open-economy Open-economy Closed-economy
(including DSGE (including DSGE
forecasts) forecasts)
4.6 Concluding remarks
In summary, Bayesian and classically estimated (vector) autoregressive benchmarks de-
liver the most accurate one-step-ahead forecasts in terms of the RMSFE for Austrian
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and Hungarian output gaps and CPI inflation rates with respect to the different vari-
ants of the two-country DSGE model. However, the benchmarks cannot significantly
outperform the DSGE models. For three out of four variables (Austrian and Hungarian
output gaps, Hungarian CPI inflation) open-economy models perform best with respect
to other single forecasts.
If we additionally calculate various uniformly combined forecasts, again for three
out of four variables (Austrian and Hungarian output gaps, Austrian CPI inflation)
open-economy forecast combinations perform best with respect to other combined fore-
casts. In case of Austrian and Hungarian CPI inflation rates, the combined forecasts
perform better than their best single forecasts, where these two combined forecasts also
incorporate single DSGE forecasts.
Hence, we conclude that even if single DSGE forecasts were not able to deliver the
most accurate one-step-ahead forecasts, the additional information provided by these
forecasting models seems to be valuable for uniform forecast combination in case of
CPI inflation rates across countries. Since open-economy models deliver the lowest
RMSFE for three out of four variables across single and combined forecasts, taking
into account the non-negligible impact of economic interrelations between Austria and
Hungary indeed leads to a more accurate prediction of most of their macro variables. As
a consequence, applying the same forecasting models used here to calculate combined
forecasts of other pairs of regions within the EU or the US may be appealing for future
research.
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4.7 Appendix to Chapter 4
Table 4.7: Pairwise Granger causality tests
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Date: 06/02/10 Time: 08:06
Sample: 2000Q1 2009Q3
Lags: 4
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.
X HUN does not Granger Cause X AUT 35 2.96761 0.0382
X AUT does not Granger Cause X HUN 1.03371 0.4087
HCPI AUT does not Granger Cause X AUT 35 0.23210 0.9178
X AUT does not Granger Cause HCPI AUT 2.74571 0.0498
HCPI HUN does not Granger Cause X AUT 35 0.06997 0.9905
X AUT does not Granger Cause HCPI HUN 0.23346 0.9170
PPI AUT does not Granger Cause X AUT 35 0.58883 0.6736
X AUT does not Granger Cause PPI AUT 1.61914 0.1994
PPI HUN does not Granger Cause X AUT 35 0.87749 0.4909
X AUT does not Granger Cause PPI HUN 0.86591 0.4975
I AUT does not Granger Cause X AUT 35 0.36359 0.8322
X AUT does not Granger Cause I AUT 4.33248 0.0081
I HUN does not Granger Cause X AUT 35 1.50376 0.2301
X AUT does not Granger Cause I HUN 0.71984 0.5862
TOT does not Granger Cause X AUT 35 3.00933 0.0364
X AUT does not Granger Cause TOT 1.32083 0.2885
HCPI AUT does not Granger Cause X HUN 35 0.55628 0.6963
X HUN does not Granger Cause HCPI AUT 7.77885 0.0003
HCPI HUN does not Granger Cause X HUN 35 0.16799 0.9527
X HUN does not Granger Cause HCPI HUN 0.34927 0.8421
PPI AUT does not Granger Cause X HUN 35 0.61837 0.6534
X HUN does not Granger Cause PPI AUT 2.87582 0.0426
PPI HUN does not Granger Cause X HUN 35 1.21646 0.3278
X HUN does not Granger Cause PPI HUN 3.38574 0.0234
I AUT does not Granger Cause X HUN 35 1.55229 0.2166
X HUN does not Granger Cause I AUT 3.56339 0.0191
I HUN does not Granger Cause X HUN 35 0.67583 0.6148
X HUN does not Granger Cause I HUN 0.15053 0.9611
TOT does not Granger Cause X HUN 35 0.53434 0.7117
X HUN does not Granger Cause TOT 0.96118 0.4453
HCPI HUN does not Granger Cause HCPI AUT 35 2.97913 0.0377
HCPI AUT does not Granger Cause HCPI HUN 1.25700 0.3120
PPI AUT does not Granger Cause HCPI AUT 35 1.08477 0.3845
HCPI AUT does not Granger Cause PPI AUT 2.07903 0.1125
PPI HUN does not Granger Cause HCPI AUT 35 1.99800 0.1244
HCPI AUT does not Granger Cause PPI HUN 1.90893 0.1390
I AUT does not Granger Cause HCPI AUT 35 1.26433 0.3092
HCPI AUT does not Granger Cause I AUT 2.24004 0.0922
I HUN does not Granger Cause HCPI AUT 35 0.24259 0.9115
HCPI AUT does not Granger Cause I HUN 0.80910 0.5307
TOT does not Granger Cause HCPI AUT 35 0.22060 0.9245
HCPI AUT does not Granger Cause TOT 0.97802 0.4366
PPI AUT does not Granger Cause HCPI HUN 35 0.22803 0.9202
HCPI HUN does not Granger Cause PPI AUT 0.76227 0.5593
PPI HUN does not Granger Cause HCPI HUN 35 0.92343 0.4654
HCPI HUN does not Granger Cause PPI HUN 1.08073 0.3863
I AUT does not Granger Cause HCPI HUN 35 0.73397 0.5771
HCPI HUN does not Granger Cause I AUT 1.04150 0.4049
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I HUN does not Granger Cause HCPI HUN 35 0.90426 0.4759
HCPI HUN does not Granger Cause I HUN 0.36069 0.8342
TOT does not Granger Cause HCPI HUN 35 3.54359 0.0195
HCPI HUN does not Granger Cause TOT 4.44540 0.0072
PPI HUN does not Granger Cause PPI AUT 35 1.49548 0.2325
PPI AUT does not Granger Cause PPI HUN 0.15134 0.9607
I AUT does not Granger Cause PPI AUT 35 3.42068 0.0225
PPI AUT does not Granger Cause I AUT 1.91515 0.1379
I HUN does not Granger Cause PPI AUT 35 0.74098 0.5727
PPI AUT does not Granger Cause I HUN 1.01166 0.4195
TOT does not Granger Cause PPI AUT 35 1.70936 0.1782
PPI AUT does not Granger Cause TOT 0.41357 0.7972
I AUT does not Granger Cause PPI HUN 35 2.06504 0.1145
PPI HUN does not Granger Cause I AUT 2.15964 0.1018
I HUN does not Granger Cause PPI HUN 35 0.65340 0.6297
PPI HUN does not Granger Cause I HUN 1.00472 0.4230
TOT does not Granger Cause PPI HUN 35 0.42216 0.7912
PPI HUN does not Granger Cause TOT 0.80469 0.5334
I HUN does not Granger Cause I AUT 35 0.42295 0.7906
I AUT does not Granger Cause I HUN 1.97327 0.1283
TOT does not Granger Cause I AUT 35 1.95685 0.1309
I AUT does not Granger Cause TOT 0.60899 0.6598
TOT does not Granger Cause I HUN 35 2.40672 0.0752
I HUN does not Granger Cause TOT 0.46917 0.7578
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Table 4.8: Correlation of output gaps
x xEURO x∗
x 1.000000 0.805056 0.782258
xEURO 0.805056 1.000000 0.689072
x∗ 0.782258 0.689072 1.000000
Table 4.9: Correlation of CPI inflation rates
pi piEURO pi∗
pi 1.000000 0.728417 0.488245
piEURO 0.728417 1.000000 0.394072
pi∗ 0.488245 0.394072 1.000000
Table 4.10: Correlation of PPI inflation rates
piH pi
EURO
PPI pi
∗
F
piH 1.000000 0.857666 0.614582
piEUROPPI 0.857666 1.000000 0.701888
pi∗F 0.614582 0.701888 1.000000
Table 4.11: Correlation of nominal interest rates
iˆ iˆEURO iˆ∗
iˆ 1.000000 1.000000 0.554328
iˆEURO 1.000000 1.000000 0.554328
iˆ∗ 0.554328 0.554328 1.000000
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Abstract
Besides an introductory chapter, the present dissertation entitled Monetary DSGE Models of
Two Countries: Set-Up, Estimation, and Forecasting Performance is divided into three more
chapters.
In Chapter 2, we develop a two-country DSGE model and investigate what are the
implications of diverging interest-rate rules on key macroeconomic variables of the EU and
the US in terms of impulse responses. We find that positive realizations of all types of
disturbances have a negative impact on output of both economies. Expansionary monetary
policy shocks always have a prosper thyself and beggar thy neighbor effect. Moreover, we
find that if the ECB implemented the interest-rate rule proposed in this chapter, it would
encounter lower fluctuations in EU PPI inflation compared to an interest-rate rule as proposed
for the Fed. This is consistent with the ECB’s paramount objective of price stability.
In Chapter 3, we estimate and forecast with the two-country DSGE model developed in
Chapter 2 and a VAR model using Euro area and US data. We find that the estimated DSGE
model qualitatively reproduces most of the findings of the calibrated one from Chapter 2.
Estimating the VAR does not yield the identical causal relationships as implied by the DSGE
and impulse responses based on the VAR sometimes differ from the ones based on the DSGE.
Both models as well as some extrapolation benchmark are not able to predict the severeness
or, at least, the evolution of the economic and financial crisis. Finally, we obtain the result
that the accuracy of one-step-ahead DSGE forecasts can compete well with the accuracy of
VAR, extrapolation, and uniformly combined forecasts in times of regular economic activity.
In Chapter 4, we shift the focus to Austria and Hungary. We compare the forecasting
accuracy of closed- and open-economy variants of the DSGE model from Chapter 2 for four
variables with respect to closed- and open-economy Bayesian and classical (V)AR bench-
marks. We obtain the result that these benchmarks deliver the most accurate one-step-ahead
forecasts, but cannot significantly outperform the DSGE models. For three out of four vari-
ables open-economy models perform best with respect to other single forecasts. If we calculate
uniformly combined forecasts, we obtain similar results. Even if single DSGE forecasts were
not able to deliver the most accurate one-step-ahead forecasts, this additional information is
important for uniform forecast combination for two of the four variables. Taking into account
the economic interrelations between Austria and Hungary by using open-economy models
leads to a more accurate prediction of most of their macro variables in general.
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Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation mit dem Titel Monetary DSGE Models of Two Countries: Set-
Up, Estimation, and Forecasting Performance beinhaltet neben einem einleitenden noch drei
weitere Kapitel.
InKapitel 2 entwickeln wir ein Zwei-La¨nder-DSGE-Modell und untersuchen die Auswirkun-
gen von divergierenden Zinssatzregeln auf wichtige makroo¨konomische Variablen der EU und
der USA in Form von Impuls-Antwort-Funktionen. Positive Realisierungen aller Arten von
Schocks haben einen negativen Einfluss auf den Output beider Volkswirtschaften. Expansive
geldpolitische Schocks haben immer einen Prosper-thyself - bzw. Beggar-thy-neighbor -Effekt.
Des Weiteren erhalten wir das Ergebnis, dass sich die EZB im Falle der fu¨r sie vorgeschlagenen
Zinssatzregel einer geringeren Produzentenpreisindex-Inflationsrate gegenu¨ber sieht, als es fu¨r
eine Zinssatzregel der Fall wa¨re, wie sie fu¨r die Fed vorgeschlagen wird. Dies ist konsistent
mit dem vorrangigen Ziel der Preisniveaustabilita¨t der EZB.
In Kapitel 3 scha¨tzen wir das Zwei-La¨nder-DSGE-Modell aus Kapitel 2, sowie ein VAR-
Modell, indem wir US-amerikanische und Euroraum-Daten verwenden. Das gescha¨tze DSGE-
Modell repliziert die Mehrzahl der Ergebnisse des kalibrierten Modells aus Kapitel 2. Das
gescha¨tze VAR impliziert nicht immer dieselben Kausalzusammenha¨nge wie das DSGE und
auch die Impuls-Antwort-Funktionen basierend auf dem VAR weichen manchmal von den auf
dem DSGE basierenden ab. Beide Modelle, sowie ein extrapolatives Benchmark, sind nicht
in der Lage, die Scha¨rfe der Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise oder zumindest deren Entwick-
lung vorherzusagen. Unter normalen o¨konomischen Rahmenbedingungen weist das DSGE bei
einperiodigem Prognosehorizont jedoch eine recht gute Prognosegu¨te im Vergleich zu VAR-,
extrapolativen und einheitlich kombinierten Prognosen auf.
In Kapitel 4 verlagern wir unser Hauptaugenmerk auf O¨sterreich und Ungarn. Wir un-
tersuchen die Prognosegu¨te von Varianten des DSGE-Modells geschlossener und offener Volk-
swirtschaften fu¨r vier Variablen in Bezug auf bayesianische und klassische (V)AR-Benchmarks
geschlossener und offener Volkswirtschaften. Diese Benchmarks liefern die besten Prognosen
bei einperiodigem Prognosehorizont, sind jedoch nicht signifikant besser als die Prognosen
des DSGE-Modells. Im Falle einzelner Prognosen sind fu¨r drei von vier Variablen Mod-
elle offener Volkswirtschaften genauer. Im Falle einheitlich kombinierter Prognosen erhalten
wir a¨hnliche Ergebnisse. Obwohl einzelne DSGE-Prognosen nicht die besten einperiodigen
Prognosen liefern, ist diese zusa¨tzliche Information wichtig fu¨r die Berechnung einheitlich
kombinierter Prognosen fu¨r zwei der vier Variablen. Im Allgemeinen tra¨gt das Einbeziehen
der volkswirtschaftlichen Verflechtungen zwischen O¨sterreich und Ungarn durch Verwendung
von Modellen offener Volkswirtschaften dazu bei, die Mehrzahl ihrer Makrovariablen genauer
zu prognostizieren.
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